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Preface 
This report is the result of a generous grant that my supervisor Henrik Secher-Marcussen 
suggested  that I apply  for  in  1995  at  the SEREIN Research  Programme,  financed  by  the  Council 
for  Development  Research  in  Denmark.  After  working  for  two  years  on  a  UNDP  project  trying 
to  implement  a  national  plan  for the sustainable use of natural  resources  in  Guinea-Bissau, I felt 
a  strongly  motivated  to  get  involved  into  research  on  why  things  kept  going  wrong.  This  provided 
an excellent  opportunity. 
Many  people  have  supported  me  in  what  turned  out to be a  “tremendous  challenge” to use a 
development euphemism. In particular, my SEREIN colleagues at RUC, Henrik Secher- 
Marcussen  and  Christian  Lund, have been  extremely  supportive.  Henrik has followed my  work 
at  close  range  (or  as close as I would  let  him),  and  has  been  very  accessible  and  suggestive.  He 
has  equally  been  remarkably  understanding  when  deadlines  were  not met, advice  not  followed 
etc. I hope  he  does  not  regret  this  now  that  the  product  is  finished.  Christian  has  likewise  been 
extremely  helpful  in  a  very  encouraging  way,  for  apparently no other  reason  than  genuine  interest 
in what I was  doing  and  colleagial  spirit. 
In  Burkina  Faso I would  especially  like  to  thank Saada Barry from Dori  who  proved to be  the 
ideal  interpreter  and  discussion  partner  during  my Seno fieldwork.  His  remarkable  understanding 
of where I wanted to get to was  quite  astonishing.  Equally,  Yolande  Lingani  proved  a serious and 
skilful  partner  in  Boulgou  Province, and  diligently  undertook a difficult  village  survey  in my 
absence  during  the  hottest  months  of  1997. 
I also  owe  thanks to the  all  the  people of IDS at  RUC,  the  environment in building  5.1.  was in fact 
very  inspiring,  something  that I have only  learned to appreciate  fully  now  that I have  left  it.  At 
my  new office at  the  Centre  for  Development  Research, I have  been  given  the  ideal  circum- 
stances  to  finish the dissertation. In this  respect, S t en  Folke  has  been  especially  supportive  and 
understanding. 
Finally I would  like  to  express my thanks to my  parents  for  their  ardent  support  in  taking  care  of 
our children, especially during the long afternoons at the office. Kasper and Peter are the 
enthusiastic  witnesses  and  proof  of  what an excellent job they have done. 
The sine qua non of the  whole  affair  is, of course,  Kristine. In a sense it is  ridiculous to say 
“without you, I would  never  have  made it”, because I would  not  even have started,  everything 
would  probably  have  been  a  terrible  mess. 
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Introduction 
In the  cool  reception  hall of the  Hotel  Independence, the favourite hangout  in  Ouagadougou for 
development  consultants,  researchers  and  the  like, I once ran into  a fellow countryman. He 
agreeably  presented  himself as a  professor in bio-chemistry,  heading an ENRECA-research 
support  programme  running in Burkina  Faso  and  Ghana.  The  research  centred  around 
fermentation  processes  in soumbalu, the  seeds of the Parkia BigEobosa -tree,  traditionally  used 
as a  taste  enhancer  in  sauces,  a  common  and  widespread,  but  economically  rather  insignificant 
plant.  Rather  bluntly I asked  him  what  was o interesting  about soumbula, knowing  only  too  well 
the  economic  implications of running an  ENRECA-programme.  He  explained that the sounbala 
was  threatened by the imported MAGGI-cube,  and that support  to  the soumbalu was therefore 
desirable:  As  this  was  a local product, it would  be better for Burkina Faso’s development. 
I have no reason  to  doubt he scientific  quality of the research of this  ENRECA-programme,  nor 
do I have the qualifications  to do so. What I find interesting is that  in Burkina Faso, rather 
esoteric research into the  fermentation  processes of rather  insignificant plants is justified by 
referring  to  the  country’s  development. 
This dissertation delves into what  this  development  in  Burkina  Faso  is  about. I prefer  writing 
development  without  the  citation  marks  that  many  anthropologists  (Ferguson 1990, Gould 1997) 
use  to  distance  themselves from the  concept.  This is not  because I feel  particularly  comfortable 
with this very normative and in many ways highly problematic concept, but it is because 
refraining from the  quotation  forces  the  writer o make  up  his  mind  how he defines  development. 
Development  in  Burkina Faso is strangely  omnipresent.  It is even  mixed  up  in the fermentation 
processes of soumbaEa. 
As I will  try to show  in  the  following  chapters,  development is an  important  business, and it is 
an issue  which  triggers off competition,  positioning  and  conflict  over  the  political,  economic  and 
symbolic  resources  which are at  stake.  Many of the  struggles  and  failures of development,  I  shall 
argue, stem  from the fact that  there  are  conflicting  interpretations of what this special  kind of 
social  transformation  means.  It  is,  thus,  a  very  serious  and  important  political issue in a country 
like  Burkina  Faso,  which  merits  sociological  and  anthropological  attention.  As I will  try  to  show 
in the  coming  chapters,  development  is the single  most  important  dynamic of a  specific  modernity 
which  is  produced. 
Anthropologists have always been a little scared of and arrogant towards the development 
apparatus. This can be explained in terms of a reasonable wariness towards development 
projects and other forms of intervention, where anthropologists, with an often much more 
profound  knowledge of Sahelian  societies,  have  been  able  to  foresee  that  local  customs  or  power 
relations  would  constitute  major  obstacles  to  the  anticipated  running of the development  projects. 
Certain  anthropologists  have,  however,  equally  been  critical  towards  development, as this  has 
been  seen as a  type of modernity,  which  would  not be good for the  “beneficiary  groups”. This 
type  of  attitude  can be divided into  two  categories. First, certain  anthropologists  “take sides” in 
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conflicts  over  development, for instance, when  local  people’s  rights  and  access  to  their r sources 
are threatened by development intervention. Second, the anthropologist sometimes sees the 
development process as perilous to the culture, lifestyle and  production  system of the group of 
people  he/she  has  grown  to  sympathize  with. The latter  approach is however  likely  to resemble 
conservationists’ views;  there is a  risk  that the anthropologist  sees for instance certain ethnic 
groups or cultures as “endangered  species”  threatened by development. 
It is, therefore,  very fortunate that increased  interest in  development as a  research domain for 
anthropologists and  sociologists  has  emerged  in  recent  years.  The  problem  with this kind  of 
research is that if it becomes  instrumental, if it turns  into  “applied  research”,  the  anthropolo- 
gisthociologist becomes  the  team  member  on  the  development  project  appraisal  mission,  tackling 
the  “human  dimension”,  assuring  that the engineer’s  development  solution  becomes applicable, 
finding the “cultural constraints”, and  providing  tips as to how  these  can  be  overcome. 
Olivier  de  Sardan  (1995)  proposes  a  fundamentally  methodological  definition  of development, 
allowing certain research  paths,  and  not  limiting  ourselves  to  normative  trajectories  of asking 
whether this or that social  change is development,  underdevelopment,  unequal development, 
development from above, below, within, or whether there is an unfortunate absence of 
development.  Development  must  be  seen as “a series of  social  processes  induced through external 
actors  or  institutions,  but by mobilizing  the  society  being  developed  and  by  forging external and 
local resources, techniques and knowledge” (Olivier de Sardan 1995, my translation). This 
definition permits an analysis of development as a  form of social  change  largely initiated from 
the  outside,  social  transformations  based  upon  foreign  finance,  ideology  and  knowledge, a salient 
feature of Sahelian countries like Burkina Faso  where  development aid makes  up  an alarming 
percentage  of  the  countries’  economies. 
Development  institutions, as central  mechanisms for resource  allocation,  become central arenas 
of conflict  over  the  very  considerable  means that are  at  stake,  often for purposes  that are not the 
vital priorities of the social actors involved. What Olivier de Sardan terms “the socio- 
anthropology of development  and  social  change”  is,  therefore,  specifically  concerned  with the
analysis of the interactions of different  social  actors  coming from different  cultures  (Culture  seen 
as a construction which is constantly  subject  to  relentless  syncretisms  and  symbolic struggles). 
This non-nonnative definition of development  allows us to  see  development first and foremost 
as an object of study. 
This socio-anthropology is understood by Olivier de Sardan as “1’Ctude empirique, multi- 
dimensionelle de groupes sociaux contemporains  et  de  leurs  interactions,  dans  une perspective 
diachronique, et combinant  l’analyse  des  pratiques et celle  des  repr6sentations”. (Olivier de 
Sardan 1995, p. 10) It  thus  differentiates  itself rom a  quantitative  sociology  and essayistic and 
speculative anthropology, emphasizing in situ empirical  research.  And  the reason why 
development  projects  are  such  appropriate  objects of study  is  that  the  encounter of the different 
social logics which  constitute  a  rather  complex  social  phenomenon,  often  ignored by decision 
makers, is presented  to  the  researcher  in  a  coherent  form  within  such  projects. 
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Contesting  development 
There is a strange paradox  inherent in the way development  intervention in the form of aid is 
performed  in  Africa. The mad Kurtz, lost  in  the  Heart  of  Darkness  of the Congolese jungle, had, 
despite his  madness  and  megalomania,  “beguiled  beyond  the  bounds of permitted  aspirations”, 
seen  the difficulties of the uneven  nature of the  historically  developed  relationship  between  the 
white  and the black proclaiming  that  “we  whites must  necessarily  appear  to them in the nature 
of  supernatural  beings-  we  approach  them  with  the  might as  of a  deity”  (Conrad  1983  (1902)). 
The fact  that he said  this  in order to  legitimize  atrocious  behaviour is another  matter. 
Marcel Mauss, in his seminal study of gifts some 25 years later, was equally aware of the 
devastating power of the rich  intruder  stating  that  “charity  wounds him who  receives,  and our 
whole  moral  effort is directed  towards  suppressing  the  unconscious  harmful  patronage of the  rich 
almoner”  (Mauss  1967  (first  ed.  1925), p. 63).  Even  nowadays,  anthropologists  describe  how  the 
rapacity of international  business  has  led  Africans  to  fear  the  cannibalistic inclinations of the 
whites  by  virtue  of  their  gluttonous  appetite  for  meat  and  their  mastery  of  the  technology  of  blood 
transfusion, suggesting  that  Europeans  wield  supernatural nd  dangerous  powers  (Comaroff & 
Comaroff, 1993  p. xxiv). All examples of the  extreme  unevenness  characterizing the Europe- 
adAfrican interface. 
Within  current  development  discourse,  this  unevenness is commonly  overlooked,  and  developers 
are  often  surprisingly oblivious to the way  their  interventions  are  subject  to  what  they consider 
to be misinterpretations.  Development  assistance  is based on “partnership”, adopting 
“participatory  approaches”  in  order for the beneficiaries  to  obtain  “self-reliance”.  Old  modes of 
domination  based  on  reciprocity,  exchanges of gifts  and  women etc. are  ignored  and  replaced  with 
“development”,  and  even  condescendingly and  scornfully  looked  upon as obsolete  rudiments of 
an era that  ought  to  be put behind us. (World  Bank  1989) 
From Africa we therefore hear accounts of development resembling the “cargo cults” of 
Melanesia, where  local  populations in  Africa  practice  rites  such as “popular  participation” or 
“forming  women’s  groups”  or  “planting  trees” ( Langley  1983;  Laurent & Mathieu  1994)  in  order 
to  attract  development from the  whites.  This is an  illustration  of  the  distance  between  donor  and 
target groups  and of the  discrepancy  between  development  rhetoric  and  practice. 
Developing Burkina Faso 
In Denmark, Burkina Faso epitomizes  the  African  “developing  country”. Strange name,  low 
ranking  in all development  indexes, on the fringe of the  desert,  landlocked,  small,  poor  (Danida 
1997b). At the  same  time, it has  a  reputation  among  people  that  at  least  know  a little bit  about  the 
African  continent as a  country  “devoted  to  its  development”.  The  Sankara  experience,  the  many 
NGOs, the  facility  with  which  foreign  development  cooperation  works in the  country, the name 
of the country  (‘The  land of the  upright  men”),  the  democratization  which the political  system 
has  undergone’.  Being  poor,  peaceful  and  without  the  spectacular  tourist  attractions of the East 
l This dissertation is not an  analysis of the  democratization  process in Burkina Faso. I cannot 
help, however,  expressing  a  certain  amazement  concerning  the acceptance by the donor 
community, especially of the president CompaorC and his  often strange mode of 
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African  countries,  development  has  become the trademark of Burkina Faso, the grand political 
(but  at the  same  time  de-politicised)  issue. The construction of a  special  development discourse 
is essential  in  understanding  this. 
When  trying to assess the impact of these  development  processes, we are confronted  with  an 
initial paradox. There is a contradictory tendency towards simultaneous exaggeration and 
underestimation of the  importance of external  interventions in  rural  Africa. 
Exaggeration because  rural  societies  are  often,  implicitly  or  explicitly,  seen as societies that are 
unable to  introduce  the  necessary  changes,  given  their  demographic,  political  and economic 
development,  changes  which  are  beyond  the  influence of  the  actors involved.  There is a  tendency 
to see the societies as static, so any changes occurring are attributed to the development 
intervention.  Donors  see  themselves as prime  movers  in  these  social  changes, providing the 
necessary  technology  and  capital  to  break  the  vicious  circles.  A  surprising  belief  in  the  possibility 
of engendering development through planned intervention; a teleological faith in social 
engineering  as  a  feasible  social  project. 
On the other  hand  there  is  a  counter-tendency to underestimate the  local  political implications 
involved when economically very powerful, logistically-huge and employment-generating 
development  projects  move  in.  The  fact  that he development  project  immediately becomes a 
political  arena  for  struggles  over  scarce  resources,  struggles  that,  in  certain  cases,  become  much 
more important than  the  objectives of the  project  themselves,  is  widely  overlooked  (Danida 
1997a; 1997~). 
It  was this simultaneous  exaggeration  and  underestimation  which  fascinated  me during the years 
I lived  in  West  Africa  before  going  to Burkina Faso. On the  one  hand,  a  tremendous interest in 
development being "participatory" and "sustainable" and, on the other hand, a remarkable 
disinterest  in  the  fierce  struggles  that  went  on  over  access  to  allowances,  cars  and all "les b &is 
qui font le diveloppement", which  affected all the development  projects that I have ever known 
of.  Problems  everybody  within  the  development  business  were  very  well  aware of but,  at  the  same 
time, saw no way  of avoiding. At the  same time, the "side effects" of aid  seemed to me to  be 
under-researched,  nobody  seemed  particularly  interested  in  the  influence of the  mere presence of 
the  aid  apparatus  in  Sahelian  societies,  despite  the  fact  that  the  majority of the cars  in the capital 
had  a  project  tag  onto  them and a  favourite  investment  object  seemed  to  be  luxury housing for 
expatriates. 
Burkina  Faso  and  Ouagadougou are no exception in this  respect:  the  weight of the development 
"machine" as Ferguson  calls it (1990),  seems  enormous.  It  is  hard  to  imagine how  many jobs are 
created  to  assure  the  leisurely  life  and  consumption  patterns of the expatriate  community  (and the 
Burkinan  elites  working  within  the  development  apparatus,  who  probably  have t e highest-paid 
jobs in the country,  along  with  high-ranking jobs in  the  mining  sector).  Restaurants  and hotels 
host  seemingly  endless  numbers of consultants  preparing  reports  and  plans  and  attending  a  never- 
ending series of conferences  on  development  issues:  "Pan-African  Conference for the 
Implementation of the  International  Desertification  Convention",  "National  Conference for Bush- 
fire Fighting",  "Conference on the  Role of Decentralization in the Process of Democratization". 
democratization  which  we  have witnessed since his violent takeover of power  in 1987. 
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Etc. etc. Every  night on TV, the news consists of accounts of these conferences the camera 
panning  across the bored  spectators, so after  a  short ime you start to recognize the same people 
every  week? 
Development is always  seen as the  solution to the problems of Burkina  Faso,  never the cause. At 
the same  time,  development is seen  as  distinct  from  politics, the latter being associated with the 
dirty business of power and embezzlements, whereas development apparently is seen as a 
conflict-rinsed type of modernity,  where  "improved  living  conditions" are of the highest priority. 
I have  been  assured  on  several  occasions  by  interviewees  that  "We  are  a  development  association, 
not  a  political  association", but I have  not  always felt comfortable with those reassurances. 
Constructing  Burkina Faso as a  developing  country 
Countries, especially  developing ones, are  often framed within  a special discourse. It  is often 
interesting  to  look at  how these  societies  are  described  in  portrayals: Lesotho totally surrounded 
by South Africa (Ferguson 1990) , Egyptians  cramped  together  along the Nile (Mitchell 1995), 
Burkina Faso landlocked on the fringe of the advancing desert, but struggling with its 
development.  As  a  consequence,  the  problem is viewed  within  a  national context and the nation 
state is  visioned  as  a  coherent  entity,  which it often  is  not.  And  solutions to address the problems 
diagnosed are also located  within  a  national  planning  framework. 
Development within  these  frameworks  is never seen as the disease,  always the cure, and it has 
a  remarkable  ability to forgive its  own  mistakes and prescribe  a reinvention of itself as the 
remedy.  Within  "sustainable  development" the victim is, furthermore,  turned  into the problem: 
it is the ignorant  farmer, or even the knowledgeable  farmer  who is unable to change his degrading 
production  techniques, who is causing the ecological  degradation of resources  (Escobar  1995). 
He is trapped in  a  vicious circle of poverty  and  degrading  production  practices, and he needs 
external assistance in  order to break out of this ~ys tem.~  
Imagine if  we  were  to  look at the "developed societies" within the same discursive framework. 
Then  Switzerland,  the  richest  country  in  the  Westem  hemisphere,  would  perhaps  be  described like 
this: 
"Switzerland is a small, landlocked country of which approximately half is 
barren mountainous regions. Traditional chieftaincies, which maintain 
considerable power, have for centuries held an isolationist policy,  with  the 
result that the country is excluded from all subregional organizations of 
2 Nobody  apparently  expects or demands  that  any  concrete  result  should  come  out of all  these 
conferences and seminars. An extremely interesting  study came out of Niger (Daouda 
1995), stating  that  only  within  the Ministq of Health 55 seminars were held within one year 
(1993). Of the 56 million  CFA  that  this  cost,  a  little  over  half  were  expenses on allowances. 
This  perhaps  explains  the  reluctance  among  the  participants to put  forward  a  more  thorough 
critique of this apparent waste of resources. 
In this  dissertation, I generally refer to the  social  actor as "he". No offense meant 3 
cooperation. In certain cantons, it is only  recently that women  have  been  given 
the right to vote. The  population  is divided into four linguistically-different 
groups, who coexist peacefully for the time being. State revenues  are largely 
mobilized through the low-interest disbursement of international  criminals and 
dictators to the bank sector. Industry is under severe competition from 
competitive Asian economies, and heavily dependent upon foreign labor." 
I am  not  trying  to  argue  that t e population of Burkina Faso does  not face a series of problems, 
but  these  differ  according to region,  community  and  social  place,  and  they  might  thus be viewed 
upon from the wrong  angle. Take a  map of Burkina Faso as the one  below: 
This  map  indicates  rainfall  averages  in mm.  in the different  regions of Burkina Faso. Enormous 
amounts of resources  have  been  used  to  determine  whether  the  isohyets  were  moving  southwards, 
what  the  cause  was,  how this could be influencing  vegetation  patterns  in the country,  whether it 
is technically possible to reverse this etc. The rainfall in the different years is, of course, 
extremely important  for the rural  agriculturalist  or  herder in Burkina Faso. I am  not trying  to 
argue that this type of research is useless. My point is that maps like the above become 
instrumental in the generation of politics, as they  tend  to  give  planners  a  sense of control. EU 
develop 
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ment  people  have  told  me  that  “It  would  probably  be  a  good idea to  implement  a  policy  dwhere 
the  rangelands North of the 400 mm isohyets  were  reserved  exclusively  for  pastoralism.”  Or  that 
“ For environmental  reasons,  our  policy  is  that  agriculture  should  not  spread  further into the 
bushlands  and  forests”  (Pers.  comm.)  Maps  thus  give  planners  a  sense of security  leading them 
to  put  forward  propositions l i e  these,  which are completely  impossible  to  implement,  and  which 
make no attempt to incorporate  farmers’  own  perceptions  and  strategies of natural  resource 
management. In other  words,  they  are politics addressing  the  wrong  issues.  Nowhere lse other 
than in the Sahelian countries are  decisions  on  such  important  issues  based  almost  entirely  on 
isohyets from maps  brought  in by foreigners?  The  establishment of such  a  de-politicized  and 
technicist discourse furthermore tends  to  lead to gross exaggerations as to the possibilities of 
addressing problems of development through planned intervention. 
The  overall  research  question of this  report  thus  becomes how do we assess the overall impact 
of development interventions in Burkina Faso. This question raises two immediate sub- 
questions.  First,  to  assess  more  precisely  what  the  impact  has  been; and  second  to ask how  we 
can  assess  impact.  These  two  central  issues of  major  importance  must  be  raised  when  addressing 
development  intervention.  They  throw  into  question the whole  issue  of  planned  intervention,  and 
call for a  deconstruction of the  discourses  behind  this  notion.  They  demand  a  critical  reflection 
on the  positivist  idea thal the  impact of a given  development  activity is measurable. At the same 
time this forces us to reflect upon how we analyse the social change that occurs when 
development  intervention is implemented.  And,  furthermore,  a much  more  careful  analysis is 
required of what  Long  (1992)  calls the development  interface, an analysis of the way different 
social actors position themselves vis-&vis the development apparatus, an analysis which 
emphasizes the conflicting interpretations of a number of the central notions on which 
development is based. 
Certain  central  notions  involve  the  idea  that it is possible  to  establish  causal  relationships  between 
planned  intervention  and  social  change.  This  again  leads  to  the  assumption  that  social  change  can 
be engineered  through  development  programmes  and  projects. This is what  has  been  called the 
“tool-perfecting”  approach  (Marcussen & Speirs  1998),  and it is  the  first  intellectual  approach  to 
Burkinan development  that  will  be  treated in this  dissertation. As it has  already  been  revealed 
above, this approach will be subject to harsh criticism. A more labourious challenge is to 
construct an alternative theoretical and methodological framework for analysing planned 
development intervention,  which  gives  an  opportunity  to  “bring  politics  back  in”  (Munck & 
O’Heam  1999).  This  approach  includes  a  deconstruction of  some of the  central  notions  on  which 
development  discourse is built, and a  more  critical  reflection on the  political  processes  involved 
in implementing development  projects,  including  looking  at  some of the  conflicts  over  the 
meaning of the development  activity.  The following Chapter  One  will,  therefore,  attempt  to 
address the following topics: 
4 Researchers’  interest in determining for instance  cropland  availability  and  potential  market 
integration on the  basis of geographical  information systems (Brunner & Nielsen, 1998) are 
economic parameters. 
other  examples of geographical  technologies,  that  seduce scientists into overlooking socio- 
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. An account of the “tool-oriented” approach. This account will try to show that viewing 
development as a  mainly  managerial  problem  misses  the  point, and at the same time 
makes us raise the  wrong  issues. 
. An analysis of the  discourses  and  narratives  that have become instrumental in the 
construction of politics of development; 
. The establishment  of  atheoretical and methodological  approach  which allows an 
analysis of the struggles  over  the  political,  economical,  material  and  symbolic  resources 
at stake within  the  ideal  type of development  intervention,  namely the development 
project. This involves  three  different  theoretical  discussions: 
Anthropological  literature on development  (Laurent & Mathieu, 1994; Crehan 
& van  Oppen,  1988;  Olivier  de  Sardan,  1995;  Bierschenk,  1988; Long & van 
der  Ploeg,  1994)  suggests that the  development  project  be  seen  as n arena of 
possible  conflict  over  economic,  material,  political  and  symbolic  resources. 
“Participation” in development  activities  by  farmers  may, from this perspecti- 
ve,  be  interpreted  not  only as their  effort  to  comply  with  project  objectives,  but 
also as strategic  positionings  where  environmental  improvements  are  stepping 
stone to create  linkages to external  agents. 
Other theorists  have  emphasized  how  development discourse and  narratives 
become influential in development policy-making within natural resource 
management, and are implemented in specific programmes, projects and 
methodologies of  data  collection  and  analysis  (Hoben,  1996,  1998; Meams & 
Leach,  1996;  Roe,  1998;  Speirs & Marcussen,  1998).  These  narratives  describe 
how Sahelian  agricultural  systems  have  become  “unsustainable” because of 
population increase, drought and lack of local capacity to adapt to new 
circumstances.  This  critical  situation  explains the need for external  intervention 
in the form of  rural  development  assistance  introducing  the  means to reverse 
the  natural  degradation. 
Finally,  certain  theorists  have  questioned the entire notion of development by 
analysing  donodrecipient  relations  not  merely as ‘partnerships’ or ‘patron- 
client-relationships’  but,  rather, as a  field  within  which  symbolic frontiers are 
demarcated  through  the  enunciation of discourses of development  (Ferguson, 
1990; Laurent, 1996). 
Chapter  one,  which  carries  the  theoretical  and  methodological  luggage,  should  then enable us to 
venture into the empirical  account,  allowing us to elaborate on the following points: 
. A short account of the magnitude and importance of aid in Burkina Faso, and a brief 
description of  what is considered to  be the  development  problem  in  the country; 
. A review of the analyses of aid to Burkina Faso with special emphasis on attempts to 
address issues of natural  resource  management. This involves  looking into bilateral, 
multilateral and NG0 aid, and exploring  differences and similarities; 
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. The concrete analysis of  how different  development  project  are  inserted into local 
society,  and  which  type of conflicts and social  positionings  occur.  This  will  mainly  be 
illustrated by empirical  findings  from Seno Province,  supplemented  with  findings from 
Boulgou province. The most important part of the analysis will focus on the way 
development  projects  in  the  town of Dori  are  wound  up in the  web  of local  politics. It 
will also stress the relationships  between  the  villagers in  villages  where  projects  and 
other  development  institutions  are  operating.  This  will  be  exemplified by focusing  upon 
certain institutions and some of the “favourite” intervention forms within natural 
resource  management. 
The  argument in these  accounts  will be that  existing  development  initiatives  are  suffering from 
three  shortcomings:  1)  They  are  address  issues,  that  are  more  based on preconceived  notions  and 
narratives of development  than on problems  derived from thorough  empirical  analysis; 2) They 
ignore  the  political  implications of aid,  and  recast  them as managerial  problems 3) They  hold  that 
societal change and development can be implemented through planned intervention, which 
although  in the rhetoric is adopting a  “participatory  approach”  is  extremely  “donor  driven”  and 
cannot be otherwise. 
An initial  clarification:  The  critique of development  and  development  aid  in  Burkina  Faso in this 
report is not an attempt to reinvent the past  as  the  good  old  days,  calling  for  a  return to a 
primordial African  equilibrium,  denigrating  the  externality of the  African  continent as entirely 
disastrous,  and  calling  for  a  return  to  “traditional”  values  within  African  society.  Neither s it to 
be seen as  an argument that “aid  doesn’t  help”, calling for an  argument that “it  would  be  better 
to leave them alone”. These arguments  seriously m i s s  the point. What I seek  to  do is simply to 
assess what development  projects  do in  certain  localities  in  Burkina  Faso,  ridding  the  analysis  of 
the normative pretensions haunting current development discourse. In a sense I am myself 
extremely normative in my point of departure  when  discussing  aid  to  Burkina  Faso  and  Africa 
as a  whole. I consider the current marginalization of the continent  and  the  growing  inequalities 
between  Africa  and  the  rest of the world  outrageous. I am just not  convinced  that  development 
and  development  theory  provide  the  instruments  to  reverse this trend.  The  medicine for the  lack 
of development  in  Africa  has  always  been  more  development,  and  the  treatment has ot  worked 
well. 
Neither  is it my  intention  to  add  to  the fast growing literature on  how to  measure  the  impacts of 
development intervention, looking at the “efficiency” and “efficacy” of intervention, but 
forgetting  to  look  at  its  more  political  implications,  ending up doing  analysis  entirely  within  the 
conceptual  framework of developmentalist  evaluation  thinking  that we  set out to  avoid.  Initially, 
I shall  content  myself  with  the  rather  unsatisfymg  description of “impact” as “The long term and 
sustainable  changes  brought  about by a  development  project.  Impact  can  either b  anticipated in 
relation  to  the  project’s  objectives  or  unanticipates’  (Danida  1999a).  This  definition is not  very 
satisfactory, first and  foremost  because it leaves  one  with  the  central  question f what is meant 
by “sustainable”. As  we shall see towards  the  end of this  dissertation,  operating  with  causal 
relationships  between  development  intervention  and  social  change  is  in  fact  rather  risky  business, 
and the whole idea of setting out to  measure  impact  should  probably  be  dealt  with  with  more 
caution. 
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The dissertation is structured  as  follows. 
Chapter one is where  the  theoretical  and  methodological  battles  are  fought  out.  First,  a  discussion 
of the  theoretical  thoughts  behind  the  “tool-perfecting  approach” is given. Second, I discuss the 
post-structural  entry  to the problem,  through  looking  at  development as discourse,  and seeing a 
central problem in the relationship between knowledge and power within the development 
process.  Thirdly, I explore  the  “actor-oriented”  approach, as it has  been  applied  in this study. The 
chapter  concludes that it is primarily  at  the  methodological  level  that  the  actor-oriented  approach 
has advanced as it inherits  some of the  weaknesses of Giddens’  theorisations  on  which it is 
largely  based. I look  specifically  at  the  notion f methodological  individualism,  and I discuss the 
“levels”  at  which  actor-oriented  approaches  operate. On the basis of this,  a  modified  actor- 
orientation  methodology  is  sketched  out. 
Chapters  two,  three  and  four  are  the  empirical  accounts.  Chapter two is a  presentation of Burkina 
Faso  and the role of development in  Burkina  Faso. It presents  a  series of dominating  narratives 
describing the crisis that  the  country  is  in,  and  describes  the way development is designed to 
remedy  this  crisis. The aim  of the  chapter  is  to  illustrate  how  certain  discourses shape the  politics 
of development and  have  a  powerful  impact on the way development  projects are run. 
Chapter three reviews  a  number of  research  reports  assessing  the  impact  of  foreign  aid to Burkina 
Faso. These reports,  though often critical  towards  development aid, end up  becoming “tool 
perfecting” and finalize by stating  more  or  less  normative  demands for aid  to  address certain 
preconceived  problems,  tied  to  certain  discourses of development.  These  critiques of aid fail  to 
criticize the positivist assumption  held  at  the  outset that aid  can be assessed,  improved  and 
addressed  at  certain  social  groups.  The  chapter  furthermore  illustrates  that  there is no significant 
difference  between the problems  encountered  in  bilateral  aid  compared  to NG0 aid. 
Chapter four is an account on  my findings  from  the  town of Dori,  supplemented  with  observations 
from the Boulgou  Region.  The  historical and socioeconomic  setting of certain projects within 
natural  resource  management  is  analysed and an  assessment of the  interface  between  projects  and 
beneficiary  groups is attempted.  The  chapter  will  show  the  fluidity of the institutional set-up and 
the  widespread  straddling by  social  actors  between  the  different  institutional spheres.  It  will  show 
that the issue of “participation” is in many ways misunderstood, as all actors involved in 
development  always  “participate”, in  the  sense  that  they  all try to  get  the  best  out of development 
projects  and  programmes  through  processes of selection  and  seizing  control.  It  will, furthermore, 
show that operating  with  spatial  and  institutional  “levels” of analysis is very difficult. 
Chapter five returns to a deconstmction of some of the key concepts constituting current 
development  discourse.  Participation,  sustainability, self  reliance,  dependence  and  development, 
are  issues  that  will  be  dealt wi h  before I present  a  sceptical,  but not too pessimistic, conclusion. 
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Chapter 1. Theoretical  and  methodological  considerations 
15 
Though  it  be  Madness - yet, there is Method in’t. 
Shakespeare  (Hamlet 2. act) 
1.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I shall discuss three theoretical approaches to the analysis of development 
intervention.  First, I present  what  I  term  the  “tool-perfecting  approach”,  exemplified  by  the  works 
of Rondinelli  (1993).  Second,  I  explore  post-structuralist  critiques of development, the discourses 
of development, and  the  way  they  shape  political  action.  And  finally, I will  take  a  more  careful 
look at  the  “actor-oriented”  approach  which  has  influenced my empirical  work. 
1.2. The  “tool-perfecting”  approach 
What I choose to  call  the  tool-perfecting  approach is not  a  coherent  theoretical outline thought 
out by  a  few  thinkers  within  a  school f thought,  nor is it a  politically  right-wing or left-wing 
phenomenon. As mentioned  in the previous  chapter, it is  a  view  which is shared by a  very  wide 
range of actors within the development field. It describes what certain people have called 
“developmentalism”  (Olivier  de  Sardan 1995), in  the sense that  “tool-perfecting”  upholds  a 
normative belief  in  development as a  feasible  social  project  which is to  be  striven for through 
technological  change  and  social  organization. My argument in the following is  that this view  1) 
Ignores the obvious  political  implications of this  development and 2) is based on nonnative 
assumptions and  narratives  about  development  primarily  derived from Westem  ideology.  The 
“tool-perfecting” approach is found within virtually all the literature  produced  by  the large 
development  agencies  (see  e.g.  Danida  1997a,  1997b,  World  Bank  1989). It is also  very  common 
in literature about  NGOs  (Edwards & Hulme,  1995;  Gueneau & Comte,  1998)  and,  as  we  shall 
see in Chapter Three, also in more academic works within development studies. It is less 
prevalent w i t h  anthropology - anthropologists  have, as already  mentioned,  always  looked  at 
development  with  a  certain  condescension. 
The “tool-perfecting’’ approach to the critique of development intervention has its most 
prominent  advocate  in  Dennis  Rondinelli  (1993)  who  makes  a  thorough  analysis of a  large  array 
of the problems of  development  intervention,  and  proposes  certain  techniques  to  overcome  these 
problems. His objective is very appealing: faced with the mediocre results of structural 
adjustment,  and  the  inability o generate  economic  growth  through  “getting  the price right” (i.e. 
the  simplistic  belief  that the  automatic  pilot  of  the  “free  market”  will assure that  development  will 
be  “sustainable” and  that  African  states  will  thereby,  through  a  hefty diet start performing  more 
effectively), he acknowledges  the  need to accept  a  large  degree of uncertainty  and  complexity 
when  planning  development  projects. It thus  becomes  a  question  of  “getting  the  institution  right” 
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as  “sustainable  and equitable development  requires  strengthening of administrative  capacity 
throughout  developing  societies”  (Rondinelli 1993, p. 185). 
In his  attempts  to  put  forward  suggestions a to  how  to  design  development  projects,  he  stresses 
that there are limits to rationalistic planning  and  management.  Projects  have  always  shown 
atendency to deviate from their original  plans. This has  led to very  costly  and  ineffective  pre- 
analyses,  that  have  however  not  been  able  to  solve  the  problem,  and  have.cost  astronomical  sums 
amounts of money. Attempts at comprehensive planning did not reduce uncertainty. The 
complexity  of  planned  development  intervention  and  the  lack of capacity  in  developing  countries 
led to dependency on foreign  expertise,  leading  to  projects  that  were  inappropriate for local 
conditions.  According  to  Rondinelli,  insistence on complex feasibility studies and  cost-benefit 
analysis  often lead to more capital-intensive  and  high-tech  projects  than re appropriate. 
This technicist approach, again according to Rondinelli, leads to a failure in involving the 
intended  beneficiaries  in the planning  and  management  of development  projects. This has led to 
ill-adapted  solutions,  lack of participation  and  the  transfer of inappropriate  technology.  The  lack 
of project  success  then  leads  to  constraints on managers  and  reluctance on their behalf  to  engage 
in  evaluation  and  error-detection. 
Development project administration must, therefore, be made more effective, but certain 
constraints  appear.  It is difficult  to  define  goals  more  precisely:  there has been  a  shortage of 
appropriate  and  adequate  data  and  there  has  been  an  inadequate  understanding of social  and 
cultural conditions. Furthermore,  international  agencies  and  governments  have  lacked 
theincentives or controls to  steer  behaviour. 
Furthermore,  Rondinelli  mentions  that  political  dynamics  are  the  most  serious  constraints o  the 
planning  and  management of development  projects. Not only do the  donors  (esp. USA) have 
clear political agendas  behind  their  aid,  but  rationalistic  planning  also  often  leads  planners  to 
ignore the political aspects of aid,  conflicts  which only erupt after  implementation.  Different 
political  parties  may  have  strong  interests  in  certain  development  projects,  despite  their  low  rates 
of return. As  we shall discuss later, Rondinelli  unfortunately  does  not  take  these  constraints 
seriously. 
Finally,  he  mentions  the  limited  administrative  capacity of  many recipient  countries,  the  Sahelian 
being the most clear examples of countries unable to  make contributions as agreed, to recruit 
managers etc, causing  delays and  examples  of  “donor  driven aid” (the latter seen as  unfortunate, 
because it impinges on the country’s  ability to achieve  self  reliance). 
Rondinelli therefore calls for a  reorientation of development  administration,  not  that  planning 
should  be  abandoned, but that the existing methods, procedures  and  requirements are often 
misplaced and should  be  replaced  with  alternative  methods. 
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1.2.1. Rondinelli’s adaptive  approach 
After this initial critique of the blue-print  approach to development planning that Rondinelli 
provides, he tums to  what he calls an “adaptive approach”, based on the concepts of strategic 
planning,  incremental  analysis, experimental design, and successive approximation in decision 
making.  He  calls  for  a  “process of project  planning  that  can  cope  with the development  problems 
in an experimental  incremental and adaptive fashion” (1993, p. 118). He then lists a  series of 
sequences  according to which we should be able to plan: 
By planning and implementing projects sequentially through experimental 
pilot, demonstration, and replication phases, problems can be disaggregated 
and alternative courses of action can evolve through what Korten describes as 
three basic stages of learning: ( I )  learning to be  effective in assisting intended 
beneficiaries to improve their living  conditions  or to attain other development 
objectives;(2) learning to be efficient in eliminating ineffective unnecessary, 
overtly  costly, or adverse  activities,  and  identifying methods that are appropri- 
ate for larger scale application;  and (3) learning to expand the application of 
effective methods by creating appropriate and responsive organizations to 
carry out development tasks. (Rondinelli, 1993, pp.  118-119) 
He  then  goes on to elaborate  what he means by experimental,  pilot,  demonstration  and  replication 
projects, as a way  of achieving a  more  adaptive planning approach. 
Experimental projects are vital  instruments in this approach.  They are small-scale, exploratory 
and  necessary  when  problems  are  not  well  defined.  Normal  effectiveness  cannot  be  expected.  He 
claims that all development intervention is in a sense experimental, as the outcome is 
unpredictable.  Structural  adjustment  loans are examples of such  experiments  (with  high  costs for
certain “beneficiaries”, one might add). However, deliberately experimental projects are 
becoming  more  common. He defines  five  types  of  experimental projects: (1) those that  focus on 
problem definition, i.e. not  presupposing the nature of the problem,  or describing all  previous 
descriptions of problems as erroneous (2) Those that focus on unknowns seeking solutions to 
problems  that are only  partly  defined.  Knowledge is thus to be  acquired  and solutions proffered. 
(3) Other projects search for the most effective means of attaining objectives, by trying  out 
different  approaches  to  a  given  problem (4)Another  type  of  experimental  project tries to address 
deficiencies, i.e.  how to break  bottlenecks, or  find ways  in which farmers could address their 
problems. Finally, (5)  projects described as “natural experiments”, i.e. not experiments per  se, 
but solutions  derived  historically from successes elsewhere, and adapted in new contexts. 
Rondinelli naturally stresses the need  to involve beneficiary groups in these experiments,  and 
furthermore warns that experimental projects  demand  qualified and highly-motivated  staff. 
Second, pilot projects can  perform  a  number of important functions. These include  testing 
feasibility and  acceptability  and  serving as prototypes for larger-scale activities. In many cases 
the pilot  project is the  phase  following  the xperimental project. Again,  in this phase he  stresses 
“The  importance  of  community  participation  in  design  and  management  in  improving  efficiency, 
effectiveness  and  sustainability”,  (Rondinelli  1993, p.  134)  and  the  need for the “suppoa of strong 
leaders  who are motivated by community spirit” (p.  135). 
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When implementing pilot  projects  he  stresses  that  the  following  factors  should  be considered 
carefully:  1)  The  basic  knowledge,  information  and  wisdom of  people  concerning their  own  living 
conditions, the identification of needs  and  desirability  and  practicality of new methods; 
2) The specific and unique ecological  characteristics into which  innovations  are introduced; 
3) An understanding and respect for the diversity of cultural values and norms within 
communities; 4) Cultural traits that  shape  individual  behaviour; 5) The formal  and  informal 
authority relationships within  recipient  society;  6)  Leadership  patterns  and channels of 
cooperation, participation, interaction and  communication; 7) Attitudes  towards risks, 
achievement  and  motivational  incentives  (Rondinelli,  1993, p. 136). 
The  pilot  project  should,  moreover,  be  designed i   order to obtain  the  support  or  avoid the overt 
opposition of government officials, political  leaders  and  vested  interest  groups. This can be 
combined  with  complementary  and  supporting  resources,  especially  in rural areas  where  resources 
and  infrastructure are weak. This, on the other  hand,  makes  pilot  projets  rather  costly,  and  pilot 
project staff  should  therefore be protected  against  undue  political  interference or pressure to 
produce quick results. But “if  they  change  norms  or  values,  diffuse  new  technologies r methods, 
or increase the willingness of people  to  consider new ideas,  they may be  well  worth the cost” (p. 
138).  Finally, Rondinelli states  that  pilot  projects  should be  run  by “autonomous” implentation 
agencies that can provide them  with  sufficient  political  and  administrative  protection to allow 
them to run their course. 
The third type, the demonstration project, aims to  show  that new technologies, methods and 
programmes are better  than traditional ones, as they  increase  productivity,  lower costs, raise 
income or deliver  services  more  effectively.  These  projects  also carry high levels of risk,  and their 
success depends on a  number  of  issues,  including  offering  farmers  security  against the e risks. 
Rondinelli  emphasizes  how  demonstration  projects  should  be  “gradually  and  carefully  introduced 
into communities” and stresses that  “attention  should be  given  to  a  timely completion” after 
transferring  resources to those  who  will  carry  on  the  work. 
Finally, Rondinelli mentions the last  type  of  project,  aimed  at replication, dissemination and 
service deZivev. This is the  final  stage in  an experimental  series,  aimed  at  expanding  productive 
and administrative capacity. Because “transforming experimental, pilot and demonstration 
projects  effectively into continuing  programs is crucial  to  sustaining  their  benefits. In this stage, 
as in  all other phases of development  projects,  the  participation of the  beneficiaries is a  primary 
factor affecting sustainability”  (p. 144). A central  factor  in  this  sustainability is the likelihood 
that  programs  will survive the  phasing  out of international  funding. 
Rondinelli  further  acknowledges  that  commitment  from  state  breaucrats  in  these  types  of  projects 
can  be  problematic.  The  replication of small  experimental  projects  can  be  potentially  undermining 
the position of state bureaucracies,  a  process  that  they  might  not be interested in. There is  thus 
often  a discrepancy between  what  would  be  best in the  national  interest  and  what is feasible. 
He mentions that the greatest  problem is that it is  often  thought  that  projects  can be replicated 
uncritically, without  looking  at  regional  differences  within  a  country.  Technical  and organiza- 
tional problems become paramount here. Extension agents may be unwilling to make the 
sacrifices necessary to perform  well,  problems of transport  increase  etc. The organizational 
challenge is to implement projects through a series of different institutions: government 
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institutions a various levels, NGO’s and the private  sector  alike. The ideal situation is when 
“governments in  developing  countries are (..) contracting  with  the  private sector as  a  way  of 
sustaining services” (p. 149). Interestingly,  Rondinelli  does  not  claim  that the private sector is 
always better than the government.  The  political  dimension is viewed as an obstacle that  needs 
to be overcome.  Towards the end of the accounts on how  to implement development project he 
sets out the following 9 commandments: 
. . . 
. 
. . 
Managers should be committed  and  dedicated,  and  given  necessary discretion; 
Supervision should be  kept  simple  and  chains of command short; 
Project  control  should  be  kept  with  a  single  organization, who can  then  subcontract  with 
others; 
St& should be qualified people  from  the  area of the  project; 
Staff should work  through  local  officials; 
Staff, consultants and contractors should be recruited on the basis of their past 
performance; 
Political constraints should be  taken  seriously,  and when possible priorities of local 
politicians who can  affect the success of the project  should be accommodated; 
Resources and attention should  be  focused on  only one or two activities at a time; 
Subordinates  should  be  allowed to be  delegated  responsibilities by the leaders in  order 
to ensure that a large number of people  substitute the leadership. 
1.2.2. Rondinelli on reorienting  development  administration 
Rondinelli  highlights the failure of earlier  development  theory,  which  claimed that development 
could be achieved merely  by  transferring  administrative  procedures  and  technology from the 
West. Accordingly, we  now need to acknowledge  that the West  succeeded because it developed 
a pervasive institutional capacity and the human  resources to innovate.  To copy this model is, 
however, extremely difficult and hard to plan  and  foresee,  hence the need for experimentation. 
Structural adjustment  frequently  ignored  the  fact  that  institutional  reform  was  necessary  in  order 
to promote economic growth, it was  not  enough  simply  to  dismantle government apparatuses. 
Institutional  reform  like  transferring  planning,  decentralization,  participation  in decision-making 
etc.  are seen as important. The needed  changes are therefore,  according to Rondinelli: 
. adjusting planning procedures to political  realities; . adopting a “learning approach” to planning and administration, in order to cope with 
. capacity-building  within  government and  non-governmental institutions alike; . decentralization; . simplifying analyses and management  procedures  within the aid apparatus; . encouraging rather  than  suppressing  error  detection; . creating greater flexibility for development administrators within the aid apparatus, to 
uncertainties; 
cope with uncertainty by offering incentives promoting innovation, risktaking and 
learning. 
These points form what Rondinelli terms adaptive administration. This will, of course, not 
proceed  in the same way as in the West, but the principles of experimentation and diversity are 
a legacy from the West which is worth  copying.  Surprisingly,  he states that  in this adjustment 
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process “no system  can  be  effective if it ignores  the  political  dimensions  of  decision-making”  (p. 
159).  Planners  and  administrators  are  not  politically  objective or n utral.  It  is  therefore  necessary 
that  development  agencies  operate  more  with  incentives  and less with  control. 
Nonetheless,  immediately  following  this  statement,  Rondinelli  states  that “To be  effective in the 
future,  international  assistance  organizations  and  governments  in  developing countries must be 
reconstructed to promote the innovation  and  creativity  needed to make  them  more responsive to 
the  needs of their  clientele”  (p. 163). This  should  be  done  through  promoting competition, 
organizing,  marketing  and  introducing  performance  agreements.  Control is unlikely  to succeed, 
and it is only  through  participatory  planning  and  adaptive  management  that i  will be possible in 
the future to find new  ways  of creating  conditions  that  will  allow  people  to  recognize  and cope 
effectively  with  the  inevitable  complexity  and  uncertainty of development. 
1.2.3. Discussion  and  critique of Rondinelli 
Rondinelli’s  line of argument  is  very  present in the  ideological  point of departure of many of the 
development  projects  and  programmes  running  in  Burkina  Faso,  and it is therefore important to 
go into a  more  detailed  critique of  where its shortcomings lie. 
First of all, Rondinelli  constantly  segregates  what  he  defines  very  loosely  as  development  and 
politics.  Development is “good” in the sense that it has to do with  a lot of the notions he likes, 
i.e.  efficiency,  effectiveness,  sustainability,  growth,  production  increase,  productivity increase. 
Politics is seen as a “constraint” on all this; political opposition is seen as something that 
endangers  efficiency,  and leads to certain private interests being prioritized  above the common 
good,  which  development  is  apparently  addressing.  He  acknowledges  that  political  aspects  should 
not  be  ignored,  but  he  does so anyway  by introducing  this  segregation. 
His text is also  ridden  with  buzzwords.  It  is  never  clear  what  he  means  efficiency efficiency and 
sustainability; he states that management should be “careful” and that managers should be 
“responsible”,  “flexible”,  “innovative”  etc. - notions  that  seem fair enough,  but  which  upon more 
thorough  scrutiny  have little real  content. 
He grossly romanticizes development in the West by attributing its wealth solely to the 
development of a  pervasive  institutional  capacity. I do  not  believe  that  Western  wealth is derived 
entirely from a  pillaging of the  colonies and the atrocious extortion of surplus value from the 
working class, but I think that these factors ought to be weighed against his extremely 
technocratic  interpretation of Western  development. 
It  is thus not  clear 1) What  is  meant by development,  apart from the  aggregation of the above 
“good”  points  and 2) What is the  object of development. 
This leads to a  number  of  misunderstandings that will  be  pursued  throughout this dissertation: 
. The assumption  that  development is something  everybody  strives  for: . The object of development  is  always the nation-state; . Problems of development  urn into problems of  bad management; 
18 
. That the development apparatus in itself often becomes the largest sphere for primitive 
. He presupposes a wide range of normative assumptions: that “modem” technology is capital  accumulation  within this nation  state; 
better  than  traditional,  that  “culture” is an  impediment to  development;  that  development 
is a  solution,  not  a  problem; 
and  power; 
the content of plans, thereby largely ignoring the interface between donors and 
recipients,  reducing  these  to  questions of  more  or less  participation; 
into all  the  “side effects” which  arise  during  in  project  implementation  and execution. 
should  eventually  arrive at a  stage  where  they  are  able  to  function  without  external 
support, thereby  having  achieved  sustainability. 
. He ignores a more elaborate analysis of the state and modes of accumulation of wealth 
. He ignores the pervasiveness and instrumentality of development discourse in shaping 
. He does not seriously examine how a project is inserted into a society, and does not look 
. He  presupposes  a normative  and  teleological  assumption  that  development  projects 
Rondinelli therefore does not provide sufficient analytical ammunition for an elaborate 
understanding of the  shortcomings of aid  in  Burkina  Faso. By clinging to ill-defined  ideological 
notions of development,  what  was  supposed  to  be  “experimental”  therefore  ends  up  looking  more 
like  very  fixed  and  predefined  development  activity,  since  the  framework for experimentation  and 
participation is established  at  the  planners  table in  advance. As Hobart  mentions,  the  “tool- 
perfecting”  approach  “presupposes  society  or  social  relations as some  hypostatized  pseudo-entity. 
Arguably,  change  is  going  on  all  the  time  and  the  problem, if  any, is to  account for the  appearance 
of stasis. In whatever sense society  may  be  usefully  said  to  exist, it is not  an  object  or entity” 
(Hobart 1993). In the  next part of this chapter  we  will  therefore  see  how these preconceived 
notions  become  instrumental  in  shaping  development  politics. 
1.3.  Post-structuralist  approaches  to  the  analysis of development 
It  is  obvious  that  poststructuralist  deconstructions of the  notion  of  development  and the elements 
that it comprises constitute an important  source of inspiration  to an analysis of development 
intervention. The new  angle  upon  development as the problem  and  not the solution seems to 
indicate  a  possibility of looking  afresh  at  some of the  shortcomings of development  projects.  It 
also  provides  a  more  thorough  critique  than  “tool-perfecting”,  which  always ends up  assuring us 
that when development failed, it was  because it was  not the right  kind of development. These 
failures  might  thus  be  embedded  not s  much  in  the  lack  of  capacity  of  the  implementing  actors, 
but  in the discursive  realm  within  which  these  projects  are  conceived. 
1.3.1.  The  notion of development  discourse 
Central to the poststructuralist critique of development is the notion of the development 
discourse. Discourses  are  in  a  Foucauldian  sense,  carefully  rationalized  statements made by 
experts  enabling  a  view of the  human  sciences as autonomous,  rule-governed  systems, founded 
on appeals to truths (Peet 1999). In this sense truth, power and knowledge become closely 
interrelated.  Not  in  the  sense  that  he  who  holds  the  power  is  the  one  who  has  the  knowledge  and 
therefore monopolizes  what is true and  what is false.  Rather, it has  to do with  an elaborate 
conception of power, where actors and institutions do not “possess” power, power is not 
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attributable to a  single  social  actor. A development  discourse is not an ideology, which has little 
to do with “the real world’, it is  not  some  apparatus  produced  by those in power  in order to hide 
another.  It  produces  “domains of objects,  and  rituals of truth.”  Discourses are subjectless, they 
“inhabit” the social actor. The investigation starts by looking at development institutions’ 
practices.  These  are  often  seen as rational  and  neutral,  but i is exactly  view of them as rational 
which  make  them  producers  of  power.  They  shape  how  we are capable of thinking  development. 
As Escobar,  partly  quoting  Foucault, puts it: 
Discourse analysis creates the possibility of standing detached from the 
development discourse, bracketing its familiarity2 in order to analyse the 
theoretical  and  practical  context  with  which it has been associated. It gives us 
the possibility of singling out development as an encompassing  cultural space 
and  at the  same  time  of  separating ourselvesfiom it  by  perceiving it in a totally 
new form. (Escobar  1995,  p. 6 )  
My argument,  in line with the above,  would  be  that  the  proliferation of development discourse 
has  made it increasingly  difficult  to  attack  any  social or scientific  problem  in Burkina Faso 
without refemng to  the  development of the  country. I furthermore  argue that this has resulted 
in  policies that are  not  well  suited  to  the  realities  as I found  in my field areas. 
So, how do we address this problem of analyzing the way discourses shape our  ability to think 
about  development.  This  process  includes  much  more  ambiguous elements of unintentionality 
and  contingency. 
In Edward  Said‘s  influential  book Orientalism (Said, 1978),  he  argues  that  the interpretation of 
oriental  societies as primarily  colonies of Britain  and  France is still  very  present  in  virtually all 
academic  work on oriental  societies.  Orientalism  became  a sort of government  giving rise to  the 
production of certain  discourses  about  ‘the  Other’  through  which  imperial  powers  were abl to 
manage - and even produce - the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, 
scientifically  and  imaginatively  (Said,  1978: 3). This he explains by the fact that no production 
of knowledge  in  the  human  sciences  can  ignore  or  disclaim its authors  involvement as a  human 
subject  in hisher own circumstance.  (ibid. p. 11)  Furthermore,  he  highlights  the  fact  that  texts  can 
create  not  only  knowledge,  but  also  the  very  reality  they  appear  to  describe: 
In time such knowledge  ami  reality  produce a tradition, or what Miehe1 Foucault 
calls a discourse,  whose  material presence or weight, not  the originality of the 
author,  is  really  responsible for the texts  produced out of it. (Said 1978, p .  94) 
In the 70s, this was  a  very  provocative  argument, as it challenged the Marxist  hypothesis that 
imperialism  required an ideology  that  could  legitimize  the  extraction  of  wealth  from the colonies. 
Said‘s  hypothesis  that  the  creation of this image of the  Other  was  instrumental  in  the  construction 
of an imperialist policy, turns things upside down and challenges Marxist notions of what 
determines  social  change  and  relations of power. 
This  creation of a  discourse of the  “Other” is useful when looking at development as well. As I 
mentioned  in  the  introduction to this dissertation, it has  become  increasingly difficult to view 
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economic and political  problems in Burkina Faso as anything  but  problems of development? 
And, as was  Said’s  preoccupation,  the  genesis  of  this  discourse  is  not just a  legitimizing  ideology 
constructed  to  explain,  for  instance,  World  Bank  premiums.  What  Said  does  not  reflect on mu h, 
however,  is  how  the  internalisation of this discourse  becomes  very  strong  among the Burkinans 
(i.e. “the  Other),  and is not just a  Western  view of the  Burkina  Faso  development object. 
The project  is,  thus, to trace  how  development  discourse is translated into certain practices, 
exemplified by rural development activities in the Third World (a notion that Escobar 
vehemently  criticises, as it is a  derogatory  objectification of a very  heterogenous cluster of 
societies)  or,  more  precisely, Burkina Faso.  Escobar  calls for the “turning of the  (development) 
apparatus  itself  into an anthropological  object (p. 107),  moving from the  textual  and  work  practice 
of institutions  to  the  effects of those  practices  in  the  world,  how  they structure the conditions 
under  which  people  live.  This i an important  agenda.  What  is,  however,  important  to  avoid is the 
creation of an “anti-development’’  counter  movement,  which I fail  to find in Burkina Faso, 
ascribing  revolutionary  agendas  to  people,  and  thereby  once  again  objectifymg he “target group” 
by turning  them  into  anti-developmentalists, as is done  by  certain  authors  (Escobar,  1995,  Munck 
& Oheam 1999).  Instead  it  seems  more  pertinent  to  look  at  new  forms f clientelism and  social 
positionings  within  the  development  apparatus a a  vital  strategy  for  resource  mobilization,  where 
new groups of actors, through the skilful deployment of development rhetoric, succeed in 
mobilizing  resources  (Blundo  1995). 
As development is such an extremely  normative  and  opaque  notion, discourse analysis is a  very 
fruitful  entry  point  to  engage  in  a  more  profound  critique of dev lopment  intervention in Burkina 
Faso. This theoretical approach however has certain serious problems which are moreover 
incompatible  with the methodological  individualism of the  “actor-oriented”  approach, that will 
be  dealt  with  below. 
A weakness of  much discourse  analysis  is  the  almost  conspiratorical  character  attributed to the 
instrumentality of discourses,  shrewdly  deployed by the  powerful,  who  thereby  construct  or 
reinforce  systems of domination.  (See  Escobar  1995).  “Discourse”  replaces  “structure” in the old 
Marxist variant,  discourses are deployed  by the big  international  organizations  and the donor 
countries in order to maintain the unjust world order, the heroes becoming the popular 
movements of the south, the NGOs turning their backs on development, highlighting local 
knowledge. “Think locally, act locally” is the new poststructuralist political parole. Local 
organisations, uninhabited by the development discourse, are seen as bearers of a new 
“antidevelopment”. “It is from  such  movements  that a genuine  alternative  development  strategy 
based  on  empowerment  might  materialize”  (Munck & O’Hearn:207).  This is the  “Emperor’s new 
6 At the turn of the  millennium,  the  ubiquitousness  of  the  development discourse within areas 
where this bad apparently  nothing to do with the problem addressed,  popped up again. A 
slightly  derogatory  article  in  the South African  Daily Mail accounted  how “Postal workers 
in Burkina  fear rats, not  millennium  bug”. It proceeds to recount how all technology had 
broken  down  at the Ouagadougou post office  long before the Y2K, and how the stamping 
machine  cannot be set to year 2000. The article is not  very  interesting,  except for its ending, 
where once again it is repeated, although it has  no relation whatsoever to the rest of the 
story: “According to the UNDP, Burkina Faso was in 1999 ranked as the fourth-poorest 
country in the  world,  in terms of life expectancy, educational attainment and adjusted real 
income” (ht tp: / /~.mg.co.z~m~news/99decU24dec-burkina.h~)  
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clothes”,  dependency  theory  in  a new guise,  but  without  the  vitamins of the  Marxist  emphasis  on 
material basis of the extraction of surplus from one class by another. 
A poststructuralist  deconstruction of developmentalism  is  therefore at times  used as a  means of 
establishing new forms of development based on “local knowledge”, thereby accepting an 
uncritical interpretation  of  everything  originating from a more  or  less  arbitrarily  constructed 
“locality”. Poststructuralism should, however, exactly enable us to get beyond the binary 
oppositions involved in development discourse (localfWestern, modedtraditional, Mal- 
thus/Boserup)  leading to crude  simplifications.  Furthermore,  poststructuralism  should  help  us  to 
undertake  a  critique of development  work  which  deliberately  tries  to  break  with  a  type  of  critique 
(i.e. the  tool  perfecting-approach),  where  even  the  most  critical  discourse  slips into the form, the 
logic  and  the  implicit  postulations of precisely  that  which  it  seeks  to  contest.  (Munck & O’Heam, 
1999). If we do not  succeed  in  this,  we are back  to  square  one,  basing  our  normative  hopes n a
new  object:  maybe  not  development  but  possibly  antidevelopment,  alternative  development or 
whatever. 
Connected to this  problem, there is  another  questionable  point  in  the  poststructuralist d course 
analysis. With the  Foucauldian  notion of power as “a spiderweb  without  the  spider”  (Crush 1995% 
we risk ending up  with  a  societal  analysis  where  the  social  actor  is  completely  obscured,  where 
power  has  nothing  to do with  instruments of coercion,  wealth  etc.  The  Foucauldian  analysis  tends 
to lack  agency  (Giddens  1984:  145-162),  and is at risk of resembling  the  functionalism  which it 
set out  to  distinguish  itself from. Instruments of discipline  and  government  become obscure 
categories,  power  becomes  completely faceless, and it becomes  difficult to distinguish  between 
different levels of subordination,  coercion and  legitimacy.  Furthermore,  there  is  a  tendency  to  pay 
excessive  attention  to texts of  development,  sometimes  unfortunately  at  the  expense of work  in 
the field (Ferguson 1990). 
An interesting,  but  perhaps  theoretically  weak,  book  on  the  aid  dilemma n  Sud n  (Morton  1995) 
interestingly  stresses  that the apparent  “failure” of development  aid  in  Sudan  cannot  be  attributed 
to the dubious  intentions of the aid  workers  who  (at  least  the vast majority), in fact, do their best 
to  get  their  projects  going.  Failure  cannot  be  ascribed  to  the  “Lords of Poverty”  (Hancock 1989), 
greedy  bureaucrats  who  have  no  other  motivation  in  their  jobs  but  to  assure  their own promotions, 
or  in  the worst cases the embezzlement of funds. The poststructuralist  would  claim that failure 
is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  impossibility to think  development in terms  detached from the  realms of 
development discourse. This becomes  instrumental in the  outline and  mode  of implementation 
of development  aid. I can  only  accept  this  argument  to  a  certain  extent.  First of all, it overlooks 
the fact that these discourses are,  in fact, constantly  under  fire, and  it  is  too  easy  to  say that all 
contestations  are  doomed  because  the  paradigms  that  this  critique  sets  out to  di mantle  are  equally 
rooted  in nineteenth  century  social  theory.  Development  has  changed  dramatically  over  the  years, 
and  has  brought  about  considerable  social  change.  One  needs  to  analyse  these  changes from a 
methodological individualist point of  view as well,  criticizing  the  positivist  approach to the 
analysis of development  intervention.  This,  coupled  with  a  discourse  analysis,  (a  somewhat  messy 
bit of  theoretical  patchwork),  might  lead  to  a more constructive  critique of development in 
Burkina Faso. It, however, leaves us with very few clear recommendations as to how to 
“improve” the performance of the  development aid. 
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1.3.2. Ferguson’s contribution 
The most  celebrated  post-structuralist  analysis of a  development  project is Ferguson’s  seminal 
work  “The  anti-politics  machine”  about  Lesotho  (1990). In his  widely  acclaimed  book,  he  stresses 
the  paradox  that  a  project  such as the  one  he  analyses  turns  out as a  more  or  less  complete  failure 
but  such  failures  are  nonetheless  repeated  relentlessly,  prolonged  and  even  duplicated  elsewhere. 
He explains this by referring  to  the  fact that the  side-effects,  or  the  instrumental  effects as he 
prefers  to  call  them, of the  projects  are  perhaps  more  important  to  analyse  than  the  anticipated 
effects.  The  project  in  Lesotho  did  not  succeed  in  eradicating  poverty  or  increasing  productivity 
within,  in  Ferguson’s  case,  livestock  production.  However it was  instrumental  in  the sense that 
roads were built and  the role of government institutions in  the  local  society  was  significantly 
enhanced.  Ferguson  therefore  suggests  that the observer  focus  on,  not  what  turned  out  as  failure 
i.e. what  was  not  done,  but  rather on  what  was in fact  done. 
The planners of the  projects  saw  what  was  termed  an  institutional  and  management crisis at 
government  level as the  main  obstacle  to  the  success of the project,  but  refused  to  recognize  the 
political dimension of the  bureaucracy  in the capital.  Government  was  seen  as  a  machine  for 
delivering  services,  but  never as a way  of  governing  people.  This  point is very  pertinent,  and 
could perhaps be  supplemented with a  remark  that  Bayart  (Bayart  1989)  has  made: that state 
institutions should  be  analysed as the  central  arena for the  allocation of funds  and  revenues. 
Development aid  in Burkina Faso is a  very  central  resource,  used  as  a  means  to  gain  political 
control  and  power.  It  is, thus, not  only  the  establishment of institutions,  roads,  prisons,  schools 
as Ferguson  mentions,  but  equally  the  interests  involved in high  paid jobs and logistics  that  can 
be used for purposes outside the strict project objectives, and outright embezzlements are 
frequent.  Embezzlements  should  however  not  be  considered as necessarily  an  example  of  dubious 
moral,  but  as  a  mechanism for building  a  power  basis  and  constructing  legitimacy. 
A problem  in  Ferguson’s  text is that  is  maybe  a  bit  conspiratorial  in  the  sense  that  he  apparently 
sees the project as an intentional  attempt  by  the  government  to  exercise  control. I find it necessary 
at this  point to stress what  Morton  (1995)  emphasizes  in  his  book  on  Sudan  emphasizes,  i.e.  that 
aid failures cannot be explained by the  dubious  intentions of the  actors  working  within  the  aid 
sector  or  machine  or  system or business.  Aid  workers  generally try to  combine  serious  work  with 
the  advantages of the  high  salaries  that  characterize  the  business,  but  there  is  no  contradiction per 
se making it impossible  that  “hidden  agendas”  and  what  Olivier de Sardan  calls “accaparemenf’ 
of project activities,  completely  dominate the anticipated  outputs of the  project. As Crewe & 
Harrison  put it ‘There is no coordinated  conspiracy  in the development  industry,  and  not  all 
projects  obviously  fail” (Crewe & Harrison  1999 : 188). 
As certain reports show (see  chapter 3), especially  projects  with  low  levels of participation and 
institution  building  components ( infrastructure  projects as the  best  example),  have  a  low  “failure 
rate”,  most  often  the  roads are eventually  built,  and  deteriorate  afterwards  like  all  roads  do.  What 
is interesting  in  the  case of Northem  Burkina Faso is  that  a  large  infrastructure  project in Dori  had 
real  “side  effects”, not  only  what  Ferguson calls instrumental  effects. A local guy lamented  that 
the presence of the Italian road building team had  had  serious  implications: “lls ont  carrkment 
detncit le marche‘defernmes U Dori”. Prostitutes  had  become  prohibitively  expensive for local 
men. 
23 
In Burkina Faso there is no  justification  for  saying  bluntly, as Ferguson  quotes Williams, “ rural 
development  turns  out  to be a  strategy  for  increased  state  control  of  the p asantq” (p. 266). The 
state does not have  a  strategy per se for  expanding its control,  and it in fact seems to care very 
little about the peasantry  (to the extent  that  a state can  care).  Ferguson,  however, empirically 
shows that this has  been  the  case in Lesotho,  comparing  the  development efforts there with  the 
“betterment”  schemes of  Apartheid  South  Africa  and  the  Ujamaa  experience  of  Tanzania. But he 
abstains from too harsh  generalization, and calls for caution on two important  points: 
He focuses on the de-politicizing  effect of development  intervention.  Development discourse 
tends  to reduce the importance of all instrumental effects (expansion of administration, jobs) and 
downsizes potential conflict  over  resources,  stressing  the  importance of overall development 
objectives like “poverty  alleviation”,  “sustainable  natural  resource  management”,  often to  be 
solved  within a national  institutional  framework. 
Second, he questions  the  degree  to  which  it  makes  sense  to equate state  power  with “the ruling 
group”. The researcher  risks  falling  into  a  functionalist  trap if the  instrumental effects of  a 
development project become analysed as the purpose of the development activity, as an 
intentional process conducted by a  group of actors,  knowing  where  they  want  to  go. The state 
becomes  a tool in the hands of a  unitary  subject. 
Ferguson sees this point within a  context of the  evolution of theories of the  African  state. In the 
seventies,  theories  emphasized  that  “overdeveloped”  states  dominated its dichotomic opponent 
society, aview that has  had  serious  implications i  the  outline of  neo-liberal  structural  adjustment 
policies,  where  state  institutions  were  cut  and  a  destructive  and  normative  belief  in the market as 
regulatory  mechanism  has  prevailed. In the eighties  writers  suggested  that  states  were enfeebled, 
and  even  though  they  were  autocratic,  they  were  not  able  to  exercise  power  over  civil  society. He 
mentions Bayart (1986), Migdal and Chazan as examples of theoreticians who stress the 
deceptive civil society, and the many  popular  modes  of  action  that  weaken  the  state. But where 
writers like Migdal  (1994),  Chazan  and  Degnbol (1996) venture  into  a  taxonomy of what is state 
and what is society, thereby not producing much more than a static picture of the existing 
institutional setup in  a  given  society  and  revealing  little  about  mechanisms  of exercising power 
and  modes  of  accumulation, I think  he is not entirely fair to  Bayart,  who  deliberately denounces 
the conceptud1zation of the state as a  unitary  subject of a “ruling elite”! 
6 Ferguson  totally  renounces  the  concept of “civil  society”,  which is indeed  problematic. This 
is partly  because  neo-liberals  have  had  a  clearly  instrumental  and  functionalist  view of t, as 
social force which could be mobilized as bearer of development, a social field of 
intervention  allowing  a circumvention  of  the corrupt and ineffective  state.  Bayart,  however, 
has a  primarily  methodological  approach to the  analysis  of  civil society, stressing the 
heuristic dimension of the  concept.  Referring  to E.P. Thompsons  view  of classes as an 
analytical  category, which is only  meaningful if it is empirically and politically defined, i.e. 
if the class conceives of itself as being  a  class  in  opposition to other social formations, 
Bayart sees civil  society as only  making sense if it constitutes  itself as such in opposition to 
the  state.  We are thus guilty of functionalism if we deduce classes, states and civil societies 
entirely from  economic  or  sociological categories teleologically  conceived of as bearers of 
this or that historical  mission. In this sense it might  make sense to talk of  a  civil society, if 
we immediately abstain from attributing it characteristics as democratic, grass-roots, 
backward,  primordial,  egalitarian,  hierarchic or whatever. Furthermore we  must accept that 
there is no red line to be  drawn  between  civil  society  and the state, processes of search for 
hegemony  are  not  restricted to such spatial or institutional  spheres. 
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Having  maybe  read  Bayart  a  bit  superficially,  he  however  proposes  a  very  interesting  path for the 
analysis of the state in Africa drawing upon Foucault, and quite close to what  Bayart later 
formulated at greater  length  (Bayart  1989): 
“one cannot  begin  by  saying  that  the  state is not  an entity that “has” 
or does not “have” power, and state power is not a substance 
possessed by those individuals and groups that benefitfvom it. The 
state is neither the  source of power, nor simply the projection of 
power of an interested subject (Ruling group etc.). Rather than an 
entity “holding or “exercising ’’ power, it may be  fruitful  to think 
of the state as instead forming a relay or  point of coordination and 
multiplication of power relations.(-) “The state” in  this conception 
is not the  name of an actor, it is the name of a  way  of  tying together, 
multiplying and coordinating power relations, a  kind of knotting or 
congealing of power (p. 272). 
Seen within this framework, development projects do not necessarily expand the state’s 
capabilities,  but  ensure  that  specific  bureaucratic  knots are tied. This is  an interesting hypothesis 
for our case in the two sites in Burkina Faso where  competing  actors,  NGOs, state agents and 
farmers all try to  position  themselves vis-&vis bilateral  development  projects that are extremely 
resource-rich in terms of  money  and  logistics. 
There  is however a  remaining  problem in Ferguson’s  analysis. He may not be guilty of being 
conspiratorical, but  his  notion of power  makes extremely difficult to point the finger at certain 
social actors that  might  be  more  powerful  than  others. The lack  of  agency is critical once again. 
This is  analytically  unfortunate in  our  Dori-case  later  in  chapter 4, where  power and agency are 
closely linked. And it risks becoming  very  static,  thus  inheriting  some of the less fortunate 
characteristics of structuralism. 
Nelson &Wright (1995)  propose  a  typology of power  analysis,  which  they  use  in  analysing  levels 
of participation in development  projects.  They  see  three  ways of nalysing  power.  Power aspower 
to, power over and  power o$ 
Power to describes  a  situation  where  power,  like human  abilities,  can  grow  infinitely  if  you  work 
at it, and this growth  within  one  person does not  necessarily  affect  others. The danger with this 
definition is that it suggests  that  power is a  personal  attribute.  Using  this definition, “empower- 
ment” becomes a  reasonable  and feasible project. This is clearly also Rondinelli’s view  upon 
power, and along with  him  most of the  people  working  with participatory approaches within 
development (Mitchener  1998). 
The second  definition, power over, involves  questions  of  how to gain  access  to political decision 
making. This involves  a  more  structural nd institutional  embeddedness of power, and power is 
to be obtained through  access to and  control of these institutions. This definition however does 
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not provide much explanation regarding  how  power  works,  when  coercion  or  any  practical, 
ideological impact are not visible. 
Finally, power oJ which is Ferguson’s version of power. Here, power is not a substance 
possessed, it is subjectless.  This  conception of power  raises  problems  with  the  question of  agency, 
but  on  the  other  hand it is effective when  we attempt to  understand why analyses of development 
deficiencies  are  not  incorporated  in  the  big  development  institutions’  plans:  They do not  provide 
a  charter for the  sort of intervention  that  institutions are set  up  to  do,  they  are  discursively  shaped 
the  wrong  way. 
A last  problem  with  Ferguson is that  his  analysis  leaves  little  room  for  “recommendations”,  a  fact 
which  he is well  aware of and  does  not  regret. “So what  shall we do?”  people  ask,  “in  order to 
assure development,  to ensure that it’s sustainable.” His answer  is  interesting as he  says  that 
people  are  already doing it. Projects  do  not just fail, everybody tries to  get  the  best  out of them. 
The  question  we  shall  take  up  later  is  that  with  this  attitude  any  kind of initiative  to  improve  the 
situation of a  given  “target  group”,  is  immediately  discarded as more or less  doomed  in  advance, 
the  possibility of a  “successful”  project  is  more or less  ruled out. 
In the  following section, I shall  try  to  remedy some of the possible  weaknesses of the  Foucault- 
inspired  development  critique  by  coupling it with  an  approach  which places  a  great  emphasis  the 
single social actor, and the importance of stressing agency. I thereby hope to avoid the 
synonymous use  of  “discourse” and “structure”,  which I see as a  frequently  occurring  problem, 
especially  in  the  more  populist  accounts  of  post-structuralism  (Escobar  1995,  Munck & O’Hearn 
1999). This may be seen by some as incongruous,  but by deploying  a little pragmatism, I think 
that it is appropriate,  methodologically.  It is an effective way of re-introducing  politics into 
analyses  of  development  assistance,  thereby constituting a great improvement  compared  to  the 
“tool-perfection’’  of Rondinelli and  his likes. 
1.4. The “actor-oriented  approach” 
In the following, I provide a description the ”actor-orienter-approach, which has been a 
guideline  throughout  my  work  on  donor-recipient  relations  in Burkina Faso.  The  ”actor  oriented 
approach”  has  been  launched  as  a  ”new  paradigm”  (Long & Long 1992),  a  term  which I do  not 
find very useful, as one of the strengths of this approach is precisely it’s ability  to  contain  a 
multitude of epistemological  and  theoretical  differences. As I shall elaborate below, the ”actor- 
oriented”  approach is based on methodological  individualism  mixed  with  elements of Giddens’ 
structuration theory  (Giddens  1984,  Kaspersen  1995),  allowing for elaborate  analyses of local 
power  positionings,  and of conflict  over  meanings of development  discourse. I see the ”actor- 
oriented” approach primarily as a methodological tool, which has a number of theoretical 
problems that will be discussed  below. These problems  are not made less complicated by their 
coupling  with  poststructuralist  discourse  theory,  but  when  applied  to  the  analysis of development 
intervention  in Burkina Faso, this nevertheless  provides  a viable analytical  point of entry. 
I contend  that  the  actor-oriented  approach is the  most  fruitful  way of  analysing  development  work 
in Burkina Faso. It is productive to approach social actors  as “not simply  seen  as  disembodied 
social categories  (based  on class or  some other classificatory  criteria) or passive  recipients of 
intervention,  but  active  participants  who  process  information  and  strategies  in  their  dealings  with 
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various local actors as well  as  with  outside  institutions  and  personnel”  (Long & van der Ploeg, 
1994, p. 64). This is, on the other  hand,  hardly  very  provocative  when dealing with relations 
between donors and recipients, like in this case. The fact that a certain dissemination and 
selection of the “aid package”,  as it is  often  presented by the donor,  takes place is hardly very 
controversial to the researcher of development  aid.  What one ought to discuss is that different 
actors have different  means of being  “active  participants”,  a  point  that Marxists have equally 
stressed thoroughly (Corbridge,  1994, Leys 1995,  Mouzelis  1995). 
Actor-oriented approaches adhere to a  sociological principle of methodological individualism, 
whereby we avoid seeing functionalist-deduced groups of actors as bearers of this or that 
historical  mission. The “actor-oriented”  researchers  are,  however,  not  all  (Long  1992,  Long & va  
der  Ploeg  1994,  Gould  1997)  clear as to the  theoretical  implications of this,  and  the  actor-oriented 
turn seems  mostly to have  been  applied  at  a  methodological level. Furthermore, the approach  is 
inspired by some  of  the  facets of  Giddens’  structuration  theory,  and  has hence inherited some of 
its strengths and  weaknesses. 
1.4.1. Norman  Long’s  presentation of actor-oriented  research as a  “new  paradigm” 
The most clear presentation of what is meant by “actor-oriented research”, presented as a 
particular  scientific  approach  to  the  analysis of  rural societies,  comes  from  Norman  Long,  notably 
in the introduction to his edited  book on examples of this type  of  research “Battlefields of 
Knowledge”  (Long &Long 1992). 
According to Long,  the  paradigmatic  status of the  actor-oriented  approach  is justified as former 
approaches have reached an “impasse”, which has already been widely discussed within 
development  studies,  a  discussion  that I shall  not  deal  with  at  length  here  (See  Bayart  1989,  Booth 
1994,  Leys  1996).  Former  approaches,  modernist  and Marxist alike, have shared a linearity and 
evolutionalism in their  view of  development,  a  determinist  and extemalist view which actor- 
oriented  approaches  seek to avoid.  Long  stresses  that  the  actor-oriented  approach takes a special 
interest in the way similar structural  circumstances  produce  differential  responses,  even  when 
conditions seem similar. The actor-oriented approach departs from a dissatisfaction with 
attributing social analysis to external  determination.  Therefore: 
A more dynamic approach to the wzderstanding of social change is 
needed which stresses the interplay and mutual determination of 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors and relationships, and which 
recognizes the  central  role played by human action and conscious- 
ness (Long, 1992, p.20). 
This marks  a  return to a  certain  type of sociology  popular  in the 60s and early 70s (Boissevain 
1974), which however  was  unable to determine  in  a  satisfactory  manner  how the surrounding 
societal circumstances influenced  the  social  action of the actor. It  tended to “explain social 
behaviour  primarily in  terms of individual  motivations,  intentions  and  interest,”  thereby  adopting 
an “economic man” type of discourse, which upon careful scrutiny doesn’t even hold in 
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downtown Manhattan? Furthermore, as will be discussed later, there was a tendency to 
exaggerate  the intentionality and  the  directionality of the  actors’  actions. 
1.4.2. The  problems  with  the  concepts of agency,  knowledge  and  power 
A major  problem  when  operating  with  an  actor-oriented  approach  is,  of  course,  initially to define 
how  we conceptualize the “social  actor”.  Long  draws  heavily  on  the  work of Giddens  and  his 
thoughts about  reconsidering  the  role of “human  agency”.  The  notion of agency,  according  to 
Long,  “attributes to the individual actor the capacity  to  process  social  experience  and  to  devise 
ways  of coping with  life,  even  under  the  most  extreme  forms of coercion”  (Long  1992, p. 22). 
Actors  are  knowledgeable  and  capable.  It  is,  however,  not  only  individuals  that  can  be  attributed 
“agency”,  certain  organizations,  institutions  agencies,  groups etc. are  likewise able to act  as 
actors. Long,  however, cautions us not  to attribute agency  to  cover  collectivities  that  have no 
discernible way of formulating or cmying out decisions. The term “social actor” should, 
therefore, only be  attributed  to  those  social  entities  “that  can  meaningfully  be  attributed  with  the 
power of agency”  (ibid. p. 23). 
Concerning  the  question  of  whether we can permit attributing  agency to even the weakest  rural 
farmer, we return to  the  much  quoted  passage of Marx  saying  that  ”Men  make  history, but not in 
circumstances of their  own  choosing” (in Giddens 1984:  14). In other  words,  the  approach  does 
not  imply  that it is the  actors’  own  fault if they live in  misery, or that  they live in the  societies  they 
deserve.  Our  venture  into  rural  Burkina  Faso,where  the  inhabitants  are  perhaps  some f the  most 
destitute and marginalized on the world  market (but not necessarily either poor or miserable), 
clearly  indicates  that  the  manoeuvring  and  positioning of rural  farmers is very  important to 
understand  when  analysing  development.  Many  misunderstandings  stem from ignoring this type 
of social  action,  termed “Savoirfuirepopulaire sociule” (Olivier  de  Sardan  1995): their ability 
to manoeuvre vis-a-vis local  authorities,  how  to  get  the  most ut of a  rural  credit  system, how to 
answer a sociologist etc. 
Agency, according to Long, is not to be equated with  decision-making  capacity alone, it is 
composed of social relations  and  therefore  has to do with  power. Effective agency  implies the 
strategic  generation of a  network of social  relations.  It  becomes  important  to  win  struggles  over 
the  attributions of specific  social  meanings  to  particular  events,  actions  and  ideas.  For  instance, 
development  interventions  can  be  seen as weapons  in  the  hands  of  those  promoting  them,  and  the 
ones  subjected to them  will try to  struggle  to  get the best  out of them.  Long  quotes  Giddens:  “All 
forms of dependence  offer  some  resources  whereby  those  who are subordinate  can  influence the 
activities of their superiors”  (Long & van  der Ploeg 1994). As we shall see in  the following 
chapters,  “dependence” is, in fact, not as Giddens and the  majority of scholars of development 
suggest, seen by the destitute actors  as a bad thing but as a  desired  position  to  be in, as this 
implies  some sort of asymmetric  reciprocity. 
7 For a  later  version of this debate  look at the debate in ”World Development”  between Sara 
Berry, Pauline Peters and Robert Bates (1994), where the two Idles criticize the culturally 
specific ”rationality” of Bates. 
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The  actor-oriented  approach is inspired by Giddens’  structuration  theory  whereby  relations of 
actors and  structures  merge,  the  constitution of structures  should be understood  in  relation  to 
human agency, they constitute one another (Giddens 1984). This is not played out in a 
mechanistic way: Long  stresses  that  it  is  worth  noticing  that the actor could  often  have  acted 
otherwise, structures do not determine the actions of the actor, they are at the same time 
constraining  and  enabling. 
Long  goes  on to emphasize  that  societies  contain  different  discourses  and  rationalities  leading to 
different  and conflicting strategies  deployed by the  social  actor.  Finally,  he  emphasizes  that  the 
term  “social  actor”  is  to  be  understood as a  social  construction,  not as synonymous  with  “human 
being”. Furthermore, one needs to distinguish  between two different concepts of social  actors: 
that  which is culturally  endogenous,  and  that  which  arises from the  researcher’s  own  categories. 
Neither  of  them  are, of course, necessarily  flawed,  but  both culturally and  socially  constructed. 
Agency is thus  constructed  differently  in  different  cultures  and,  especially when  dealing  with 
cross-cultural interventions like development, it becomes important to grasp these multiple 
realities. The construction of agency therefore requires (not surprisingly) an analysis of the 
construction of power and  knowledge,  which a e  closely  interlinked.  Power  and  knowledge is not 
something which is possessed it emerges  out of social  processes.  Agency  can  therefore  not 
always  be  “imposed”  or  given as development  practitioners try to do when  they try to  “empower” 
people  or  have  them  “participate”.  Power  and  knowledge  become  reified,  and  this  process is an 
essential  part of social struggles  over  meaning  and  strategic relationships and  resources. 
Longs  account of actor  orientation  is  methodologically  extremely  useful  as  a  heuristic  device for 
analysis  of  development  intervention,  a  point  which  has  been further developed by Olivier  de 
Sardan (1995) in his attempts to develop methodologies for anthropological research on 
development, a point which I deal  with  at  length  below.  The  above  discussion  of  power  and 
knowledge is a good combination of Weberian action sociology and post-structuralism as 
sketched earlier in  this  chapter. 
His  account on “agency”,  however,  inherits  some of the  problems of Giddens’  structuration  theory 
in  its  attempt  to  merge  the  structure/actor  dualism. In attempts  to define who  we  can  reasonably 
define as actors, we are forced to content ourselves with a rather nebulous and normative 
definition.  This  problem  is  actualized  when  speaking of classes,  where an  old  discussion  between 
structuralists  and  adherents of action  sociology  concerning  whether it is reasonable to speak of 
classes if  they cannot be attributed  agency,  pops  up. E P. Thompson (1991) insists  that  speaking 
of classes, if  they do not  have the ability  to  act as such, or  to  define  themselves  as  a  class  in 
opposition  to or in alliance with  other  classes,  does  not  make  sense, an  argument  which  is  equally 
forcefully made  within  an  African context by Bayart (1989). It is meaningless to try to deduce 
classes from functionalist economically-based  categories,  as this will eventually  lead either to 
politically  and  analytically  useless  instruments  which  will  only  have  esoteric  and  academic  value, 
or to  the  attribution of “interests”  and  “consciousnesses”  to  certain social actors,  who  might  not 
agree  with  these  interpretations.  Long  claims  that  “classes”  should  not be considered as having 
agency, but if they  don’t, do we  need  the  notion of class?  “We  must  only  define  “social  actors” 
as organisations  and institutions that can  reasonably  be  attributed this.” This is no definition!  It 
somehow  calls for a  strangely  normative  common-sense  based  definition of  agency,  which  might 
serve  well as a  methodological  tool  but  is  very  unsatisfactory.  What is a  “reasonable”  attribution? 
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The  same  goes for the structuration  notion.  Actors  influence  structures,  which  at the same time 
constrain, construct and enable the  action of the  actors. Yes, and so what?  Again  a  strangely 
commonsensical  argument,  which I personally  eagerly  subscribe  to,  but  which at the same time 
takes us back  to  an  analytical  square  one. 
Mouzelis  (1995)  argues  that  Giddens’  actor/structure-dualism  makes it impossible  to identify the 
movers of social change,  and  that  the  agency-based  approach  makes it difficult to  “scale” the 
different actors. Some actors are  obviously  much  more  powerful  than others, they operate at 
different levels of society,  and  are so heterogenous  that  the  term  “social  actor”  becomes so wide 
that it becomes  meaningless. 
Furthermore, it is not clear to  what extent the actors’  actions are “strategic”, there is a potential 
within  Long’s  thinking of exaggerating  the  intentionality  and  directionality of the  actors’  actions. 
Gould  (1997)  thus  claims  that  Long  approaches  utilitarianism  in  his  insistence  on  the  “room for 
manoeuvre” of the  actor.  Gould  furthermore  questions  the  ability of the  actor-oriented  approach 
to explain “what hold societies together”,  what  defines  a  “society”  and  which  mechanisms of 
compliance and affiliation are at  work. 
It is therefore more  at the methodological than at the theoretical level that “actor-oriented” 
approaches  have  reached  new  frontiers. At the  theoretical  level  they  mostly  resemble  a  series of 
sensible compromises, while stressing empirical work based on a verstehende sociological 
approach. In the following, three points will be discussed to clarify the problems  mentioned 
above. First, the issue of methodological  individualism.  Second,  the  issue of “scale”  or “level” 
of analysis;  and third the question of “strategy”  as  a  useable  concept. 
1.4.3. Methodological  individualism 
The actor-oriented  approach  marks  the  return of a  tempered  methodological  individualism. The 
insistence on methodological  individualism is, to  some  degree,  sparked by a  distancing  within 
social  anthropology from structural  functionalism  (Berry  1993,  Olivier  de  Sardan 1995, Gould 
1997): by emphasising friendships, networks, alliances, coalitions, and seeing actors as 
entrepreneurial manipulators of their interpersonal relations, and not as accomplishers of a 
historical mission or passive pawns within a system. The insistence on methodological 
individualism makes sense, as I see it, as a way  to  help  avoiding  that  aggregates from social 
science  (society, culture, ethnicity, class, kinship,  mode of production  etc) from being taken as 
collective subjects to  which we ascribe  all  kinds of characteristics. 
Methodological individualism has, according to Berry (1994), rightfully been criticized for 
treating  social  processes as multiples  or  weighted sums of  autonomous individual  acts.  A  number 
of misunderstandings concerning this  concept  have  prevailed  over  time,  giving the concept a 
utilitarian and Zweckrutionalitut - focused bias. Methodological individualism draws upon 
classical German  sociology esp. Weber,  but  can in fact,  interestingly  enough,  equally  be traced 
back to Marx, who is ambiguous on this point, taking an individualist standpoint but later 
developing ideas like ”objective interests” of members of different  classes (See Boudon 1986). 
However, the voluntaristic  assumption  that  people  act  isolated  and  without  influence from their 
surroundings, always pursuing their  self-interest  constitutes  a form  of  methodological 
individualism, which is more ideological  than  methodological. 
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There is another  danger  which  must be avoided,  that  of  ascribing  a  single or unique  rationality 
(most often economically optimizing) to the social actor. Actors circulate between several 
”logics”,  they act socially  within  a  sphere  which is often  full of ambiguities,  ambivalences,  and 
different  influences.  What  is  important when  looking  at  problems  related to rural  development 
in Burkina Faso is not  to  focus  too  narrowly  on, for instance,  farmers  at local level, thereby 
overlooking the influence of bureaucrats,  developers,  businessmen,  brokers etc. 
It  is,  thus,  important  not t  fall  into  a  voluntaristic  trap,  giving  insufficient  attention  to  examining 
how individual choices  are  shaped by larger  frames of  meaning  and  action.  Neither  should  we 
explain social  behaviour  primarily  in  terms of individual  motivations, intentions or interests. 
Methodological  individualism  should  enable us to avoid  precisely  this  pitfall.  Boudon’s example 
(1986) explaining  why  individual  motivations  end up working  against individual interests, is 
revelatory  in this respect.’ 
There is a  widespread  fear of adhering  to  methodological  individualism  (Berry  1994,  Gould  1997) 
because of the  risk of being  accused  of  being  neo-liberal,  economistic,  ethno-centric,  utilitarian 
and various other evils. A fear probably stemming from a time when structuralist Marxist 
thinking was  very  predominant.  Another  factor  explaining  the  reticence of rtain researchers  to 
accept  the  principle of methodological  individualism seems to  be  the  understandable  fear of being 
lumped  with  “rational  choice”  theorists, who end  up  postulating  a  directionality  and  intentionality 
to actions by social actor, which  researchers  ought  to be  the first people  to  question.  (see Berry 
1993b,  Peters  1993,  Bates  1993)  Olivier  de  Sardan  (1995)  therefore  proposes  that one distinguish 
carefully  between  1)  methodological  individualism,  which  is  strictly  methodological,  and  which 
permits  an  understanding of the  multiple  forms of friendship,  networks, alliances and coalitions 
which characterize the African political landscape and 2) ideological individualism, which 
resembles neo-liberal ideology with its utilitarian beliefs in the economic self-interest and 
directionality of the individual  action of the  social  actor. 
Lukes (1968) in  his  classic  critique of methodological  individualism,  lines  up 4 central  doctrines 
advocating  methodological  individualism,  which  according  to  him  disqualifies  this  sociological 
approache’s  validity: 
. a  view  that  holds  that it is  elf-evident  hat  social  phenomena  can  be 
explained  only  in  terms of the analysis of the  conduct of individuals, 
so-called  “truistic  social  atomism”. 
8 The  example  given is the  school in a  Vesterbro-like  environment. The parents caring about 
their  children’s  education, wanting  them  to  integrate  with  the  immigrants,  having  all  the  right 
opinions about children education  and  the  necessity of maintaining  a  high  quality public 
schooling system,  end up being  the first moving  their  children to private schools. This 
accelerates the deterioration of the public schooling system. This is however just an 
example, it is by no means a law  of  social  action.  The  same  sociological principle has  been 
applied to Sahelian rangeland  in  the  “Tragedy  of  the conmons”-narrative, where Hardin 
postulated  that  the free access to the  grazing  lands of the  individual leads to the  ruin of all. 
This narrative has  however  been  convincingly  refuted for its  mechanistic  application  of 
ideological notions of social actors’ guidance of self- interest and for overlooking the 
importance of local  institutions’  capacity to  manage  collective  resources (Roe 1998, Juul 
1999). 
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. The  idea  that  all  statements  about  social  phenomena can be  reduced 
to  descriptions of the qualities of individuals.  “Structures”  make  no 
sense,  they  are just aggregates  of  properties  of  individuals. 
. Only  individuals are real.  Any  concepts  referring to properties of 
collectivities or social  systems  are  abstract  models,  contrary to the 
notion of the  individual. 
The  allegation  that  there  cannot  be  laws in social  science,  save  insofar 
as they are  laws  about  the  psychological  dispositions  of  the  individ- 
ual. 
Giddens (1984)  supports  Lukes  in  disagreeing  seriously  with  all the above  points. The first is 
truistic  and  therefore  in  a sense beyond  debate.  And the following  three  are  demonstrably false. 
What  Lukes  seems  to  be  doing is looking at methodological  individualism  not as a heuristic 
category, but rather  as  a  foundation for establishing  societal  laws. 
It  is,  however,  important  to  emphasize  that  the  methodological  individualism  is methodological, 
and  does  not  exclude  an  analysis of how  societal  structures  and  conjunctures shape the action of 
the social actor.  Boudon  (1986)  thus  insists  that  actors’  behaviour  can  only  be  analysed  in  a 
verstehende way, and this requires strictly individualistic methods. Concepts such as will, 
consciousness,  psychology  (and I add  strategy)  can  only  be  added  metaphorically to collective 
subjects.  Boudon  goes on to  emphasize  that the principle of methodological individualism does 
not  rule  out  the  existence of  phenomena  such as influence,  authority or charisma.  This  should  not, 
however,  be  seen as indicating  that  the  social  actor  is  passive or fundamentally susceptible to 
manipulation. If, for  instance,  farmers in Burkina Faso are  reluctant  to  adopt  new agricultural 
techniques, we are  required  not  to  resort  to  “society-based” explanations like “it’s the weight  of 
tradition”, it’s “peasant  modes of perception”  etc. but instead  to try and  understand whether we 
as researchers  would  not  have  done  the  same  thing.  This  does  not  exclude  that certain farmers 
might  be  unwise  not to change their practice,  but  then  at  least  we will have  understood this. 
According  to  Weber  (cited  in  Boudon  1986; Gerth &Mills 1958,  p. 280) it is  only the individual 
that  can  be  attributed  motivations  and  interests. If we start attributing interests  and motivations 
to institutions, social groups, classes whatever, we may end up in an extreme degree of 
determinism, attributing, like certain  Marxists  had  the  habit of doing, “false consciousness” to 
social  actors  not  acting like they  were  supposed  to  according  to  their  theory. This often ends up 
in  deliberate  attempts  to  avoid  understanding  the  motives of social  action.  Another danger is 
ending  up  attributing  agency  to  notions  that  ought  not  be  attributed  with  it, like “capitalism” or 
“modes of production”  (Meillassoux  1975),  repeating  the  functionalism of structural-functionalist 
anthropology. 
According  to  Boudon,  many  misunderstandings  regarding  methodological individualism are 
drawn from misinterpretations of Weber’s  and  Tonnies’  distinction  between Gemeinschuft and 
Gesellschaft. Tonnies  was  focusing on the fact that  interdependence was more marked in certain 
types of social  context.  This  has,  however,  led  to  theorems  stressing  that in a Gemeinschaft 
individuality  dissolves  and  becomes  a  focus of the  collective  will. The proof  is  the  unanimity  and 
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consensus of village  communities.  The  individual,  however,  belongs to the GeseZZschujf,  which 
then  again  gets  equated  with  “modern”  societies;  individualism is turned into ideology. 
This  misunderstanding,  which  is  at  the  basis of  many misinterpretations  of  rural  African  societies, 
results in a  series of dichotomies  operating  within  development  discourse. The 
Gemeinschaft/GeseZZschujf duality is thus  found  in  dichotomies  of traditionallmodem, 
communityhndividual,  rural/urban,  and  even  related issues like gifthoney,  clientilisd 
bureaucracy,  some  feminists  have  even  argued  woman/man  (Olivier de Sardan 1995). 
The  point is that  though  an  individual’s  conduct is carefully  scrutinized  within village society, 
this  does  not  mean  that hisher individuality  dissolves (one might  argue that proof of this is that 
so many  Burkinan  escape  the  villages in order  to go to  the  capital  or  to  Cote  d’Ivoire  to  avoid  this 
scrutiny). It is, furthermore, not restricted to an analysis of societies, which are termed 
“individualistic”,  and  according  to  Boudon  neither  does it nly  apply to “micro”-levels of society. 
The  strength of  methodological  individualism lies in its insistence upon the agency of the social 
actor, and hisher explainable  action.  But  explaining this action  is  not that easy.  Why  does  the 
actor do this  and  that? And how do we  bridge  the  contradiction of not  accepting entirely that 
social  change  is  the  aggregation f atomized  individuals’  actions?  Boudon,  the  most enthusiastic 
adherent of methodological  individualism  stresses  that  there  is no reason  why we should  not  take 
macroscopic  variables  into  account,  and  that  issues of relationships  and  intersubjectivities  are  still 
a  central  concern. 
Methodological individualists are right to be suspicious of the inherent essentialism and 
functionalism of “structural  sociology”,  furthermore  they are right to emphasize that we should 
not  forget  the  knowledgeability of the  social  actor and insist that  “social forces” are a  mixture 
of intended  and  unintended  consequences  of  action  undertaken  in  specific contexts. But they  are 
wrong  if  they  instead  reduce  social  categories  to  descriptions of individual  predicates. 
Giddens  insists  that  methodological  individualism and “structural  sociology”  are  not  mutually 
incommensurable  alternatives. We, however,  need  to  accept  that  “structure” is not the same  as 
constraint, and that the terms agent, individual actor and agency need careful clarification, 
because who  can  be  qualified as bearers of agencies?  Collectivities? Institutions? Tribes? The 
Government?  etc  etc. 
Olivier de Sardan has a similar project to Giddens, trying to merge these actor/structure 
dilemmas. He  proposes  two  “heuristic  points of view”,  a  notion  he prefers to what others call 
paradigms:  “holism”  and  the  methodological  individualism. The study  of  development,  he  says, 
has  to  take  a  holistic  perspective  in  the  sense  that it merges  various  registers  of  social  reality,  and 
is always  economic,  social,  ideological  and  symbolic at the same time. In that sense, he insists 
on what  Polanyi  calls  the  embeddedness of the  economy in the social life. This must,  of  course, 
not lead  to  a Hyd6nian normativism of “economies of affection” (Hyd6n 1983), but  must,  more 
specifically, force us to see the  economy  and  social  life  as  interrelated. On the other hand,  we 
must be careful  not  to be holistic  in  the  sense that we  must avoid  a functionalist view  of  society 
as a homogenous and coherent entity. Societies are neither despotic and totalitarian nor 
communalistic  and  egalitarian per se. We  must  avoid  seeing in social  action the simple effects 
of a  system,  not  considering  positionings  within  a  social structure, a  common feature within  the 
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structuralist  Marxism as  well  as  among  “culturalists”  who see systems of cultural  values,  national 
characters, or “habitus” as stable  social  categories,  enabling  essentialist  conclusions  about  certain 
typologies  of societies (Bayart  1996). 
There are thus two  types of holism. The heuristic which  emphasizes the transversality  and 
multidimensionality  of social processes,  and the other which sees everything  as  a  “hypertrophy 
of the system, the structure”. These  two  holisms  can  be  termed  ”methodological  holism” and 
“ideological  holism.” In order  to  avoid  any  misunderstanding, it is the  first  kind of holism which 
is interesting when  studying  development. 
1.4.4. The  problem of scale and level of analysis 
Mouzelis (1995) raises the problem of “levels” of analysis when operating from an actor- 
oriented  approach  perspective.  As  Booth  (1994)  also  notes,  the  actor  oriented  approach  has so far 
been  most effective when  dealing  with  “micro” levels. How does  the  actor-oriented  approach 
work  on  a  larger  scale or level? Mouzelis  questions  the  validity  of  seeing  “macro”leve1s  as mere 
aggregations of actions  at  micro level. These  are  very  relevant  issues  to  take  up,  but extreme 
caution  should  be  exercised, to avoid  confusing  “micro-macro’’  with  “local-central” (or “local- 
national”, national-international) and with “actor-structure”. As we shall see in the coming 
chapters, the referring of certain  social  processes to a  defined  space  or  level is rather more 
difficult  than at first  sight. 
Actor-orientation  at  “macro”  level  has,  according  to  Booth  (1994),  contributed  to  a  healthy focus 
on diversity  within  development  studies.  First, it is  now  very  difficult  to  operate  with  a  notion like 
“The  Third  World”,  after  the  realisation  that  societies  like  Hong  Kong  and  Burkina Faso perhaps 
did not have  that  many  things in common.  Later, it changed the focus of development studies 
from generalities  about  post-colonialism to analyses of specific  features of the  African state. 
Some  resorted  to  generalizations  about  a  specific  cultural  mode of dealing  with  economy  (Hydbn, 
1983)  Others  provided  the first ground  for  “actor  orientation”  through  their  meticulous analysis 
of social  processes  within the state  apparatus in order to attempt  careful  typologizations of modes 
of domination  and  accumulation,  (Berry,  1984,  1993;  Kitching  1984;  Bayart  1989). The good 
thing about these latter studies  is  precisely  that  they do not define  African  society  as  a  diagram 
with decisions and  struggles  played out at different  institutional  “levels”, but as a complicated 
mess of networks, factions and  alliances  which  are  constantly  changing. 
Migdal (1994) proposes  an  analysis of African  state/society  relations  looking  at the different 
levels at which state governance occurs and looking at the interaction between levels, an 
approach  which  has  been  labelled  the  “interactionist  approach”  (Degnbol  1996b). 
In order  to  explain  why  political  outcomes  are  not  necessarily  in line with what  seem to be state 
“interests”,  but may stem instead from the  complex  interaction  between  different  levels  of the 
state,  he  defines  4  levels  at  which  a  disaggregation of the  state  should  be attempted The trenches 
(i.e.  the  lowest  level,  extension  officers,  school  teachers  who  act  with  maximum  confrontation 
with  society).  Secondly  the dispersedfield ofices i.e. the  national  extension  services  and  branches 
of ministries and  the prefecture. Thirdly  the agency’s central office, (la direction nationale, 
ministries,  PNGT  offices)  Finally central  commanding  heights i.e. the  president’s  office, certain 
ministers. 
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From  an  analysis  of the  different  policies  at  these  different levels, he  concludes that conflicting 
interests  on  different  levels  often  result  in  concrete  state  policies that have little resemblance  to 
official  statements. 
Although he uses a Gramscian vocabulary, Migdal’s institutional topography is strangely 
undynamic.  This  rather  arbitrary  defining  of  “levels”  at  which  “state”  and  “society”  interact, tells
us very little about  social  processes  concerning  power  and  resource  allocation, and will  at best 
give us a  more  or  less  accurate  picture of the  state  apparatus,  which  is  nonetheless  likely  to  look 
very  different  the  following  year.  Furthermore, it reveals  nothing  about  the social processes 
enabling  social  actors  to  “straddle”  between  the  different  levels,  and  between  what  is  termed  state 
and  society.  “State”  and  “society”  are  two  distinct  social  spheres,  and  the state actor  can  have 
more  or less contact with society.  Finally,  although  he  puts it in brackets,  he assumes that  there 
is  such  a thing as a state “interest”. 
It therefore seems fair to  conclude  that  when  Bayart and Etching are  successful  in conducting 
“actor-oriented” research on a “macro” level, it is precisely because they do not confine 
themselves  to  establishing  levels,  spaces  and  institutions  within  which  social  processes  can be 
boxed. In fact the  micro-macro  distinction  more or less evaporates. 
Booth  goes  on  to  explain  how  inspiration from actor-Orientation  has  sparked  research at “meso- 
levels”. Actor-orientation  has  given  new life to  class  analysis,  moving it away from fruitless 
attempts to adapt imported models of class formation, hardly even valid in the northern 
industrialized  countries,  to  societies in Africa. A result of this is a  very  widespread reluctance 
towards  operating  with  a  definition of classes  within an African  context, operating with other 
types of social  organization,  which  are  more  relevant  in  Africa like clans, factions, ethnic forms 
of representation,  networks, more fluid and invisible  notions  than classes (Cruise O’Brien 1976, 
Berry 1993, Bayart  1989).  Without  rejecting  categorically the relevance of class analysis these 
studies  have  cautioned us to  look  at  class  formation  in  Africa as only  very  embryonic,  and at the 
same  time  not as a  process  advancing as a  result of some  historical  logic.  Another  “meso” level, 
Booth emphasizes is gender  analysis,  which  has  helped to unravel  modes of subjugation  and 
subordination,  stressing  at  the  same  time  the  danger of importing  normative assumptions of 
gender  relations  from  women’s  movements  in  Europe  and  America. 
At  “micro-level”  (which is the  one I shall  predominantly be examining  in the following  chapters), 
the actor-orientation has focused on the diversity of especially rural societies and their 
heterogeneity,  highlighting  the  difficulties  in  applying  grand  models  and  schemes  and attributing 
rural  populations  specific  historical  missions or essentialist  characteristics. As will be discussed 
below, it has  also  turned  the  focus to, for  instance,  the  analysis of institutions  and  issues  that have 
tended  to  become  depoliticised,  such  as  “development”  (Olivier  de  Sardan,  1988,  1995;  Crehan 
& von  Oppen,  1988;  Bierschenk,  1988),  or  “natural  resource management”(laurent & Mathieu, 
1994;  Lund  1998). 
Now,  to  what  extent  is  this  thinking on macro-  and  micro  levels  adequate?  Mouzelis insists that 
if micro  and  macro  are  not  linked  to  agency  and  structure, the distinction is a  useful  one. He 
defines  macro  as  referring  to  cases  where  the  impact of institutionalized  rules  or  actors’  practices 
stretches widely  over time and  space; micro applies where this impact is very limited. This 
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distinction  should  enable us to avoid  reductionist  explanations, jumping from levels of analysis 
of less-encompassing  to  more-encompassing social systems  without  taking  into  account their 
complexities. A micro-macro distinction remains useful in order to maintain a distinction 
between  levels of analysis,  making  sure  we  become able to  attribute  the  necessary  weight to the 
different  levels,  thereby  being  able  to  distinguish  between  what  is  socially  important  and  what is 
less  important  (Mouzelis 1995, p. 155). The  problem is that if this  distinction is to  be  withheld, 
it seems crucial  to  adopt strictly methodological  individualism,  something  Mouzelis is not too 
enthusiastic  about.  And  another  problem  is to define what  are  “micro-events”,  i.e.  events that are 
confined  in  time and space.  It  becomes  difficult to assess  the  importance of interaction  (Giddens 
1984, p. 142). 
Ferguson (1998) eloquently questions the way we tend to construct “levels” or virtual 
“topographies of power” thus implicitly  operating  with  a  vertical  ranking of institutions and 
spaces.  The State thus  tends to be  placed  on  top f the  institutional  hierarchy,  while  a  more or l ss 
ill defined “civil  society”  is  placed  at  the  bottom.  Apart  from  framing  the  analysis  within  a 
national context where it often does not belong, it is wrong to see “civil society” as being 
necessarily  “at  the  bottom” or representing  some  kind of  “grassroots”.  As  Ferguson  shows,  “civil 
society” is often  made up of multinational  organizations, NGOs and  the  like  with  a  wide  network 
of international  contacts  and  considerable  resources  at  their  disposition.  He  suggests  that  viewed 
within a  horizontal  topography,  the  state-civil  society  dichotomy  might show a quite different 
picture of the  power  implications  within  these i sues. The topographies of power  become  active 
in shaping  the way we shape our views  on  political  realities,  and  therefore  they  become  policy- 
generating as  well. Mouzelis thus  operates  with  a  notion of the  nation  state  (macro),  which is a 
far more coherent entity than is the case in  most  African  societies,  and is therefore  guilty of 
building  imaginary  topographies, as “state”  is  clearly on top,  society  at  the  bottom.  Furthermore 
Mouzelis holds  preconceived  notions  of  which  structures  produce  macro-levels,  which  type of 
institutions, etc. He is therefore right in maintaining that there  are  certain  societal  mechanisms 
and actors  that  are  more  important and  decisive  than  others.  The  problem is that he is sometimes 
a bit too eager define in advance  which institutions these are,  a  point  which  Ferguson  rightly 
points to  as  dangerous  within  an  African  context. 
The  definition of levels of analysis  must,  therefore  be  dealt  with  with  the  utmost  caution.  Rigid 
distinctions of spatial  and  institutional  spheres  within  which  certain  social  processes occur end 
up obfuscating political  realities  and  become  instrumental  in  generating  narratives of 
development, thereby  proposing  technical solutions to problems  that  ought  to  be  analysed  as 
political.  The  most  interesting  analyses of development in African  societies  (Berry  1984,  1993, 
Bayart 1989, Kitching 1984, Olivier de Sardan 1995, Meams & Leach 1996, Gould 1997, 
Ferguson 1990, 1998)  are  interesting  precisely  because  they  succeed  in  getting  beyond  these 
levelings. The “local” appropriates, selects and alters “external” influences which again are 
influenced in a way  which Giddens calls “double hermeneutics”  (Kaspersen  1995). The notion 
of locality is thus  produced,  and  localization  is  a  process  through  which  the  production of locality 
becomes a change in sentiments, ideas  and interests undergirding  social  actions.  The  conse- 
quences of this are that  we  must  be  aware of the dangers of looking  too  uncritically at the 
prospects of, for instance,  establishing  modes of “gestion de terroirs” as the  power  implications 
within  natural  resource  management of  may not be confineable  to  a  defined  space. 
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1.4.5. Understanding verstehen 
The remaining, but intractable problem  now  becomes how to acquire  sufficient information to 
be able to understand the individual  action, how to be verstehende. This involves solving the 
riddle as to whether  individual  action  can  at  all  be  explained in a  meaningful  way. The principle 
of verstehen is simple: 
In the sense which Weber used it, it means  establishing  the kind of 
relationships between the actors’ situation and their motivation and 
action which enable the observer to conclude that in the same 
situation he  or  she  would probably have acted in a like  manner  being 
able to persuade his or her reader to feel the  same ”. (Boudon 1986, 
P. 55) 
This sounds  quite  reasonable,  but  a  serious  problem  remains.  Culture,  conjunctures,  and the fact 
that  social  change  apparently  occurs in  very  different  locations  along  similar  patterns  and at early 
the same time  become  hard to explain. A verstehende approach as it is outlined by Boudon  above 
implies  that the observer  is  very  well  aware of the contextual  variables  that shape the actions of 
the observed actors. Or, as Weber himselfputs it, “Thus for a  science  which  is  concerned  with 
the subjective meaning of action, explanation requires a grasp of the context of meaning 
(Sinnzusammenhang) in which an actual course of understandable action thus interpreted 
belongs”. (Weber 1947, pp. 95-96) 
Drinkwater (1992), is critical of the “actor-oriented”  approach’s  ability to  be applied  reflexively 
to the researcher himself (Drinkwater constantly  writes  “herself”). He quotes Outhwaite: 
(W)e cannot simply record, in  an objective  and  valuefree way, the 
practices and beliefs of other  human  beings.  The  social  scientist  does 
not go  into the field  as a “tabula rasa” and return with an account 
of what it is like to be a European car worker or  an African peasant; 
it  is  precisely  in the encounter between the  social  scientist’s own 
beliefs and practices and those people he or she is studying which 
makes up whatever understanding we can  have  of another social 
reality (Drinkwater, 1992:375). 
A friend of mine is carrying out an interesting study of  young  members  of Pentecostal churches 
in  Ouagadougou. She has  been  interviewing  them  about  their  views  on  Christianity, iden ity, life 
and  their  expectations to it,  etc. At one  point  an  interviewee  said  that  he too wanted to interview 
her  on the same issues.  Going  through t e tapes  after  returning  home,  she  found  out  that  what she 
had answered was, in the best cases, a sensible representation of  what she  had  thought  at  that 
particular moment, but in most cases outright rubbish, pathetic discount-philosophy on the 
meaning  of  life,  carefully @ut unintentionally)  constructed  in  order to please  the  interviewer. This 
made  her  more  sensitive to the importance of a  critical  hermeneutic  approach,  especially because 
the questions  that she was  asked  were  in line with her project,  and  therefore  presumably  more  in 
line with  her thoughts than the thoughts of the young Ouagalais. It was  therefore reasonable to 
assume that their answers were even more far fetched. We are thus beyond a simplistic 
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interpretation of respondents answers as truthful or unreliable, what we are searching is 
understanding. 
Drinkwater describes how his research  in  Zimbabwe  among  farmers showed that contrary to 
predominant  official  attitudes,  farmers’  practices  were  not inefficient and degrading. By “letting 
farmers speak freely” it was possible to uncover a perfectly understandable rationality. 
Drinkwater concludes that “In holding farmers to be ignorant we are confirming our own 
ignorance” (Drinkwater 1992: 377). 
I think  that  Drinkwater  contradicts  himself  a bit in the above statements. “Letting farmers speak 
freely” must mean  giving  them an opportunity to present  their case to an outside observer. It is 
natural that they  will try to appear  knowledgeable,  contesting the government extension agents’ 
view of them as ignorant.  “Speaking  freely” does not  necessarily  imply  that hey say the same 
things to the researcher as they  do  to  their  fellow  villagers.  And  the  fact  that  they are knowledge- 
able concerning their agriculture is hardly surprising. I would therefore turn Drinkwater’s 
statement upside down  and  challenge  what I think is a  problem  in the actor-oriented approach: 
In holding  farmers  to be  smart,  we  are c o n f i i n g  our own smartness as researchers.  There  might, 
however, be a  stupid  bloke  or  two  out  there, doing as his father told  him, malnourished, never 
receiving much  inspiration,  tired  and  recalcitrant, unable to adapt to new circumstances. It has, 
however,  become  remarkably  politically  incorrect to say this. Researchers  nowadays  venture into 
the field  precisely  with the objective of corroborating  that  “local  knowledge” is important, well 
adapted, rational etc. This is, in my view,  a  much  more fruitful approach than anticipating that 
they  are  ignorant  and  need to be  developed,  it is also an attempt to be verstehende, but  in  a sense 
it is not less normative  in  its  point of departure. There is thus no  fool-proof  methodology to be 
applied  when  setting  out as verstehende sociologist, it depends on the researcher’s knowledge of 
the society  under  scrutiny, as well as on his willingness to question  the  preconceived notions he 
shows up with. As I shall argue below it furthermore helps to focus on certain heuristic 
categories,  such as conflict,  within  the  society  analysed,  revealing  dynamics,  that  may  be  hidden. 
Finally, although  most  actor-oriented  researchers are aware of this, I think there i s  a tendency 
anyway to underestimate  the  “bias” (I do not like the word bias, as this seemingly indicates that 
there may be such a  thing  as  an “unbiased” answer) of respondents’  answers to researchers,  given 
the fact that the researcher  is  a  potential  ally  and  a  link to an unreachable outside world.  “We do 
not know  how to attract the people of development,  and  we  wish  that you would help us” as a 
farmer said to me.  Many are the  letters  that I have  received from villagers stating that “Now that 
you have honoured us with  a  visit,  and  you  have  seen  with  your  own  eyes  the  misery  in  which  we 
live, we  would  be  most  pleased  if  you  would  help us find  a  donor  who  can provide us with a  well, 
as the  one we have has just run  dry”.  There is no real solution to this, I have tried to enter into 
more of a discussioddialogue rather  than  interviewing  on the basis of questionnaires, but there 
is no “solution” to this  problem,  one just has  to  accepts  that  the  researcher is a part of the answer 
he gets. 
1.4.6. Actors’ actions 
But how do we trace the genealogies of the societal processes that shape actors’ actions? The 
actor-orientation is, as  mentioned,  derived from a  Weberian  analysis stressing a hermeneutic, 
”verstehende” sociology based on methodological individualism. We still, however, need 
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instruments  to  explain  notions  like  culture or other  mechanisms  that  shape  the  actors’  actions.  As 
Weber states “”Action  is  social  insofar  as, by virtue of the  subjective  meaning  attached  to it by 
the  acting individual (or  individuals), it takes  account of the behaviour of others  and is thereby 
oriented  in its course”  (Weber  1947,  pp.  87). 
Giddens  has  worked  intensely  with  this  problem  in his ”structuration  theory”  trying  to  get  beyond 
structuralist and  functionalist  ways  of  emphasizing  the  preeminence  of  the  social  whole  over its 
parts, in order  to pay  due  attention  to  actors’  actions.  (Giddens 1984 1-37)  As  mentioned  above, 
his attempts to  bridge  the  actor/structure  duality  did  not  entirely  solve  the  problem, but rather 
reduced the notions  to  common-sense  statements of interrelationships  and intersubjectivities. 
Gould  (1997) in  discussing  certain  deficiencies  of  the  actor-oriented  approach,  tries to aggregate 
a  view of African  societies  which  he  terms  constructivist  and  which  aims  at  bridging this gap. 
This  view,  based on a  critique of functionalism,  has  sought  to  discard  the  empirical  notion  of, for 
instance, peasants as carriers of a  certain  historical  logic  (Marxist  version) or as puppets  of 
normative  structures  (early  anthropology).  Constructivists  are  linked  to  the  notion of  agency  with 
Giddens  and  Long as two  poles,  where  Giddens  sees  institutional  continuities  as structuring the 
unintended  consequences of  individual  action - thus  reproducing  structure,  and  Long  emphasizes 
the strategising intentionality of the  individual  actor.  According  to  Gould, the most articulate 
presentation of this  thinking  has  been  undertaken  by Sara Berry  (1993). 
Gould sees a  problem in “constructivist”  thinking, in that it is  unable  to  distinguish  itself from 
being  lumped  with  neo-liberal  notions of Africa falling  apart.  Actor-oriented  approaches  become 
unable to analyse  the  social  fabric of African societies that “hold  them  together” or at least 
prevents  a  total  breakdown of order. Is it  “primordial  bonds”  or  “economy  of  affection”  or ther 
value-driven  models as functionalist  anthropologists  have  seen,  and  as Hydin (1983)  withholds 
today?  Or is the  social  chaos  present  a  result of the  disappearance of these  moral notions? Gould 
thinks not, but claims  that  the  constructivist  theoreticians  are  defenceless in the face of such 
claims. 
1.4.7. Overemphasizing strategy? 
There is a central problem in constructivist approaches which is again found in Olivier de 
Sardan’s  approach  to  the  analysis of the  development  project as “dispositif”, i.e. that he ends up 
with a slightly  utilitarian  and  even  misanthropic  interpretation of human  action.  Everybody is just 
out to make a  buck,  nobody  works for the  project or for the  sake of the  community,  notions  of 
“trust” and “communalism”  are  not  only  discarded as useless  analytical  categories, but even 
ignored as possible shared  cultural  traits  in  the  society  analysed.  Greed,  personal  benefits  and 
seizure of power  and  resources  are  the  order of the day. 
I cannot help to some  extent  accepting  this  very  gloomy  approach to the  development field of 
intervention, but I would like clearly  to  distinguish  this  from  a  general  and essentialist view of 
Burkina Faso as a  society  which is characterized  by  some  kind  of  specific “m~ra l”~ .  I would like 
9 This moral  can  have  positive as well as negative  connotations. The former include a  view 
purporting that Burkinan  society is characterized by altruism and communalism (Fiske 
1992, OuBdraogo 1990) , the latter the  “absence of justice” and  “degradation of modes of 
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to distinguish myself  very  clearly  from  a  certain  variation of this view  purporting  that  people 
from  Burkina  are  more  treacherous  than others. What I prefer  to  call  a  critical  approach  derives 
from  what I have  interpreted as the  profound lack of legitimacy of the development institutions 
in Burkinan  society.  Although  credit  reimbursements  and contracts for “beneficiary  contribu- 
tions” are  often  remarkably  well  lived  up  to (despite the fact that this is always  lamented as a 
source of project  failure, and the  fault  is  attributed  to  the  beneficiaries’  ignorance  (Burkina  Faso: 
Ministere de 1’Agriculture et des  Ressources  Animales, 1995), it is my  firm  conviction,  and  a 
point I shall elaborate upon  in  the  following  chapters, that a  severe  discrepancy exists between 
what the  “beneficiary  groups” see as their problems  and  what he donors  provide. This leads  to 
a  situation  where  the  embezzlement of funds, the  misuse of logistics, the dilapidation of stocks 
etc.  are  looked  upon as quite  understandable, one might  say  that  the  people  act  in  a “verstehende” 
way regardingthese things, had  they  been  in that situation  they  would  have  done  the  same. 
The field of this study is, thus, an environment  where  cynicism  is quite widespread. I must 
however  denounce such allegations,  and,  moreover, I find it unfair to accuse  the  actor-oriented 
anthropologists of development of  such. To go  beyond  the  normativism,  and  the “langue de  bois” 
of development  projects  and  reports  is  clearly  not  the  same as turning  cynical,  neither is it dubious 
to  look  a bit further into the  notions  on  which  development  projects  and  programmes  are  built. 
Furthermore, as stated above,  this  approach,  which  could be said  to  resemble  utilitarianism, is 
primarily methodological and is not an attempt to establish essentialist patterns of human 
behaviour. 
It is within this actor-oriented  and constructivist approach  to  development  that  the  notion of 
‘arena’  has  become fashionable. The  development  institution is such  an  arena  where  different 
groups  of  actors  with  different  interests  struggle  over  the  meanings  and  spoils f development. 
This represents a move towards a more Foucauldian view of power. Within the arena, the 
question of power  is closely associated  with the actors’  knowledge of the world.  This  has far- 
reaching implications for how people act v i s -h i s  issues of economic morality, political 
legitimacy  and  other  central  societal  ideas. 
What Gould (1997) sees as  problematic is the extent to which  we  can  ascribe  the  notion of 
strategy to social action. The problem with ascribing strategy is that it may lead to an 
exaggeration of the intentionality of a  given  action,  too  much  emphasis  is  put  on  the  goal- 
orientation of action,  and  intersubjectivity  is  neglected.  The  problem  facing  the  researcher’s  actor 
orientation is, as  Gould  formulates  it: 
Fieldwork monographs often rely on a quasi-literary narrative 
structure to organize the presentation. Instances of “extended case” 
and “actor-oriented” analyses, while allowing  the narrative to retain 
the subtle interplay of a broad range of empirical factors, require 
dramatic structure in order to be readable. The temptation is great 
for the author to impute instrumentality to the actors in order to tease 
out the tensions and contradictions of social processes. As a result, 
what is intended as ‘rich description’ ends up as a as a story in which 
government” (World Bank 1989) 
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virtually all social action resembles the behaviour of shrewdly 
strategising actors. (Gould 1997: 67) 
I feel a  bit  vulnerable  in  this  respect,  and it is  a  huge  problem  that  the  researcher  faces  when 
working  with  social  conflict  from  a  problem-oriented  scientific  approach.  Adding  to  the  problem 
is the  fact  that  the  “rich  description” in this  monograph is perhaps  not  as  rich as it ought  to  be.  It 
is a  balance  which  has  to be struck  when  one  wants  to  avoid  positivist  accounts  where  social 
processes  and  production  practices  are  seen as “measurable facts”. When, as has  been attempted 
here, we look at development aid interventions, it is important  to look into how the different 
social actors attempt to “position”  each  other,  but it is equally  important  to  note  that  in  certain 
cases, they in fact do not.  Social  actors  within  rural  development  sometimes, like researchers, 
ignore  possibilities  and  options or prefer  to  turn  their  back  to  opportunities. 
Bierschenk‘s and Olivier de Sardan’s (1997) ECRIS-methodology” attempts to define a 
collective  methodology for the  analysis of conflict in rural  settings, by defining what  they term 
“strategic  groups”.  “Strategic  group”  is  a  term  introduced to supplant  “social class”, as this  term 
is  seen  as  not  empirical  enough,  too  economistic, too dependent  on  an  analytical  framework  based 
on modes  or  forms of production. Strategic groups  are  groups  sharing  a  set of interests  within a 
local  power  framework,  through  social  and  political  action.  They  are, in other  words,  bearers of 
agency. 
Bierschenk and Olivier de  Sardan  are at risk of overemphasizing  the  strategizing of the  agent. 
What they do is, however, interesting insofar as this notion is methodological rather than 
theoretical  and it is also an  expression  of  considerable  pragmatism.  Bierschenk  (pers.  comm.)  has 
even voiced a certain disinterest in what might be considered esoteric theoretical and 
epistemological  problems, as it  is  the  methodological  tools  that  in  his  view  lead  to  interesting  new 
empirical work. What they stress is the temporary and “problem-oriented” character of the 
strategic  group,  individuals  within  this  group  might  have  differing  interests on other  subjects  than 
the  conflict  or  problem  which  is  the  research  focus, and the  group  is not  “structurally”  embedded 
in local society, but might dissolve tomorrow. Still, the problem remains, as Gould has 
emphasized,  that  this  emphasis  on  strategy may lead  to  a  tendency  towards  implicitly  assuming 
that  actor-orientation  has  to do with  “grass-roots”,  automatically is “participatory”  etc. This 
criticism  can  however,  easily,  be  refuted. 
There  is  another  kind of populism  inherent  in  actor-oriented  research,  certain  notions  come into 
vogue, we no longer speak of peasants  but of “rural  entrepreneurs”, we overemphasize the 
directionality in the actions of the actors by alluding to “strategy” when what is actually 
happening  is  that  people  just  do  what  they  always  did.  (Bierschenk  has  accused  Albert0  Arce of 
this, see Bulletin de I’APAD, v01 11, 1995) This kind of populism is potentially  more  harmful 
as it presupposes certain features,  which  should  be  dealt  with  with  caution: 
it implies a  model of rationality,  people  making their decisions  consciously.  This  model  of 
rationality will  tend  to  end  up  making up essentialist  characteristics  about  certain  types  of 
social  actors,  ending  in  a  type of functionalism  which  we  set  out  to  avoid  (For an example of 
this see Fiske 1992 on  Mossi society). 
10 EnquZte Collective Rapide d’identification des conflits et des groupes Stratigiques. 
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it somehow  exaggerates the idea of  voluntary  action  determining  social  consequences. Social 
change is not  always  “willed”,  even  though  the  actor  may  be  knowledgeable  and  resourceful; 
it assumes relations  between  means and ends,  as if people  always  had  goals  they pursued; 
it doesn’t consider opposing interest  within,  for  instance,  households; it looks at households 
as  actors,  where  these  should  maybe further disaggregated. 
I nevertheless share  Olivier  de  Sardans  pragmatic  approach,  accepting on the  one  hand  that 
individual action is clearly not very strategic,  but on the other hand,  when focusing on conflict 
one must  accept  a  certain  directionality in  social  action, if not it would  be futile to investigate it. 
1.4.8. Summing up 
Before outlining a  more coherent approach  to  the  study of development institutions in Burkina 
Faso based of Olivier de Sardans  thoughts,  it  might  be  appropriate  to  sum  up  some of th   trumps 
and shortcomings of the actor-oriented  approach.  The  approach: 
. Avoids determinism in the sense that we do not reduce human action to 
a schematic effect of certain  structural  laws  determining the course of 
history.  The  idea,  for  instance,  that n automatic  proletarianization  goes 
on in  rural Africa because of on-going  capitalist  penetration  does  no 
longer  attract that much  interest.  Neither  does  the  idea  that  peasants  think 
or behave  in certain discernable  ways  when facing this or that  problem 
or opportunity. 
. Allows for scrutiny of the  diversity  and  specificity of local  circum- 
stances, accepting that apparently quite similar political and natural 
circumstances can result in very different outcomes, explained by 
specific local, cultural  or  even  random  events  and  characteristics. 
. Allows for a  return  to  aWeberian “verstehende” sociology  based  on 
methodological  individualism,  but  at  the  same  time  ridding this concept 
of its utilitarian  and  voluntaristic  elements. 
. Opens for a much more nuanced analysis not just of the state, but also of, 
for instance, development  institutions  as  arenas of conflict over eco- 
nomic,  political  and  symbolic  resources. 
. Avoids seeing  teleologies,  i.e.  goal  or  ends  or  directionalities of social 
processes. This, on the  other  hand,  raises  the  challenge  that it becomes 
hard to  predict  anything  or  to  see  any  pattern  in  social  transformation. 
It can  be coupled with  discourse  analysis, in the  sense that it makes it 
possible  to  link  the  analysis of different  actors’  practice  with 1) the way 
power  and  knowledge  interact and 2) the way discourses are deployed 
42 
by different social  actors,  and  become  instrumental in the way 
development is implemented. 
Problems  with  actor-orientation  include: 
. To call the  actor-oriented  approach  a new  “paradigm” is probably  a bit 
far-fetched,  especially  as  there is nothing  specifically  new  about  it,  based 
as  it is on Weberian  action  sociology  and  Giddens’  structuration  theory. 
The approach  has so far  primarily  developed  at  the  methodological  level; 
the  theoretical  questions of avoiding  seeing  society as the aggregation of 
atomistic individuals  are still not  satisfactorily  solved.  Gould tries to 
solve this through ameticulous rereading  of  Weber,  but  does  not  succeed 
entirely  in  demonstrating this empirically. 
. The  approach  risks  leading  to  an  overemphasis on the intentionality of 
social action,  exaggerating the room for manoeuvre of the  social  actor, 
and putting  too  much  emphasis  on  the  notion of strategy.  It  thus  risks 
becoming  utilitarian, as it stresses  interest  over  value-based  action. 
. The  actor-oriented  approach  as  problems  at “macro  level”.  Explaining 
the social changes within very large institutions or societies remains 
difficult. This is, however, not only a problem of actor-oriented ap- 
proaches,  but  also f structuralist,  functionalist  or  neo-liberal  approaches. 
When  studying  development  intervention,  the  actor-oriented  approach is the most  obvious  option, 
as it provides a means to get beyond the heavy rhetoric of development, and leads to a 
reassessment of some of the  central  notions  on  which  development  thinking is based. This 
reassessment will  be dealt with  in  Chapter 5, and  will  include  a  discussion of the  issues  of 
participation, sustainability,  dependency and development,  proposing that these  issues  be  seen 
in  the  light of an  analysis of power,  thus  “bringing  politics  back in”. 
1.5. Study methodology 
The intention  in this dissertation  has  been  to  undertake an “actor-oriented  analysis” of certain 
development interventions, where  different  actors  and  strategic  groups  are  seen as pursuing 
different interests within  the  development  project,  competing for the political,  economic  and 
symbolic  resources  in  which  the  projects  are so rich. The study is, thus, not  only  an  assessment 
of whether  the  development  activities  have  been  successful  or not, it will also emphasize  the 
contingent  social  processes  accompanying the implementation of development  projects. I am 
particularly  interested  in  the  social  and  institutional  positionings  taken  in  order  to  get  access  to 
the  means  for  development. 
In the  following, I will  propose  an  analytical  framework,  inspired by Olivier  de  Sardan (1995). 
He proposes an  analysis of the development  project  as  the  “ideal  type” of what he  terms  a 
“development deployment” (dispositif du dheloppement). The development  action  should be 
seen as a  an  occasion for the  interaction of social  actors  coming from different  worlds  with 
multiple behaviours and “logics”. Social actors faced with the opportunities, resources and 
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constraints implied in development  are  therefore  operating  in  a  sphere of varied behaviours, 
sometimes contradictory, not only derived from individual options, but also from differing 
interests, norms and objectivities (Olivier  de  Sardan, 1995: 125). 
It is, however,  necessary that we do  not fall into the  trap  of defining  too  rigorously  what re the 
“strategies”  and  logics of the Burkina  farmers,  thus  depicting  essentialist  patterns  of behaviour 
of project “target  groups”. In defining forms of interaction  between  the  project  and its ‘‘target 
group” it is important,  as I seek  to  do  in  the  following  chapter,  to pay considerable attention to 
context  and historicity. The context,  often  beyond  the  control of donors as well as recipients, 
(international conjunctures, climatic uncertainties, political changes in the capital, refugee 
influxes) influences the way “target groups” interact with the project. And the historical 
experiences  and former development  encounters  shape  the way  target  groups  react v i s - h i s  the 
project, as experiences, like in  this  case,  are  not  always  that  good.  Projects  which see themselves 
as  a rupture with past experiences of development  “from  above”  with its noble objectives, are 
assessed by the target group on the  basis  of  their  past  experiences,  who  remember  that, for 
instance, the coercive Sankara experience of the  eighties,  was  also initiated with the aim of 
helping the poor and promoting development. 
Olivier de Sardan speaks of four levels of coherence of a development project, which are 
constantly challenged by the political  realities in which  a  project  is  inserted. The first is a 
technical rationality which dominates the project setup, based on ideas of productivity and 
agronomic  research,  and  which  often  ends  up  ignoring  local  agricultural  knowledge of agriculture. 
The second is a willed  coherence of political  economy  and  national  planning. The project is seen 
within this national political economy, a context which the “target group” is often not too 
enthusiastic about. A third coherence  revolves  around  the  role  that  donors  have, their right of 
inspection  and the imposing of  certain  logics  and  procedures  (logical  framework  approach  and 
the  like),  which  might  be quite alien  to  local  conceptions of trust and control. Finally, there is the 
coherence of the project  as  a  structure  in  itself, as a  professional  institution  and  often the biggest 
local  employer,  with  its  “informal”  economy,  its impact on local  economies  and  power  relations. 
The  interests  involved may  weigh  very  heavily on project  policy.  One  only  needs  to  be  reminded 
of the inherent contradiction  in  virtually  all  development  projects,  where the project, from the 
donors’ point of view  is  intended as an intermediary  arrangement  which is supposed to end, 
leaving  a  set of activities which  are  intended to continue  in  a  post-project  phase. The personnel 
of the project and the target  groups  will  often  not  share  this  interest  in  reaching  a phase where 
they are supposed to be “sustainable”. 
Departing from an idea of establishing certain heuristic notions enabling analysis of these 
processes, rather  than creating essentialist  categories  about  “peasant  behaviour”, Olivier de 
Sardan proposes that certain principles and logics be established  concerning  the  interaction 
between projects and  “target  groups”.  When  dealing  with  projects,  target  groups act according 
to two principles, a  principle  of selection and  a  principle of diversion (ditounzement). 
By far  the majority of development  projects  are  based on a  “package” of activities that are 
proposed  to or even  enforced on the  target  population.  This  package  is  always  submitted  to  a  kind 
of selection: certain activities are  rejected,  adopted and almost  all  altered  according to  the local 
circumstances  prevailing. No package is accepted as a  block. The second principle, the principle 
of diversion concerns the  way  certain  resources for activities  are  diverted  and  used for more 
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urgent needs. Credits are  often  not  used  for  the  intended  purchases,  a car is not  used for its 
designated  purpose,  goods  are  distributed to  other  people  than  intended etc. 
In addition  to  these  principles,  a  number of “logics” prevail  among  target  groups. First of all, 
when  dealing  with  a  project  and  when  considering  adoption of certain  project  activities, an initial 
concern as to farmers’ security can  be  expected.  Experiments  with  new  crops,  new cropping 
techniques or certain  inputs  can be  difficult  to  afford if your  harvest is at stake. Therefore people 
usually insist on  seeing  whether  things  are  really  that  good  ideas  before adopting them. 
A second logic is what  Olivier de  Sardan  terms “assistencialism”. Many  projects are based on 
a  more  or  less  implicit  assumption  that  the  project  should  support  the  “self-  reliance” of the  target 
group.  This  might be an appealing  idea,  but it remains  a  very  moralistic  and  ideological  concept 
which is not  always  easily  imposed on  others. In fact,  the  opposite  is  much  more  common:  trying 
to  maximize  aid  from  the  exterior  and  do  whatever you  can  to assure  that this aid is perpetuated. 
This logic thus often ends up causing serious contradictions in the  philosophy  behind rural 
development  projects.  For  instance,  the  project  staff  themselves  will  have  a very strong  interest 
in the prolongation of the project  for as  long  as  possible,  as  “self-reliance” for them  will  mean 
unemployment. 
A third  logic is a  logic of seizure (accaparement), referring  to a social  process  where  any  project 
activity necessarily  becomes  the  object of social  competition.  One  therefore  often  sees that a 
project  intended to support  a  vaguely-defined  community,  ends up being  monopolized  or  seized 
by a  small  group  within the local  community.  This  often  reflects  local  power  structures,  but  cases 
can  also  be found, where  new  groups  (e.g.  the  young,  the  women)  get  organized  and  succeed  in 
grasping  the  benefits  from  an  external  donor. This can  include  monopolizing the credit line of a 
project, strengthening  power  bases  through  achieving  control  over  who gets to  work for the 
project, etc. 
These three logics are  what  could  be  termed  “strategic  logics”.  There  are,  however,  equally 
certain “representational logics”, that need to be  taken  into  account.  Many  project failures can 
be ascribed to different  interpretations of certain  issues  central  to  the  project  (in  our case, for 
instance, “participation”, “land”, “credit”). The misunderstandings that emerge from these 
different  interpretations  are  not  necessarily  strategic, in  the  sense  that  they  are  results  of  deliberate 
social action by certain actors. They  are  results  of  differing  representational  logics. 
This methodological point of departure seems to me to be much more pertinent than the 
recommendations of Rondinelli  earlier in  this  chapter.  Where  Rondinelli  ended  by  assuming 
implicitly  that  all  involved  partners  automatically  subscribed  to  an  often  very  vaguely  described 
endgoal of development,  Olivier  de  Sardan  draws  attention  to  the  very  different  interests  involved 
and  the potential conflicts  that  emerge out of these.  Where  Rondinelli  often  ascribes failures to 
lack of capacity  and  knowledge  about  the  technicalities of the  development  activity,  Olivier  de 
Sardan  points  to the exact  opposite,  that  “target  groups”  are  very  well  aware of  what is going  on, 
position  themselves  accordingly,  avoid  getting  their head  chopped off by respecting existing 
constraints on simplified ‘‘empowerment”, try to select what is useful,  and, if resources are 
available, try to grasp control of certain elements of the development “package”. Where 
Rondinelli  brings  his  home-made  (and  Western)  normative  assumptions of  what  is  good  and  bad 
with  him  to the field, Olivier  de  Sardan  explores  the  social  dynamics surplace. 
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1.6. The  empirical  accounts 
The following two chapters will attempt to goanalyze various development project and 
programme outlines and  political  statements  on  Burkinan  development in order to trace how 
development  discourse  and  narratives  have  been  instrumental  in  shaping current development 
politics.  Chapter two is an attempt  to  present he country  in  brief,  highlighting  which  narratives 
and discourses prevail in establishing  the  Burkinan crisis, and  thereafter  attempting  to  show 
which  initiatives  are  taken  in  order  to  remedy this crisis. I will,  furthermore, try to point to  how, 
as in  the  “tool-perfecting”  approach  that  we  went  through,  political  problems  are  constantly  recast 
as technical  problems, and how more difficult problems  become  recast as developmentalist 
tautologies  and  truisms,  often  confounding  strategy  and  goal. 
Chapter  three is an  account of different  research  which  has  been  done in attempting to assess 
different types of  aid to  Burkina  Faso. My aim  here is similar,  as  this  research,  although  much 
more critical, ends up being tool perfecting as well, trapped as it is within a development 
discourse which  does  not  allow  a  sufficiently  political  view of development intervention. 
1.7. Fieldwork 
My fieldwork  has  admittedly  not  been  conducted  in  a  linear  manner,  and  both  research  location 
and  has  changed  considerably  in  the  course of the  work. The fieldwork was, furthermore, too 
short, and  broken  up into several  visits.  There are a  number of personal  reasons for this, and I 
shall not tire the  reader  with  excuses  and  justifications. I a m ,  however,  convinced  that  any 
fieldwork  will  be  confronted  with  the  problems of running into cul-de-sacs, having  to alter the 
focus of the  enquiry,  collecting  information  that  is  not  very  helpful,  and  my  work  is  no  exception. 
A more serious  problem is, perhaps,  that by focusing  on  problems  and conflicts over develop- 
ment,  there  is  a  risk  that I have  given  these  issues  an  importance  which  is  not  shared  by  the  actors 
involved.  Furthermore,  in  following  conflicts  and my personal  interest  in  these, I have, perhaps, 
been  too  eager  to  corroborate  my  suspicions  about  how  things  were,  rather  than  trying to falsify 
my hypotheses. 
From  the  outset,  my  intention  has  been  to find good  cases that could illustrate the  problem  that 
I was  searching  to  elaborate  upon.  This  has,  perhaps,  been  done  at  the  expense  of  representativity, 
some  may  even  say  systematic  rigour.  However,  by  looking  into  where  things  go  wrong I believe 
it is possible to  say  more  about  what’s  normal  than  vice  versa.  By looking at events such as 
institutional conflicts of interest as heuristic categories rather than as non-representative 
coincidences,  more  revealing  information  was  found.  The  problems  of  representativity, 
quantitative  evidence,  averages  and  other  time-  consuming  elements of systematic  research  is  not 
only  one of laziness of the  researcher. A sample of 120 villagers  in 5 villages in the Boulgou 
region, selected  on  the  basis  of  wealth-ranking  exercises focusing on  villagers’  knowledge of, 
relationship  to  and  opinions of development  agents  such as extension  officers, NGO-animateurs 
and  development  project  staff  ended  up  not  revealing  too  much,  as  the  interviewer  was  a p rt of 
their  strategic  positionings vis-&vis these  institutions. In one of the  villages it seemed that people 
had  agreed  or  been  told  to  say  more  or  less  the  same  to  the  interviewer.  And  in  all  cases  there  was 
a  marked  reluctance  towards  expressing  any  dissatisfaction  with  development  agents,  presumably 
because sanctions  were  feared, or because  they  thought  this  would deprive them of any future 
collaboration with potential donors. Quantification like “95%  of interviewees expressed 
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satisfaction  with  the  existing  extension  service”  might  therefore  not  give  any  exact  picture  of  how 
relations  are  between  development  institutions  and  farmers.  One  has to follow the leads one gets. 
The  problem  has  been  that as more  insight  was  gained, the focus of the research changed. From 
being  initially  sparked by a  wish  to  look  at  institutional  conflicts  over th  spoils of development, 
especially on conflicts  between  NGOs  and  government  institutions, theresearch  has  become  more 
focused on what I term  development institutions, their dealings with  recipient groups, and the 
political stmggles entailed in this. The obvious reason for this is that conflicts between 
institutions are confined to an NGO/govemment dichotomy, and especially not on a more 
analytical  level  to  a statdcivil society  relation.  Another  point  was  that  conflicts were not as fierce 
and overt as I had  expected  in the region  when the research  was  started.  An initial belief  that  a 
certain  dynamism  within  the  widespread  ”groupements  villageois”  existed furthermore appeared 
exaggerated. 
Another  problem  whichemerged in the first stages of the workconcerned my attempt to link 
institutional conflicts and  agrarian  changes  with  structural  adjustment programmes, trying to 
deduce  the  “local  level”  impact of these  “macro-economic”  policies. There seemed to be far too 
may contingencies  and  mutually conflicting social  and  economic  processes occumng that any 
attempt to deduce  specific  causes  and effects appeared  rather  hazardous. Findings only seemed 
to be able to question the grounds  upon  which the macroeconomic  policies were built, and to 
point to the plurality of responses  and  results of policies  with specific objectives. 
A  third  and  more  serious  problem  stemmed  from  the  difficulty  of  finding  interesting n ry points 
to the analysis of institutional positionings and conflicts within development activities in 
Boulgou. It was difficult to ”break the ice”  and  get  beyond  respondents’ reluctance to reveal 
controversial information: the conflict-centred  analytic  approach  was  not successful in finding 
any conflicts.  It  was,  therefore,  at  a  rather lat  stage  decided to investigate another locality, Dori 
in  the  Sen0  Province,  where  research  was  much  more  fruitful.  Thisdecision  was taken at  a  rather 
late stage, where  not  much time was left. This is problematic, but there is not much to be  done 
about it. Research  in  the  Dori  area  was  focused  on  different  actors’  positionings around different 
development  projects  and  development institutions, bilateral projects and local NGOs alike. 
Natural  resource  management  projects and programmes  in Burkina Faso are to a large extent 
based on activities defined on the basis of preconceived notions of  what the problems of rural 
development  are,  rather than on  thorough  local  studies  of the perceived  development  needs of  the 
“target” population. This enabled  me to discuss  with the different actors whether they saw the 
project  objectives  as the most  central  given the local  context. 
On the other hand, the projects  all  subscribe  to  a participatory  approach. I had to to assess 
carefully how different  actors  involved  (e.g.  different  beneficiary  groups,  non-beneficiary  groups, 
extension  agents,  project  leaders)  viewed the participatory  approach of the projects in question. 
A central  element  of  this  participatory  approach is the support for the creation of local institutions 
able to define and  plan  activities to improve the living conditions in the local society. These 
institutions are seen as central awareness raising instruments, whereby, through a better 
understanding of their  situation,  people  will  be  able  to  organize for improvements of their living 
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conditions. Thorough  attention  has  been  paid  to  this  process of institution  creation,  in  order  to 
reveal  the  dynamics  behind it. 
Finally,  development  projects  are  very  concerned  about  the sustainability of their  activities. This 
sustainability includes three elements, 1)an ecological sustainability, stressing that natural 
resource management activities supported by the project should enhance natural resource 
management practices, and not cause a degradation of the environment; 2) an institutional 
sustainability,  stressing  that  support  should  be  backed by a  capacity-building  component,  assuring 
that institutions are created  enabling  a  continuation of project activities beyond the project 
intervention  phase; and finally 3) afinancial sustainability,  aiming  at  scaling  activities to a  level 
where  they do not  become  economically  prohibitive  the  moment  they  are  not  supported  heavily 
from external  sources. 
It was noticed that different actors have quite different interpretations of these notions of 
sustainability, which  can lead to  certain  misunderstandings. 
As a final point, development projects in Burkina Faso all have the ambition of creating 
independence. A central  concern of the  project is the  planning of its own demise;  it is important 
that projects support “help to self-help”,  and that they do not create  relations of dependence 
between  the  donor  and  the  recipient  groups.  What is meant  by  this  normative  notion is ,however, 
not  always  clear,  neither is it obvious  why it is seen as so important. 
The  three  points,  participation,  sustainability  and  dependence  will  bedealt  with  again  in  Chapter 
5, as they constitute some  of  the  central  reasons for conflicts  over  meaning of the  development 
efforts in Burkina Faso. 
In  pursuing  the  work, an iterative  approach  was  adopted  which  concentrated  on  the following 
elements: 
. 
. 
. . 
. 
Discussions with  project  personnel,  and  excursions to villages,  where 
they  presented  project  activities; 
Interviews  with  village  officials; 
Group discussions  with  villagers  at  sub-village  levels; 
Interviews  with  project  staff of other development  and  projects in the 
Region 
Household  surveys,  focusing  on  villagers’  perception  and  relation  to  the 
project; 
Interviews  with  selected  villagers  according  to  social  status on project-related  issues; 
Interviews with key informants, i.e. people that were said to have a 
specific knowledge of the  issues  to  be  explored. 
Interviews  with  politicians,  functionaires  and  “traditional”  leaders. 
My attempt has  been  to “trace peoples’  movements  through  interviews and observation  as  a 
means of understanding the porousness  and flexibility of social  and  spatial  boundaries”.  (Berry 
1994)  This may not  be  overtly  systematic,  but  on  the  other  hand it seems as the  number one rule 
of thumb  in the field. In a sense it is revelatory how this can  lead  to  seminal  research on social 
processes  in  Berry’s  case,  but it can  also  lead  to he opposite.  In  connection  with  another  research, 
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I recently  paid  a  visit to The library  at  the  University  of  Dar  es  Salaam,  in  order t  see what  kind 
of  research  was done on the Kigoma  Region  in  Western  Tanzania.  Most f the  research  was from 
the seventies, the days of plenty  at  that  university.  But  nearly  all of it was  focused  on issues like 
“capitalist penetration and proletarianization of the peasantry” although with the power of 
hindsight one can see that the  work  was  completely  detached  from  reality.  Another striking 
example is the influential French researcher, Guy Belloncle, who in his work on peasant 
associations in West Africa (Belloncle 1983) sees  a  great  potential  for  rural  development  in he 
support of local peasant associations. The reason for his optimism is what he sees as the 
primordial  structures of mutual  help,  egalitarianism and  solidarity  within the villages  in the Sahel. 
His ideas have been  effectively refuted and are  nowadays  mainly  seen as flawed, and there is a 
general  attitude  that  egalitarian is precisely  what  society,  “primordial”  or  not,  in the Sahel is not. 
The lesson to leam from this is probably  that the researcher’s  wish to present  a politically 
convenient  message at times  leads h i d e r  to trace  corroborations of hisher preconceived  notions 
rather  than  being  critically  hermeneutic.  Nevertheless,  these  studies are ba ed on fieldwork, they 
are not just made up at the researchers’  desks.  It  serves a a  reminder  the  power  of  preconceived 
notions, the way they shape our  selection of data  and  our  understanding  of  the  reality we find. 
Furthermore, given the extremely  uneven  character of the researcherkespondent relationship it 
is obvious that  in the respondent’s interactions with  the  researcher, she  will  often attempt to 
confirm the outsider’s preconceived  idea,  or to turn h i d e r  into  an  ally in the  struggles s h e  is 
engaged  in.  Finally,  farmers may selectively  adopt  outsiders’  developmentalist idioms and try to 
turn  them  into  their  own  advantage  in  their  struggles  over  development  means  (Meams & Leach 
1996). 
An important part of  the  research into development  institutions’  insertion  into  Burkinan  society 
is, therefore,  an analysis of these  preconceived  notions onto which  development  is constructed. 
Whether I have  succeeded in  this is up to the reader  to  judge.  One  thing  is,  however,  sure. At the 
end of our empirical accounts, wewill encounter problems answering our main formulated 
problem.  Given this more  theoretically-grounded  and  elaborate  entry  to impact analysis,  we risk 
that  what  we  are able to conclude  becomes tembly elusive.  This  might  however  not  be  such  a  bad 
thing  and it may lead us to reconsider  our  expectations,  not  onlyof  what  we  can  get  out  of impact
studies, butalso of development as a form of induced  social  change. 
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Chapter 2. Images of Burkina Faso's  development 
2.1 Introduction 
Burkina Faso is a  small  West  African  country  in  the  Sudano-Sahelian climatic zone of Sub- 
Saharan Africa bordering  Ghana,  Togo,  Benin  and  Cote dIvoire to  the south, Mali to the  West 
and North and  Niger  to the East.  It  covers  approximately  274.000  square kilometres and  has  a 
population of around  11  million (10,l at  the  last  census  in  1995),  of  which 3/4 is considered  rural. 
This  population  consists of  approximately  60  different  ethnic  groups,  with t e mossi dominating 
both demographically  and  politically.  Burkina Faso, formerly  known as Haute Volta, achieved 
independence from  France  in  1960.  French is still the  official  language. 
The climate is tropical  with  a  rainy  season of between  three  and five months' duration, peaking 
in August. Rainfall decreases  as  one  moves  north  and  averages  at 3-400 mm in  the  North  and 
1100-1200 in the  South.  This  rainfallvaries  considerably,  within  each  season  and from year to 
year.  The  last  25  years  have  had  an  average  annual  rainfall  significantly  below the preceding  25 
years. Agriculture is based on smallholder farming with millet as the most important crop. 
Especially  in  the  Southeast,  cotton  is an important  crop,  and is one of the  country's  main  exports. 
Extensive livestock-raising is the  other  very  important  natural  resource  management practice, 
especially in the Northern part of the  country.  The  coastal  countries constitute the traditional 
market for export meat, which together with cotton are the two most important export 
commodities.  Demographic  growth  is 2,4 % per  year,  and  population  density is high  compared 
to  other  countries  in  the  Sahel.  Technological  change,  population  growth,  and changing rainfall 
patterns  have  been  elements  in  important  changes  in  natural  resource  management  practices  since 
independence. 
Other economic activities of national economic importance include mining (esp. gold) and 
tourism. The latter  has an interesting  branch  as  the  capital,  Ouagadougou, is evolving into a 
conference centre of West Africa; an astonishing number of international conferences and 
festivals are held  in  Ouagadougou. 
Burkina Faso is one of the  poorest  countries  in  the  world.  With  a  GDP  per ca ita of  250 US$ it 
ranks the 1 Ith-poorest country, and it is usually  among  the  bottom five on UNDPs Human 
Development index  list. 
Why  does  this  chapter  begin by repeting  these data  that  begin  virtually  any  report on development 
in Burkina  Faso?  Why  is  rainfall  considered  worthy of  page  one  mention? In the  pages  that  follow 
an  answer to this  question  will  be  traced,  as it is  my  initial  hypothesis  that  emphasis  on  these  data 
become important  in  the  construction of politics of development  in Burkina Faso. These data 
frame our understanding of the  country  and  limit  the  way  we are able to conceptualize the 
country, or perhaps  the  societies  that  constitute  the  country.  They  are part of a  development 
discourse  within  which  a v riety of implicit  assumptions are tacitly  accepted, but at the same time 
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not clearly  enunciated.  Initially,  one  can  conclude  that  Burkina  Faso  seems  to  have  a  series of 
problems  (poverty,  natural  resource  degradation)  that  need to be  addressed. 
2.2 Development aid to Burkina Faso 
Problems of poverty  and  natural  resource  degradation  are  being  addressed  through  development 
aid.  Being  a  relatively  easy  country  for  aid  donors  to  work  in,  it  is  one of  the  most  aid-influenced 
countries in the  world.  Not  that Burkina Faso receives as  much  aid  pr.  capita as many other 
countries, e.g. Senegal which  received 3 times  as  much  aid pr. capita  at the end of the 1980s 
(Gabas et al. 1997). However, a million dollars is a lot of money in Burkina Fao, and 
approximately 90 % of all public  investments  are  externally  funded  (ibid.) 
The main bilateral donors are France, Holland, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and US, 
contributing 250 million US$ in  1995 (EIU, 1997).  Multilateral  aid is at an almost similar level, 
227  million USD in  1995,  of  which  the  World Banks International  Development  Association  has 
consistently  been  the  most  important. A multilateral  donor  gaining  importance  is  the EU. Finally, 
there is another  type of capital  inflow  that  should  be  mentioned,  roughly  a  million  Burkinabe’s 
are  working  in  Cote dIvoire and  remittances  constitute  a  large  input of capital  channeled  directly 
to  the  family  target  group of the  immigrant.  This  is  however  rarely  invested  in  development, bu  
more  often in more profitable  business  or  the  mere  reproduction f the  family. 
Development  Aid  thus  stands  at  roughly 0,5 billion US$, or 20 % of  total  GDP. Of this  aid,  about 
70 % is  in the  form of grants,  the  rest  in  often-renegotiated  loans. An interesting  aspect of this  aid 
is  that  approximately 15 % is directed  through aplethora of NGOs.  There  is,  however,  uncertainty 
as to the  exactness of these  amounts  (Gabas et d ,  opcit.). This  is,  according  to  Gabas,  apparently 
because of deliberate  opacity  in  their  accounting  systems.  Nevertheless,  NGOs  have  been  seen, 
mostly  by  bilateral  donors, as a new  and  interesting  way  of  circumventing  the  state  as  partner,  in 
order for donors to  reach  their  target  groups  more  easily. 
The NGOs  operating  in  Burkina F so are  organized in their  own  umbrella  organization,  SPONG 
(Secrktariat Permanent des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales), which has roughly 200 
member  organizations.  These  are  under  the  auspices of the  government-run  National  Monitoring 
Bureau BSONG (Bureau de Suivi des  ONGs).  Once  registered by BSONG,  an NG0 is entitled 
to  a  number of advantages,  notably  tax  exemption. In order  to  ensure  that  the  number  of  NGOs 
does  notsoar,  BSONG  has  had to outline  a  number of criteria  that an NG0 must fulfil in order to 
obtain this status. A certain size  in  terms  of  budget and a  ‘development  agenda’  are  the  most 
important.  Although the number of NGOsis striking,  and  the  space  they  occupy  within the 
development business is important, it is  not  higher  than  in  other  countries  in  the  subregion. 
National  NGOs  have,  however,  attained  a  high  reputation  for  their  innovativeness in organizing 
and  mobilizing  rural  people  and foreign funds, and  have  raised  high  expectations  within  certain 
circles of development  studies  and  the  media  (Pradervandt  1989). In the  nineties,  the  World  Bank 
is sees great  opportunities  in  supporting  NGOs:  “The  advantages of most  NGOs  can  be  found  in 
their work at the grass-roots  level  and in their flexibility,  which is great  enough  to  allow for 
unorthodox  approaches.  NGOs  have  a  capacity  to  sense  local  needs,  listen  to  people  and  take  their 
traditional knowledge seriously, and make local  populations  integral  partners  in  development 
rather  than the objects of development”  (Leisinger & Schmidt,  1999). 
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An important  aspect of  development  aid is that it is virtually  impossible  to  assure  any  kind of co- 
ordination.  Being  the  rich  almoner,  a  bilateral  donor is normally  unwilling to submit its activities 
to  the  will  and  command of others,  and  therefore  claims  that 'he  who  pays  the  piper  calls  the  tune'. 
The  Northern  NGOs  normally  follow  their  own  ideologically  based  agenda,  and are therefore 
equally  unwilling  to  subordinate  their  activities  to  the  auspices of others.  The institution which 
would seem the  obvious  choice  in  executing this co-ordination, the govemment of the country, 
is more or less  at  the  mercy of the  donors,  and is very  tempted to gear its activities  according  to 
the priorities of the  donors.  The  result  is  very  tough conditions for planning, all government 
activities are to  a  wide  extent  'project-mn',  not  least  all  planning  activities (see Marcussen & 
Speirs, 1998). 
Development  assistance  to  Burkina  Faso  can thus be said  to be: 
. Economically  insignificant  when  seen  in  alarger  global  perspective or when  seen 
from  the  perspective of  the donor  economies. 0,5 billion US$ is  not  a lot of money 
when  shared by a large number  of economically  strong  donors; 
. Extremely important  when  seen as the  share of development activities that are 
funded from abroad. According to certain sources, 98 % (Danida 1997) of all 
activities  within  what  is  termed  'environment'  are  funded from abroad; 
. A very  diverse  socio-economic  field  with  a large number of social actors pursuing 
a  series of rather  varying  interests  within govemment as well  as  non-government 
institutions; 
2.2.1. The Burkinan  crisis 
Reports on development  aid in Burkina all point  to  the fact there is a  huge  problem  in Burkina 
Faso. The aid  that  Burkina  receives  is  going  to  provide development. Development is the means 
by  which Burkina Faso is  going  to  get  out of its  state of crisis. The  crisis  has  several dimensions. 
There is an ecologic crisis, where ecological equilibrium has to be restored. There is an 
institutional crisis, as the  institutions  necessary for the  effective  management of development are 
not available. Therefore,  aid  has  to  include  an  institutional  capacity-building component. And 
there is a management crisis in the  sense  that not all  players  are  accountable,  not  everybody  is 
participating, there are  problems of misappropriation  and  embezzlement  of  means for 
development  aid.  These  issues  have  to  be  addressed in order for development to be sustainable. 
It is interesting to  note  what  the  crisis  seemingly  does  not  imply.  There is no mention of, for 
instance, farmers being  backward  or  ignorant: the involvement of local  knowledge is seen  as 
important. This is not  always  the  case  in  development  work. In a  recent  study I conducted with 
a Tanzanian colleague  (Kaare & Nielsen  1999) on the  impact of a  Danish  development  project 
in Tanzania, it was an initial  assumption  in  the  project  documents  that  the local people  were  very 
"undeveloped"  and  backward.  There is no mention of ethnic or traditional impediments on 
development,  there is a  general  acceptance  that the blame is very  much on the donors (Gabas et 
al, 1997; Lund & Marcussen  1996;  Danida  1997). 
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2.2.2 The ecological crisis 
This dissertation  is not a  contribution  to  the  debate on whether  a  process of desertification is 
going on in  Burkina Faso (there  indeed  seems  not  to be), whether  the  environment  is  degrading 
or  not in the  Sahel,  or whether  human  natural  resource  management  practices  are contributing to 
this  degradation.  This  has  been  convincingly  done  elsewhere  (See  Juul,  1999,  Benjaminsen,  1998, 
Scoones  et al.  1994).  Rather, I venture  into an  analysis  of  how  discourses  of degradation  become 
important for policy  making in Burkina Faso. This  has  serious  implications for the  manner  in 
which  development  projects  and  programmes  are run, and for the  way  donor-recipient relations 
evolve. For the time being, I shall content myself with presenting what seems to be the 
dominating discourses  in  framing  the  environmental  question  in  the  Sahel. 
. A narrative  purporting  that  natural  resource  management  has  gone from a  sort of 
equilibrium to a disequilibrium. Accordingly, an exceeding of the “carrying 
capacity” of the  land,  has  led  to  use  practices  are no longer  sustainable. 
. An assumption  that  this  equilibrium  can  be  r instated  by  merging local and 
imported  technologies  and by mobilizing  popular  support. 
. An implicit linking of  environmental  degradation to  demographic  growth,  stressing 
the Malthusian  rather  than  the  Bosempian  perspective. 
. An assumption  that  here is a  correlation  between  vegetation  cover  and  rainfall, i.e. 
that the  latter  can be influenced by a  man-induced  change  in the former. 
This discourse orientation of the  question of natural  resource  management i s  of course not 
uncontested,  and  serious  efforts  to  question  these  discourses  are  made.  Mearns  and  Leach (1996, 
p.6.),  however,  point  to the fact that these contestations  often end by dichotomizing the debate, 
which  eventually  becomes  unhelpful,  common  property  vs.  privatization,  Malhusian  degradation 
vs.  Boserupian  intensification,  backwardness of peasanm vs. utilizing  local  knowledge.  This  can 
be expanded to the whole question of development, where dichotomies abound, develop- 
ment/politics,  traditional/modern,  local/foreign  (oftenequivalent to traditional/modem) 
state/society.  This  is an example of  how even  the  most  critical  discourse slips into the form, the 
logic  and  the  implicit  postulations of precisely  what it seeks  to  contest. We end  up  discussing  the 
wrong issues. 
2.2.3 The institutional crisis 
As I will try to show  in the following  chapter,  donors  understandably lament the failure of aid 
initiatives to successfully  build  institutions  capable  of  pursuing  aid  activities  beyond the project 
phase.  This  problem has  been  raised  in a  number  of  different  settings  and  different  solutions  have 
been proposed  as  to  how  to  solve it. The  institutional  problem  seems  to  address  the following 
shortcomings of Burkinan  institutions: 
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. They  do  not  have  the  necessary  capacity,  human  logistical;  staff  are  not  sufficiently 
trained, and resources are too scarce to enable a renewal of logistics as they 
deteriorate. 
. The “monde rural” in particular  has an unused  potential,  as it is  dispersed  and 
unorganized. Important  improvements of rural  populations’  poverty  and 
marginalization  could  be  envisaged if they  were  organized  effectively. 
. Accompanying  institution  building  with project aid is seen  as  increasingly 
important as more  emphasis  is  put on the  sustainability of the  aid.  As  aid is ideally 
seen as something  which  ought o plan  its  own  demise,  it  is  important  to  plan from 
the start so that institutions are  set up that  will be able  to  continue  the activities 
without external  support. 
. Perhaps  for  diplomatic  reasons it is considered  politically  incorrect to mention  the 
fact  that  assuring  the  continuity of these institutions, which  are  ideally  intended  to 
“wither away”, is an essentially  political question.” 
2.2.4 The Management crisis 
Burkina Faso has  a  management  crisis,  the  political  system is not able  or  willing  to  decentralize 
resources and lack of accountability,  transparency and  democracy  are  exacerbating corruption. 
(It is  interesting that it is  after  the  introduction of structural  adjustment  reforms  and  parliamentary 
elections  that  the  problem of corruption  has become serious. Earlier, the  country  was  character- 
ized  by  what  has  been  termed  surprisingly  good  management  (Gabas  et al1997). The  pluralisation 
of society, however, seems  to  have  fomented  corruption.) 
The cure  this crisis is  seen  to lie in the reform of the  political  system  through  decentralization, 
support for democratization  and  the  privatization of institutions likely  to  perform  ineffectively 
or as centres for nepotism  and  embezzlements  of  public  funds.  This  has  been  initiated  through 
structural adjustment measures,  and  a  policy of decentralization  but  according  to  donors in 
Burkina Faso, the problem is growing. 
In  donors’ address to these three crises, we clearly  recognize the “tool-perfecting”  approach  as 
it  was  sketched  in  the  beginning of the  previous  chapter.  The  development  problem is a  problem 
of the right type of technology, management and institutions, problems which sometimes 
11 The withering  away of institutions  potentially  exercising  power l i e ,  for instance,  the state 
is one of  the  notions  within  populist  versions of Marxism  which  has  met the most serious 
problems when  confronted  with  political realities. People from  Eastern Europe will h o w  
about this.  Stalin  solved  the  problem by  introducing a pseudo-dialectic  notion of “withering 
away through  strengthening”. It seem to me that donors are facing  some of the same 
problems as Marxistsneninists had looking at communist  Eastern  Europe.  The  withering 
away of aid,  and its planning of its own demise,  its  ideological  objectives of providing  “help 
for self-help” are not going well. The current approach to this  problem,  by  shifting to 
programme aid, institution-building and capacity enhancement in fact resembles this 
“withering away through stren,@ening”. I am, of course, in no way proposing any 
resemblance between donors and Stalin. 
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deliberately, sometimes  unintentionally  obliviate the political  dimension  and the power 
implications of development. 
2.3 Development  assistance within natural  resource  management 
It is a common assumption that the problems faced by Burkina Faso are linked to the 
backwardness and  low  productivity  of its agriculture  and  livestock  sectors.  Widespread rural 
poverty  and  all  indicators  on  health  and  education  being extremely low  corroborate  that  there  is 
a  problem  which  needs to be addressed.  As  approximately  75% of the population is considered 
'rural', the development problem of what is termed 'le monde  rural' is considered of the highest 
priority,  and constitutes an  important 'challenge' as it is called  within  development jargon: 
'Slow  growth  in  agricultural production has been a serious problem 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, challenging domestic and foreign  policy- 
makers. Accelerating that growth will  require important contribu- 
tions from agricultural extension and research.' (World Bank 
research observer,  vol. 12, no.2 Aug. 1997) 
Growth in agriculture is seen  as the sine qua non, and  in the nineties  growth  is  furthermore 
associated  with the need  for  development to be sustainable. As two  World Bank consultants  note: 
Sustainable  economic and social  development will be possible in the 
Sahel-and in most mainly  agricultural  developing countries-only if 
rural  development  is suficiently accelerated and agriculture  becomes 
considerably more productive. (Leisinger & Schmitt, 1999) 
The  problems are, however,  not  only  limited to low  productivity.  According to development  plans 
and policies, unsustainable land use management  has  caused  serious  degradation of natural 
resources  (Burkina Faso, 1991).  Demographic  growth  and  decreasing  rainfall  have  put  a  pressure 
on natural resources,  rendering  'traditional'  management  practices  inadequate  to  address these 
issues  (Danida  1997b).  Furthermore, these traditional  management  practices  have  not  been able 
to define  new  solutions,  and  have  been  unable to tackle the degrading  impact of the  activity, thus 
creating  a  vicious  circle of poverty  and  degradation,  where the m a l  producer is unable to change 
his/her  production  techniques  because  of the poverty  he/she  faces,  whilst  he/she  at  the  same time 
enhances hisher poverty  by  further degrading natural resources. (Gvt. of Burkina Faso 1991; 
Gbikbi 1996; MARA 1995).  Donors therefore speak of a  merging of traditional  and  imported 
natural resource management  techniques,  but  immediately  thereafter  disqualify the traditional 
ones as unsustainable and  inappropriate: 
Traditional and modem natural  resource  management  methods must 
be more  closely  linked in the future to promote agricultural develop- 
ment. Examples include less use of slash-and-bum techniques, 
allowing reforestation in erosion-prone areas,  development of 
ecologically acceptable forms of cultivation such as agroforestry, 
and improved  rangeland  management. In the interest of development, 
it is very  important hat any  measures  taken  support  men and women 
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engaged in small-scale farming, since  they constitute the majority of 
the population in  the Sahel(Leisinger & Schmitt, 1999). 
As we can see, slash-and-bum techniques are discarded agroforestry and improved rangeland 
management , although it has been  only  very  partly  successful, is praised, and rural "men and 
women" are lumped  together as one  apparently  homogenous  group,  which should be supported, 
not for their own sake, but in the interest of  development. 
Furthermore, development aid  of  course  works  within  a  specific historical context in Burkina 
Faso. Within agriculture, the rapport  between  rural  producers  and institutions with the task  of 
assuring their development has always  been  based on the  establishment  of local institutions, or 
"groupements". If farmers wanted credits, fertilizer, extension, pesticides, plows, in short 
development,  they  had to organize  in groupements, formed by the  national extension agent. The 
enormous  number of village "groupements" in  Burkina  Faso  (some  say up to 12.000)shows that 
organizing within such institutions has  become  a  conditionality if fanners want contact with 
external  actors. We are,  in  other  words,  far  from  the  Rochdale-model of fanners' co-operatives, 
where farmers unite to face a  usurping state or  class of oppressors. 
A list of historical events over the last 15 yearsis  relevant  to enhance understanding of the 
organization of the "monde rural" and  its  relationship to donors  and the state. In 1983-84, two 
years of consecutive drought hit Burkina Faso, emptying  rural  populations'  granaries,  severely 
diminishing livestock numbers, causing  massive  migrations  and leaving people at the mercy of 
emergency  aid organizations. This  introduced  nurturing  contact  with external aid organizations 
as a potential survival strategy. 
In 1983, the Thomas Sankara "revolution"  took  place, an event that  seriously disrupted systems 
of subordination  and  power  (customary,  religious,  economic and political)  at  all  levels  of  society. 
In an environment of both coercion  and  enthusiasm,  systems of subordination were no longer 
necessarily seen as incontestable or indisputable. In this  turbulent context, old accounts are 
settled, new alliances made, old autocrats are overthrown or reinvented in new guises (See 
Laurent 1996). Through a political will of the government to transfer power to village levels it 
becomes  apparent that "no condition  is  permanent",  that  things  are changeable. Accordingly, the 
fact that organized collective action  could  lead  somewhere  made  a  long-lasting impact. 
In 87, however, it became apparent  that there are limits to the changes one can expect. With 
Sankara assassinated,  a  return to former  types of subordination  began.  But this was accompanied 
by new  trends  within  development  discourse, where  structural  adjustment  programmes  emphasize 
the necessity of breaking the state monopoly  as  development  institution. This discourse shared 
with the revolutionary rhetoric of the Sankara period the emphasis on the importance of 
"grassroots" development, an organized civil society. It meant an increased importance of 
development  means  transferred to NGOs, and  with  this,  new  types  of positionings and conflicts 
of how to access and distribute these means, as well as it meant new relations between 
government and non-government institutions, suddenly in potential conflict over external 
resources. 
The last ten  years have also witnessed  a  sweep of externally-driven  ideas  concerning  democratiza- 
tion and decentralization, processes  that  have  not  resulted  in  significant  transfers  of  power or 
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redistribution  of  wealth,  but which  have  undoubtably  inspired  certain  social  actors  within the field 
of development to venture into  more  adventurous  social  experiments. 
A number of projects and  programmes  have  been outlined and  implemented  with the overall 
objective of addressing problems  within  natural  resource  management. These activities range 
from the 50 million US$ PRSAP- project (Projet  pour le  Renforcement des Services Agro- 
Pastorales) financed  by the World  Bank,  to  bilateral  development  projects  and  small  local NGOs 
trying to  raise money from foreign  sources for their  ‘grass-root’  activities. These development 
institutions  are  highly  heterogenous in the way  they  are  set  up,  in  their  approaches as to how  their 
activities are to be undertaken,  but  they  share  to  a  remarkable  degree th  idea mentioned above, 
that  there  is  a  problem,  what  the  problem  is,  and  that there is a need to address it through outside 
assistance.  Over the years  what  have  been  seen as the  central  problems have changed, as well as 
the way solutions are implemented.  Nevertheless,  development  has  always  been  seen as the 
solution to these problems. And development has always been the main objective for rural 
producers,  when  these  have  been  organized.  The  organization of the  peasantry  or ’le rnonde  rural‘ 
has always been a precondition if rural producers wanted to deal with institutions doing 
development,  be  these the state,  colonizing  powers,  bilateral  development  projects, commercial 
enterprises,  parastatals or NGOs. Of special  interest is the Programme National de Gestion  des 
Terroirs” aimed at  supporting  institutions  capable of assuring sustainable land  use in the rural 
areas. This initiative  is  supported by a  long  array  of donors,  among others Danida and the World 
Bank. 
2.4 Danish  bilateral  aid  to  natural  resource  management in Burkina Faso 
Danish  aid  is based upon  support  to  certain  sectors. The notion of “sector” is a bit problematic, 
and certain issues are seen as  overarching the different  sectors  wherein Danish aid is operating 
(in Burkina Faso Denmark  works  within  agriculture,  energy  and  water). The “cross-cutting 
issues” include participation, gender,  sustainability,  poverty  orientation  and strengthening civil 
society. All this is finally going to lead  to  development, the grand  and final cross cutting issue. 
In Burkina Faso  “environment” is not  a  sector,  but  a  “cross-cutting issue.”” 
Burkina Faso was  appointed  as  ‘Programme  co-operation Country’ by the Danish government in 
1993. This was  a result of considerations  aiming  at  widening  the  range of countries receiving 
Danish development assistance.  The  choice of Burkina  Faso  was justified by stressing that the 
country  had  a  good  reputation  as  only  moderately  corrupt,  it  had  a  decent  regime,  adapting to WB 
and IMF policies, and undergoing democratic institutional changes. Finally a number of 
environmental  problems  seemed  to be a  cause  for  concern,  a  type of problem  requiring Danida’s 
special  attention.  Desertification  and  natural  resource  degradation  had for a  number  of  years  been 
a major priority in Danish development  assistance,  and  multilateral  aid to Burkina Faso was 
already  being  financed  through UNSO, to address  these  issues.  (Lund&  Marcussen 1996). Danish 
NGOs had, furthermore been,  operating in  the  country for a  number of years. 
The choice of Burkina  Faso  was,  however,  equally  a  sign of considerable  pragmatismon the part 
of the Danish co-operation, as the president of Burkina  Faso, Mr. Blaise Compaore, can hardly 
12 In certain  programme  countries,  environment is, however,  considered a sector. 
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be  accused  of  democratic  behaviour  bearing  in  mind  the  way  he  has  seized  power.  Being mmber 
two  in the ‘gang of four’ that  gained  power  in  a  bloody  military  coup  in  1983,  declaring  the 
revolution  and  embarking  upon some quite  remarkable  social  transformations, he was  behind the 
assassination  of his superior, Thomas Sankara,  in  1987  and later as well  of  the  two  other  members 
of the  quartet  Mr.  Jean-Baptiste  Lingani  and  Mr.  Henri  Zongo.  However,  in  1990-91,  President 
Compaore  embarked  upon  a  process  of  democratization,  allowing  a free press  and  oppositional 
political  parties and adapting to the structural  adjustment  policy  requirements of The IMF and  the 
World  Bank.  This  change  has  led  the  bulk  of  the  donors,  including  Denmark,  to  accept  atrocities 
of the  past.’3 
Another  reason  why  Burkina  Faso  was  chosen as programme  country  could be that it submitted 
to  the  structural  adjustment  policies  in  1991.  The  following of the  conditionalities of the  Bretton- 
Woods institutions has always been an imperative for Danida’s support of Programme 
cooperation  countries. 
Compared  to  other  African  countries,  Burkina F so signed  structural  adjustment  loan  agreements 
remarkably  late.  Certain  observers  point  to  the fact that  the  country  in  fact  embarked  upon  a  “self- 
imposed  adjustment”  already  in  the  Sankara era, but  donors  generally  nevertheless speak very 
derogatorily  about the economic  performance of the  country  in  this  period, despite the fact that 
big donors like France  withdrew their aid quite quickly for political  reasons.  The World Bank 
states  that 
“(..)With bold and egalitarian objectives, the regime nonetheless 
undermined the economic base  of Burkina Faso and its efforts proved 
unsustainable. The regime ’S political orientation was inspired by 
central planning and a Marxist-Leninist ideology, distrustjiuful of 
external intervention in particular the Bretton-Woods institutions.(..) 
In the  social sectors, the government sought to  improve  the ducation 
and health status of the population through aggressive vaccination 
and literacy campaigns, and launched the construction of  a large 
number of health centres and schools. The authorities actively 
promoted environmental conservation and the role of women. 
Burkina saw several years of growth, fuelled  by high public invest- 
ment, good weather and increased agricultural production in the 
onchocerciasis-freed areas, but nonetheless faced economic crisis as 
the  economic foundations of the policies pursued were  weak” (World 
Bank 1994, cited in Speirs, 1995). 
As Speirs  notes, it is interesting  to see that  when  a  “Marxist-Leninist’’  regime  does  vaccination 
campaigns  they  are  “aggressive”  (although UNICEF gave  them  full  marks),  not  “effective”,  or 
13 In December 1998 the most outspoken  critic  of Compaort, the editor of the independent 
newspaper,  “L’IndLpendent”,  Mr. Norbert Zongo, was  murdered by several armed men. 
Donors have (which probably  makes sense within  a  diplomacy-logic) remained cautious 
about  criticising  the  president and have  awaited  the  results of different  commissions’  work. 
The  result of the  work of these  commissions has now  advised  the  president to withdraw  and 
call for new elections. The strategy of Compaort now seems to be procrastination,  there  has 
been  no  reaction  to  the  commissions’  recommendations. A situation that seems to suit the 
donors, as this assures business as usual. 
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some other more positively  laden  adjective. It seems,  though,  that he reason why the terms of 
the structural adjustment policy were relatively modest was that the Sankara regime had 
attempted to moderate spending. It is, however,  equally  interesting  that  what  was dubious in 
1994, egalitarian objectives and  central  planning,  is now  part  and  parcel  of  the World Bank 
package. The Bank-people Leisinger and  Schmitt  thus insist that 
At the  minimum, development policy must  include  the following: 
. Political decision making  that ’tombines the free market principle  with the social 
equilibrium principle.“ This means creating an environment that encourages 
economic development by, for example,  promoting private initiatives. It also means 
abolishing&ed prices and  introducing sociopolitical policies that enable the poor 
to  satisb their basic needs. 
. The construction and development of infrastructure,  such as roads,  transport and 
storage facilities, electricity, health  care and education institutions, drinking water 
supplies, and irrigation systems. 
. Measures to  protect the environment  and preserve non-renewable resources. 
. The promotion of small  businesses and local crafts. (Leisinger and Schmin 1999) . 
The difference between this approach and the Sankara-one is, however, that the “social 
equilibrium principle”  is hard to trace  as  anything  but  noble  intentions in this newer edition. 
Where Sankara  attempted de facto delegation of  authority  and  resources to rural  areas  (admittedly 
with  a  greater or lesser  degree of  success), it remains  a  mystery  how free market  forces  alone  will 
assure this equilibrium  for the first  time in  world  history  in  rural  Burkina Faso. Empirical  findings 
from  the capitalist era of world history  in  fact  seem to suggest  that free market principles and 
social equilibrium principles are virtually  impossible to merge. As colleagues have shown, the 
World-Bank-encouraged planning efforts in Burkina Faso are likewise extremely centralized 
“top-down’’  and  “donor-driven”  (Marcussen & Speirs  1998). 
Many of the elements that the Bank criticizes from the Sankara era are thus duplicated in  the 
nineties. Nowadays, the Bank claims,  the  efforts  are  more  sustainable. What this sustainability 
means,  however,  remains  a  mystery  which  we  shall  return  to  towards  the end of the dissertation. 
Danish  aid thus attempted to be  a  more  integral  part of a  Burkinan agricultural policy, which is 
fundamentally  defined by the World  Bank. In Danida’s  Programme Support Document (Danida 
199913) it is stated that Danish Agricultural  support to Burkina Faso is based on the strategic 
outline and  priorities  in  the  Burkina  Government’s  strategy note and  action  plan. On top of this, 
the Danish Government has added an emphasis on poverty  alleviation, sustainable use of the 
environment, equality between the sexes,  and the development of democratic institutions. 
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On the basis of this,  a  series of  areas  of  intervention  have  been  identified for the development of 
the  agricultural  sector.Combined,  these  aim  to  reach an overall  goal: to improve living conditions 
and the economic security of the rural population. This  goal is pursued  in order to solve the 
problems  seen as the  main  problems  of  the  rural  poor.  Danida  formulates these problems  as 5 
subgoals: 
. Improvement of natural resource  management in order to reach a 
sustainable use of the productive potential of the land and to halt  the 
degradation of soils. This  is  sought  through establishing more  economi- 
cally  and  ecologically  sustainable  use,  through  support  for the establish- 
ment  of  committees  on  inter  and  intra-village  level  able  to  decide on local 
natural  resource  management,  and  through  the  diffusion of  new  technolo- 
gies,  techniques  and  crops,  in  order  to  avoid  overgrazing  and  soil  erosion, 
and to maintain  water  resources  and  regenerate soil fertility. 
. Increase and diversify the economic activities of the rural population. 
Rural, poverty,  according  to  Danida is explained  partly by the lack of 
diversity of cultivated  crops  and  farmers’  dependency on what is often  one 
single rainfed  foodcrop  for  domestic  consumption. By cultivating 
different crops, raising domestic animals and through other income- 
generating  activities,  vulnerability is reduced.  Therefore,  new  breeding 
techniques,  cropping  techniques  and  alternative  income-generating 
activities  are  introduced. 
. Increase  incomes of the  rural population - esp. the women  and the poor. 
Through  marketing of certain  agricultural  commodities  and improving 
infrastructure  and  supporting  certain  forms of production,  the programme 
provides extra incomes to the  rural  population. 
. Strengthen the organizations of the rural producer groups. Through the 
programme the rural populations will create institutions capable of 
managing natural resources locally. The programme will also help 
organizations defend their interests, and help them marketing their 
produce  and  obtain  agricultural  inputs.  Credits  should  be  directed  through 
these. 
. Improve the institutional framework so that the agricultural sector will 
be able to pefobrm  in a market economy. Now that the state is no longer 
involved in marketing  and  regulating  prices  within a,giculture, it must 
adjust  to  its  new  regulating  and  monitoring  role.  The  state  has  a responsi- 
bility to allocate  donor  support  and  to  plan  where this support  is  most 
needed,  and it needs  support  in  order  to  perform these tasks  optimally,  in 
an efficient  way  assuring  productivity  and  competitiveness. 
These goals are pursued through four different programme components: Support to natural 
resource management projects  and support to the national Gestion de  Terroirs programme : 
Support to  agricultural  credit  schemes;  Support  to  private sector support  and finally through 
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institutional  support to the sector, i.e. support to the Ministry of Agriculture, and to applied 
agricultural  research.  The  Programme  document  furthermore  states that, in the first months of 
intervention, a special effort  will  be  made to develop  indicators to measure the impact  upon 
poverty  in the intervention  areas. How this is  to be done remains to be seen. 
The Danida  programme  support  document  claims that these activities will have positive effects 
on alleviating  poverty,  protecting the environment,  on the living  conditions  of  the  women  and on 
democracy.  Poverty  will be alleviated as the  rural  population  in the intervention area is virtually 
all  considered  poor,  credit will benefit the women, the environment  will benefit from the sound 
management  that  will  result from institutions set up and the construction of the famous stone 
bunds diguettes, a  point we return  to in Chapter 4. Democracy  will  be enhanced as the founding 
principles upon  which these new institutions are built are democratic. Principles which  will 
enable  village  institutions  will to grow  and  become active institutional  players  in the process of 
decentralization. 
Danish  aid to natural  resource  management  has so far mainly  been concentrated in  two  projects, 
one in the Northern  part of the country  in the Seno and Yagha Province, based in the town of 
Don; and  the  other the recently  initiated  Boulgou-project  operating  from the town  of  Tenkodogo 
in the southeastern  part of the co~ntry.’~ 
2.4.1 The PSBmANIDA project in Dori 
The DANIDA-project  in Dori was,  until  1996, executed by UNSO. It started in 1990 with the 
objective: 
. to develop a  natural  resource  management  approach taking into  account  both 
private  and  common  lands; 
. to introduce  improved  and  intensified  systems of production; 
. to introduce  inter-  and  intra village institutions capable of assuring a  management 
of natural  resources  that  would  lead to more sustainable use and the appeasement 
of conflicts among different  user  groups: 
The project has, in  collaboration  with  other  donors  and projects, developed  an  approach  termed 
‘gestion de terroir’, based  on the assumption  that  the gestion de terroir is not  only  a village affair 
as the common grazing lands between the villages are used by several villages and by 
transhumant pastoralists. This has been done by creating so-called Unifis Agro-Pastorales 
(UAPs) regrouping members from several often adjacent villages with traditional linkages. 
Within every UAP a number of Cornitis de Gestion de Terroir (CGT) from each village is 
designated, plus a number of Cornitis d’action specifique (CAS), involved in undertaking 
activities  supported by the  project  such as the  construction of stone  bunds, artisan production of 
14 As a matter of fact these  projects are no longer  projects. I recently contacted the  Ministry 
of Foreign  Affairs  in  order to obtain a  project  document, and I was informed  that  they were 
no longer to be seen as projects,  but as “Agricultural Sector  Programme components”. 
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soap  etc.  Recently, a third institution has  been  introduced,  the Comite' Technique Villageois 
(CTV),  which  is  to  assure  coordination  within  each  village.  The  project  encourages  and supports 
the  creation of a Sche'ma de Diveloppement et de lxmenagement du Terroir within  each UAP, 
in  order  to  encourage  the  population  to  develop a long-term  vision for the  development  of their 
territory, thereby  assuring  a  de facto decentralization of land-use  decisions  to  the  village level. 
A very  long  list of supportive  activities  are  part of the  project,  but  the  main  activities  remain  the 
construction of stone bunds  and the disbursement of credits  for  small-scale  livestock-raising 
activities,  and  the  approvision of water  infrastructure  in  the  form of wells or bolis, dug-out  tanks 
where  rainwater is gathered  mainly for the watering of cattle.  The  problems of this project  will 
be dealt with in Chapter 4. 
2.4.2 The DANIDA Boulgou project 
The  other big Danish  natural  resource  management  project  is  situated  in  the  province of Boulgou, 
in the  southeast of the country. This project is situated in the town  of Tenkodogo  on the road to 
Togo. According to project  documents (DANIDA 1997a),  this  project  operates in a difficult 
context, as an  Italian  funded  FAO-project  operated  in  the  region  in  the SOS, which  apparently was, 
as they say in  UN-language,  'not  entirely  successful'.  This  new  project, like the  Dori project, 
initially states that Burkina Faso has  a  problem: How to  manage  the  carrying  capacity of its 
ecological as well as human  environment?  (DANIDA  1995, p. 5)  The  project  has  got  off  to  a  slow 
start as it has  been the objective  to  ensure  the  participation f the  villages  within  the  project  zone. 
Therefore, a lot of diagnostic work  has  been  undertaken  in  order to define more precisely what 
kind of activities were  the priorities and in order to define  who  were  to  be  the  partners of the 
project.  Although  cultivation  patterns,  the  ethnic and  religious  composition  of the population, 
rainfall  and  infrastructure  are  markedly  different, it seems  that  this  project  nevertheless ends up 
to a large extent carrying  out  the same activities  as the  Dori  project.  The  project operates with 
four main principles: 
. It  has  a  participatory  approach . the support aims  at  village  s lf-help ('auto-promotion') . the choice of zones of intervention  is based  on  vegetation  cover . executing the different  project tasks is open to a  long list of service providers, 
subcontractors and entrepreneurs;  (DANIDA,  1997a, p.3) 
It has  not,  however, come up  with  concrete  solutionsregarding  how  the  project  will ensure other 
points than  point three. It  is  not  substantiated  in  more  concrete  terms  what  is  actually meant by 
the above. The  participatory  approach,  which  is  no  doubt an honest  intention of the project 
management, has so far not  been  able  to lead to  the  identification of project  activities that are 
different from the  ones  initially  stated  in  the  earlier  documents  from  the  preparatory  phase  of  the 
project.  The  many PRA exercises  have  not been  able to define  either  why  the  self-reliance of the 
farmers  should  mean so much  to  them,  despite  the  more  obvious  fact  that  submitting  to somekind 
of dependency relation to the project seems more logical,  hence the discussion of the ideas of 
Oliver  de  Sardan  (1995).  When  trying  to  explain  this,  the  authors f the  project documents end 
up in clear tautologies: 
"A ce grand principe (Gestion de terroirs) doit s'ajouter l'exigence 
pour le projet d 'une dimarche opirationnelle vismt 
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fondamentalement  le renforcement progressif des capacitis 
endog.2nes de la population dssentiellement rurale- 6 prendre en 
charge son propre diveloppement'. (DANIDA, 1997a, p.3.) 
In other words, indigenous capacities  should  be  strengthened in order  for  people  to  be capable 
of taking charge of their own development. This statement is, to say the least, not easily 
transformed into concrete  activities.  Going  further  into  the  report, it is stated that the project 
supports the government  policy of liberalizing  markets and  promoting  private  investments  and 
reducing the role of the state (ibid.p.4) Furthermore it acts within the national policy of 
decentralization,  because: 
"L'approche  du projet (qui) privilegie le dialogue et la negociation 
avec les populations, et  qui  vise avant tout la risponsabilisation des 
comrnunautis rurales locales pourprendre en main la  gestion de leur 
avenir, se situe dans le contexte global de la ddcentralisation au 
Burkina Faso. (ibid) 
However,  one  searches  in  vain  for  studies of local  power  structures  within the project  document, 
and  there  are  no  concrete  recommendations as to how  dialogue  with  the  local  population is going 
to  be translated into a  de facto transfer of power  to  local  levels. 
It seems that both  projects  in  fact  make some rather  drasticinitial  implicit  assumptions: 
. 
. 
. 
that there are  problems; 
that there is a  consensus as to  what  the  problems are; 
that  everybody  is  willing  to do something  about  it; 
that  the  project is operating in an institutional  void; 
that the introduction of the  necessary  institutions  will  solve  problems of social 
conflict over  resources; 
that people's powerlessness  can  be  overcome  through empowerment and 
'responsabilisation'; 
that existing power  structures  will  accept  that  newly  introduced institutions gain 
influence; 
that  imported  soil  and  water  conservation  measures  provide  solutions for farmers. 
We are,  in  other  words,  back  to  a  rather rigid version of the  "tool-perfecting " approach. There 
is virtually no  mention of any kind of political  dynamism in  rural  Burkina  Faso:  poverty is 
viewed  within  a  completely  powerless  context,  and it is to be  alleviated  though  bringing forth a 
number  of opportunities that these  people  apparently  formerly  were  not  aware of, regardless of 
any  social  constraints that they  may  succumb  to.  Furthermore,  the  institutional  question,  where 
the set-up of institutions is supposed  to  solve  a  series of serious  resource  allocation  problems, 
seems  to  underestimate  seriously the local  political  implications of resource  competitions. The 
mere establishment of a  series of institutions  (with  no  juridical  status, just an  affiliation  to an 
affluent  project,  important  but  not  necessarily  very  legitimate  or  long-lasting)  is  seen as a  pa acea 
for resolution of resource conflicts  that  local  institutions  have  worked  with  for  years  with  more 
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or less success. The establishment of a rigid  institutional  code  might as well  lead to the exacerbation of resource 
conflicts as to the  opposite, aS the fluidity of the existing  institutions opens for a certain negotiability, thereby 
avoiding open conflict. This, of course,  might  especially benefit the powerful,  but at least considers local power 
structures. 
The oblivion towards  any  kind of power  relations  and  resource  allocation  mechanisms in rural 
Burkina Faso makes  it  rather  dubious  whether  it is at  all  legitimate  to  state as bluntly as DANIDA 
does  that their programme  will  have  a  positive  impact  upon  their “crosscutting issue”  objectives, 
poverty alleviation, environmental  sustainability  support for women, democracy, as they seem 
to imply. 
2.5 Potential partners of the  DANIDA projects 
The project  documents  stress  the  importance of establishing  partnerships  with  local  partners,  not 
only  within  the  government  extension  services,  but  also among NGOs, local  organizations  and 
private entrepreneurs.  DANIDA  projects  are,  naturally, very popular  partners, because of their 
strong  economic  capacities.  Therefore,  other  institutions  are  very  eager  to  work  with  the  projects. 
The most  important  partner  is  the  government  extension  service, th  CWA (Centre RLggionaZ de 
Promotion Agro-pastorale). Severe  problems as to  how  to  optimize  these  partnerships  have, 
however,  occurred, as CWA in  itself  has  practically  no  means  to  run  their  services  apart from the 
funding they  get  through  the  PRSAP-project,  which is basically  a  logistic  support  programme. 
A very  ’uneven’  partnership  thus  immediately  emerges,  where  the  project  has  to  ’control’ the 
CRPA, and make sure they  get  their  money’s  worth. 
Similar problems exist among  the NGOs. Both  in Dori and  in  Boulgou  a  number of NGOs 
operate, but most  often  either  strictly  with  their own agenda  without  the  ability  to  focus  on  what 
their agenda should  be  apart  from  promoting  development.  They  operate  without  any form of 
coordination of their  activities,  and  are  mostly  entirely  dependent on external  support  to cover 
their  salaries,  logistics and activities.  The  projects  have  attempted to entrust  certain activities to 
local NGOs, especially  activities  related to the  training of villagers  and  project staff, but  the 
NGOs have often lacked  sufficient skills to  direct  these training activities. Or the uaining has 
been  ‘ideologically biased as in the  case  where  project  staff  in  Dori  was trained by the locally 
based NG0 APESS,  which  has  a  very  strong  semi-religious  ideological  basis  developed  by their 
charismatic leader,  Doctor  Boubabar LY. 
It has  also  been  quite  limited  what  kind of activities  that  have  been  possible  to entrust to  private 
entrepreneurs.  Activities  have  included  the  hiring of trucks  to  transport  stones  for  the  construction 
of stone  bunds or the  supply of fuel  for  project  vehicles  from  the  local  petrol  station.  Furthermore, 
of course,  the  mere  presence of the  projects  has  boosted  the  local  economy  in the sense that the 
DANIDA  projects  are  among  the  largest  employees in the towns  where  they  operate,  which is a 
very important influence. 
In all three cases it is  the  impression  that  this  has  not  been  successful. It does  not  seem that the 
activities were  enabled  to run  without  significant  prolonged input from DANIDA. Neither  did 
DANIDA project  activities  become  more  cost  effective  through  entrusting activities to  others. 
64 
2.6 Summing up 
Evaluations of the  DANIDA-projects are ambiguous.  DANIDA-evaluations  generally recognize 
that  great  efforts  have  been  made  to  build  institutions,  but on the  other  hand  they  accept  that  the 
overall  impact,  especially  in  the  ecological  sense, is very  reduced  (PNUD  1996, Danida 1997a). 
Furthermore  it  is  recognized  that  a  more  clearly  outlined  pedagogic  strategy  in  the  training  efforts 
is lacking.  However,  the  evaluations  are  generally  positive,  and  in no way  question  the  premises 
on which  the  projects  operate. 
Evaluations do not  mention  local  knowledge of the  environment,  or  Burkinan  farmers’ own 
agricultural  techniques and  strategies.  Although it is stated as a  clear  intention, there is a  striking 
absence of  any  kind  of  reflection  upon  the  positioning  and  strategies  a  “recipient  group”  might 
have facing an awesome “partner” like Danida. All mention of farmers’ strategies towards 
poverty  (cutting  down  trees,  migrating,  having  more  children) is condescendingly  discarded as 
unsustainable,  harmful,  starting  vicious  circles of degradation. But admittedly  these  strategies  are 
harmful aren’t they? Well, the fact is that all development documents and plans content 
themselves  with  repeating  the  narratives  causing  the  “crisis”  in  Burkina Faso, but  none provide 
any  more  convincing  evidence  to  why  things  should  be lik that. Is the  environment degrading? 
They  apparently do not  need to  prove this, it is so obvious  to  everybody. Or the other side of this 
question: Is development  intervention  reversing  the  degradation? No, not  yet, so we  need  more 
of it (PNUD 1996). 
But  most  importantly,  Danida  makes  no  mention,  even in th ir  swift  account on “risks”  (to  project 
success) of political  constraints  or  opposition  to  their  activities.  Project  activities  are  apparently 
inserted  into  a  void of  both institutions,  power  and  conflicting  interests. But is Danida aware of 
these problems of local  powers  being  constraints  to  development?  Maybe so, but  they see the 
problem as  solved by extracting  social  problems from the  political sphere, and  recasting them 
as managerial  or  developmental. 
The  three  following  chapters  will go  more  thoroughly  into  details  of  development initiatives like 
the two DANIDA  projects. In the  third  chapter,  I  shall  explore  a  special form in  which criticism 
of development  projects  and  programmes  is  made.  It is a  form of critique  which is most  often  very 
pertinent and  precise in pinpointing  shortcomings  and  recommending  perfections of certain 
methodologies.  It is again a  ‘tool-refining’  perspective on the  critique of development initiatives, 
once again not calling into question the political dimension of development institutions. 
Furthermore, this tool-refining perspective has a tendency to revert to developmentalist 
normativism. In this  critique I will not limit  myself  to  the  empiria  of Don and  Boulgou,  but  will 
also  draw  upon other researchers  who  have  studied  different  types of development institutions. 
In the fourth  chapter I shall try to outline  a  more  political  approach  to  the  analysis  of  development 
institutions. This is not just seeing the project  ‘within  the  framework of the national  policy  of 
decentralization’, but as a contested arena of conflict over economic, social and symbolic 
resources.  Looking  at  the  project  in  this  way  suddenly  produces  new  perspectives,  because all of 
a sudden people  ‘participate’  very  actively  trying  to  position  themselves  in order to  benefit as 
much as possible  from  the  externally  driven  intervention.  Finally,,  in  Chapter five I shall return 
to the basic  assumptions on  which  development is construed.  Looking  at  these as special forms 
of discourse and tracing their genealogy, weighing them against the narratives and myths 
prevailing concerning  causes  and  importances of certain  features of Burkina Faso  society and 
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natural  resources,  will  constitute  the  final coup de grace to  the  development  initiatives as I have 
experienced them  in Burkina Faso.  And I shall even  irreverently  not end with  a  chapter of 
'recommendations'.  Instead I will  focus on  what I see  that  development has nevertheless  done,  in 
the  sense that it has created  certain  societal  dynamics of its  own,  maybe  not he anticipated  ones, 
but  maybe something not so bad  after  all. 
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Chapter 3. Tool-perfecting  development  research  and  its  failure 
In Chapter Two I listed  a  number of apparently  common  assumptions as to the necessity  and 
relevance of development  assistance  for  natural  resource  management  in Burkina Faso. In this 
chapter I shall  review  important  critical  research  within  this field. My point is that  much of this 
research,  though  thoroughly and  critically  carried out, fails at a  critical  point  as  the  researchers 
resort  to  a  normative  acceptance of the  relevance  of the  aid,  which  they,themselves,  have shown 
to be so unsuccessful. My  hope  is  to  show the  importance of insisting  on  a  political  dimension 
in development  assistance,  looking  at  development institutions as arenas of conflict over the 
means  for development..  This  political  ‘arena  approach’  will  then  be  developed  and  illustrated 
empirically in Chapter  Four. 
In the  following, I shall  go  through  a  number  of  different  assessments  of different  types of aid to 
Burkina Faso.  All  texts  have  what I term  a  “tool-perfecting”  objective.  Development aid, it is 
claimed, has  not  been  successful for a  number  of reasons,  but  should  be  altered  through the 
application of  new  techniques  developed in part  by  drawing  upon  experience from the  past.  There 
is room for significant  improvement.  More  involvement of recipients,  better  targeting, setting 
more realistic  goals,  more  thorough  studies  before  carrying  out  things  in an unknown setting etc. 
are seen as ways  to  improve  aid  performance. 
The first, from the  OECD  is  a  critical  assessment of aid  to  the  Sahel  in  general.  The OECD, in 
a  summarizing  essay,  ‘Finding  problems  to  Suit  the  Solutions:  Introduction  to  a  Critical  Analysis 
of Methods and  Instruments of  Aid to  the  Sahel’  (OECD, 1996) tries to point to a  number of 
central  shortcomings  in  development  aid  to  the Sahel. 
The second, by  Gabas et al. is an assessment of the  effect of French  aid  to  Burkina Faso. It  tries 
to  get  beyond  the  “evaluation”-stage,  listing  a  series of issues  the  authors consider not  should  be 
forgotten when  looking  at  the  effects of aid. 
The remaining are all NG0 studies,  and  have  a  more  narrow  focus.  Maclure  reflects  upon  certain 
NGOs working  in  the  Namentenga  Province,  and  highlights  certain  shortcomings  of  this  NGO- 
work. Atampugre reflects on the institutional problems related to two projectswhich are 
undergoing a  transfer  from  being  executed by a  foreign NG0 to  being  taken  over  by  a  locally- 
created NGO. Finally, I refer  to  three  other  studies,  which are revealing  assessments of NG0 
performance. 
These mentioned texts, I shall argue share a number of normative notions, despite their 
differences in  scope  and  focus. 
The notions  that  they  share  are  the  following: 
. They  all  share  a  vision of a  preferable  kind of development  being sustainable. Few 
people  nowadays  have  no  reservations  about  the  concept  of  sustainability,  admitting 
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. 
. 
the problems of operationalising  political  goals of sustainability  in  more  concrete 
terms.  However,  when it comes  to  assessing  development  aid,  the  concept  pops  up 
again  and  again, not  always  intentionally,  as  a combined  normativity  and 
conditionality. 
Associated  with  the  sustainability  concept is the  ideological  idea that development 
aid  should  plan its own  demise. The withering  away of the  development  apparatus 
is  still an objective,  although it could  very  well  be  argued  that  things are going  the 
opposite way. 
All texts see a  related  problem  in the sense  that  aid  tends  to  create dependence. Aid 
has  often  been  hoped  to  help  beneficiaries  to  become  self-reliant,  but i has  often 
appeared  that  there  was  no  realistic  hope f  this: the  presence of the  donor was sine 
qua non if the project  activity was to  continue. The way to tackle  this  problem,  to 
assure  popular  participation  and  a  feeling of ownership,  has  notyet  emerged. 
. Finally,  they see Burkina  Faso as being  in  a  state of crisis, to  which  development 
is the solution.  However, it has to be the  right  kind of development. 
3.1 The OECD report 
The OECD  report  (OECD, 1996) is  a  remarkably  critical  report  on  development  assistance  to the 
Sahel. It  presents 1) an  overview of weaknesses and failings that  hinder  aid  effectiveness; 2) it 
tries to identify the reasons for these failings and 3) it details goals  of  aid  in  order to provide 
instruments of analysis in order to propose possible courses of action. As it is the most 
comprehensive  account of the difficulties of administering  aid  to  Sahel, I will  summarize it at 
length  before  going  into  a  discussion  and  critique of some of the  preconceived  notions on which 
it is  based 
I) Overview of the  effectiveness  of aid. 
OECD  puts  forward  two  main  conclusions  regarding the aid  effectiveness: 
I. It  claims  that  aid  to  the  Sahel  has  had  mixed  results  in  terms of impact. Its  main  shortcomings 
include  a  failure  to  assure  ‘ownership’; it appears  that  ‘punctual  aid’  has  been  the  most  successful, 
as in  e.g.  the  installment of infrastructure  (esp.  communication),  and to some extent also  energy 
and  water. On the other hand,  institution  building in order  to  assure  the  continuity of these 
activities  has  largely failed. It  equally  points to the fact that  the  private  sector  has  not been  very 
successfully  addressed. 
II. Secondly, the report points to shortcomings in the way aid has been inconsistently and 
inefficiently directed. The report  points  to  the  following  issues: 
. The aid  is  mainly ‘donor driven’, i.e.  managed,  conceptualized,  appraised, 
implemented,  evaluated,  and of course paid for by  donors. 
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. Aid is offered rather than requested. It  is  designed  to  fit  donor  demands  rather  than 
to fulfill a  demand.  Initiatives  are  taken by donors  to  face this, through  trying  to 
assure  local  involvement,  but  this  leads  to  ambiguity of action,  lack of sustainability 
and  obstacles  to  the  building of local  institutions. 
. Aid  sometimes  u es  unsuitable  and  even  counterproductive instruments. Institu- 
tional building initiatives mostly fail, and there is a  preference  for  constructing 
parallel  institutions,  which  are  seen as particularly  destructive. 
. Goals are too ambitious, forecasts too optimistic  and  eadlines  unrealistic.  This  is 
mainly  because of lack of sufficient  knowledge,  underestimating the complex 
nature of recipient  society.  There  is  too little "learning  capacity" by development 
institutions,  the same mistakes  are  made  again  and  again. 
. There  are too many aid activities and they are badly coordinated. Especially the 
lack of coordination,  uneven  distribution of intervention,  too  many  seminars  (this 
could  however  equally  be  seen  as  a  sign of attempts  to  coordinate  things.) 
. The dialogue between donors  and recipients is tense. Recipients feel that they  are 
not  listened  to,  donors  treat  them  like  crooks,  insisting  on  having  the  final  say  when 
they  finance.  The  result  is  that  targets  are  boosted  in  order  to  reach  a  pleasant 
consensus. 
Concluding, the  report  says  that  there  is  a  considerable inconsistency in  the way  aid is given. 
However, the OECD  insists  that here is considerable  scope for perfecting  the  way  aid is given, 
which is a  better  alternative  than the withdrawal of aid,  a  solution  practised by certain  donors. 
Inconsistency,  however,  remains.  Donors  promote  development,  but define the  goals;  Insist  on 
participation but on the donors'  terms;  they  keep setting unrealistic  goals. 
What are the reasons for these failures? When  looking for the causes, it is  first  and  foremost 
striking that there is not too much  haste  when  it comes to  reforming  inadequate donorpractices. 
Mistakes are repeated again and again. And poor performances are explained by the weak 
institutional capacity of the  Sahelian  countries.  However,  the  report  sympathetically  notes  that 
this blaming the  recipient for his  inability to receive  the  aid  is  somehow  odd.  Thirdly,  the  aid 
business is "rallied by catchwords", hence the focus is on participation, aid coordination, 
partnership and, more recently, ownership . However, these have been more successful as 
indicators of  problems  than  as  solutions  to  problems.  As  a  matter of fact, it is claimed  in  the 
report  that there is an inverse  relationship betweem the  level of participation and the success rate 
of development aid, the most  successful  being those dominated  totally by the donors:  building 
roads, fighting onchocerciasis etc. 
2. Looking for causes of aid  Failings. 
The  OECD  report  goes on to a search for improved aid effectiveness. As mentioned  above,  the 
report  sees  considerable  scope for improvement  in  the  way  aid  is  given..  The  search  for  improved 
aid effectiveness is concentrated on three  issues: 
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1) looking at the methods for designing aid, 
2) looking at partnership  practices, 
3) assessing results and  risk  management. 
ad. 1.) 
Methods in aid designing  are,  according to the report,  “steeped  in  a culture of planning and 
strategising”.  Goals  are set, finances  set,  resource  allocations  planned,  reciprocal commitments 
made,  etc. This definition of  goals sometimes  makes  dialogue  problematic.  Northern partners 
have more long-term  objectives,  while  Sahelians  have  very  pressing  and  short  term  problems. 
Problems that emerge  (lack of sanctions,  nepotism,  incompetence  etc.)  are  always  excused  with 
a  lack of resources  (human  or  logistic).  The  goal  can  therefore  always  be  attained by adding 
resources. The report  suggests  that  the  problem  can  be  addressed  through  reversing  the se ting of 
goals, starting by identifying specific problems among recipients and defining the goals 
afterwards.  This  should  guarantee  a  “real  commitment”. It is  therefore  impossible  to define the 
goal  more  in  detail as the outcomes of the  interventions  depend  on lessons learned,  behavioural 
changes,  trial  and  error,  successes  and  failures.  This  ‘ascending  initiative  approach’  reversing the 
top-down  goal-setting  relies  much  more on local  institutions  to  play  a  larger  part  in  implementa- 
tion  and formulation of  objectives. The reader  will  notice  a  strong  similarity  with  the  approach 
of Rondinelli  as  sketched  in  Chapter One. 
Furthermore,  the report claims  that the many instruments developed  to assure sustainability in 
development  aid  end  up  becoming  obstacles. An example is planning,  which is a  key element in 
local  capacity-building  efforts.  The  donors’  efficiency  ideal  appears  to  be  a  strongly centralized 
and  planned  country,  with  a  jungle  of  “plan  cadres”,  NEAPS,  SAP-plan etc. etc.  Many examples 
equally  show  that  a  great  deal of institutions  are  created  with  the  sole  objective of accommodating 
aid.  The  prevalence of instruments  over  problems  has  two  consequences.  Firstly, it makes “true 
partnership”  difficult.  Secondly,  it  creates  a  temptation to  push for solutions that might not  be 
very  helpful, but will keep the  aid  instruments  running. 
The  design  chain of development  projects  does  not  foster  the  analysis of problems.  Many actions 
are launched  following  negotiations  over what  the  goals  should  be,  which opens for preconceived 
solutions (often based on myths about the causes of the problems). This goes for grand 
programmes and  grass-roots  levels  alike.  It  results in the  striking feature that all  rural NGOs 
basically do the same  thing. 
This  is, according to the report,  not  because of a  misreading of Sahelian  reality.  It is a problem 
of conceptualization, of going  from 
GOAL > INSTRUMENT > SOLUTION > PROBLEM 
To 
PROBLEM > SOLUTION > INSTRUMENT > GOAL. 
Carrying out this more  thorough  definition of  what the  problem  is i s  much  more  time  consuming, 
and  may delay action. And it requires  a  decentralization of decision-making  power.  And it  is 
much more difficult if one  cannot  adapt  a  “package  solution”  but  has  to  adapt  each project to 
special  local  circumstances.  The  fact  that  this is not  done  results  in the rather  extraordinary fact 
that  the same development  medicine is prescribed  worldwide, as long as it is the “Third  World.” 
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ad. 2.) Looking  at  partnership  practices,  the  report  asks  the  question of why  aid  does  not  simply 
respond to the demands of the  recipient.  This  is  apparently  because of problems  of linking 
recipients’ development demands to donors’ options and constraints. This again results in a 
situation  where  aid  is  not  meeting  a real  demand,  but  is  being  supply-driven.  Supply-driven  aid 
is intended to  be diminished through the establishment of “partnerships”,  but this does not 
actually  change the problem. 
The result is that aid  increasingly  becomes  unrequited,  with  diminishing  “contributions 
nationales”. With no counterpart funding the use of aid becomes too casual, there is no 
“responsubilisution”. According to  the  report,  the  following  failings are observed: 
. Lack of reciprocity  distorts  aid  value.  This  d torts  sustainability. 
Reciprocity is the  only way to  assure  this. 
. Absence of reciprocity  has  made  institutions  assisted  by aid into aid 
instruments.  This  is  true  among  institution  building  projects  and 
especially  within  Sahelian  regional  institutions (CILSS a.0.). 
. reciprocal  arrangements  are  the  only  signals  by  which demand can be 
identified, checked and  ranked.  This  will  at  the  same  time  reduce the 
number of aid  programmes  to  the  number  “really  necessary”. 
In Conclusion the report  states  that  donors  have  become  “shoppers” for structures that could 
accommodate  projects,  and  no  longer  suppliers of  aid,  meeting a  demand.  Lack  of  reciprocity  and 
“ownership” is the  result. 
The idea of a  “real  demand”,  however,  according  to  the OECD calls for some serious  questioning. 
The consequence of insisting on  this  is  serious  downscaling,  less  visibility of results and the 
massive  abandonment of activities  that  have  started to degenerate.  This calls  for  a  massive  change 
in  policy  and  a  general  consensus  among  the  donors. 
Moreover, the report  suggests  that  counterpart  financing  might  not  always be a  prerequisite, but 
should  maybe  only  be  insisted upon  when  “ownership”  is  required.  For instance,  it is OK to  build 
a road without reciprocity, local involvement, sustainability demands, etc. In the case of 
institutional building, however, it is  seen  as  very  problematic. 
Finally, concerning partnership practices, knowledge transfers to the Sahel have not been 
successful, probably  because  experts  have  lacked  sufficient  knowledge of Sahelian realities. 
Technology  transfer  has  been  especially  problematic. At the  heart of this  problem  is  the  question 
of intermediaries.  The  internal  clock of  the  foreign  expert  often  runs too fast, and hisher urge  to 
rush  things  in  order to see results  before the end of the  contract  often makes the activity  “donor 
driven” to  an excessive degree.  The  problem is that  local  intermediaries,  that could solve this 
problem (like  for instance small NGOs) are eager to protect themselves against risks, thus 
blurring their role as  conveyors of development demand. The second problem is that  local 
intermediaries capable of playing  this  role  (translating  different  discourses)  are  in  short  supply, 
and  once  again  aid  questions  about  the  aid  process  end up overshadowing  development  questions. 
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ad 3.Assessment  of results  and risk management. 
Within this third problem area, there is an initial dilemma within the donors’ demand for 
immediate  and  visible  results. The success of an  aid project  is  measured by referring to the 
objectives  in  the  project  document,  comparing  actual  results  with  the objectives stated. Visible 
and  measurable  evidence is therefore of  great  importance.  However, it is increasingly  evident  that 
even if  these  measurable  targets are met,  the  overall  goals  may  be  far from accomplished. A 
reconsideration of the evaluation  process  is  probably  necessary.  This  leads  again to the dilemma 
of donor control vs. recipient ownership. Donors must ensure maximum control of the 
development  activities. This is done by creating  recipient  institutions as “short  circuits”  thus 
guaranteeing  tangible  results.  This  however  undermines  the  other  objective of developing  local 
capacities.  Short circuits become projects  carrying  their  own  institutional  mechanisms,  through 
technical  and  financial control, parallel to national  institutions.  Programme aid as well shows 
other  examples of short circuits.  Loaded as it is with  conditionalities  to limit imponderables, it 
forms  a  circuit  based  not  on  autonomy,  but on the  precise  predictability of partner behaviour. 
Aid to the  Sahel  is  thus,  geared  to  achieve  maximum  predictability  and  control  in  an  environment, 
which  is  characterized by extreme  unpredictability.  This  often  leads  to  ruptures in participation. 
All this  is,  however,  not  said by the OECD so that  donors  forget  about control, as it is accepted 
that control is imperative as some national  institutions  are  unable  to manage aid  funds  in  a 
reasonable manner. It does, however, de-responsibilise the recipients, further deteriorating 
relations  between  the  two  partners,  and  the  result of these  control  mechanisms is the  elimination 
of local  influence. In this  case,  a  possible  solution  would  be  to  accept  that  donors  control  projects 
from  start  to finish. But this is  not  “sustainable”,  there is no longer  any institution building 
component. 
Evaluations  play  a  central  role  here.  Evaluations  tend  to make projects more cautious  as to 
experiments,  to  avoid  any  risks  and  instead make them  focus  on  “visible” actions, so that  the 
project  has  something it can  show  the  evaluation  committee.  Larger  joint  evaluations  ought to be 
initiated  to  assess  longer-term effects, and  which  permit  mistakes. 
C. Isolating  goals  and  differentiating  between  instruments. 
The  report  finally sets up a  number  of  propositions  concerning  how  to  better target the  aid into 
areas of  priority:  How  do we improve  aid  performance,  apart from lowering  the  probably  too  high 
expectations  that  have  prevailed? 
First of all,  the  report  says,  we define what the main goals  have been so far : Crisis prevention 
and management, capacity building, the provision of timely aid and the development of 
strategies  and  innovations. 
1. Managing  and  preventing  crisis. 
Crisis prevention can take many forms, from emergency aid, to rendering systems more 
sustainable,  like  agricultural  aid  or even structural  adjustment  programmes.  The  programmes  may 
be run entirely by donors,  and it might  even  be  argued that this is acceptable in cases where the 
overall  objective  and  the  problem solved in the longer  term is so advantageous that the fact that 
the Sahelian country  has  not had  any  “ownership”  may be considered less important. Health 
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programmes could be  included in this  category, or emergency  relief  in case of acute crisis. The 
problem is, however, that at a certain point the crisis becomes permanent, and everything 
becomes  “crisis-oriented”. The report  states  that  a future course  should  be to more  clearly  identify 
which areas deserve the crisis label.  Obvious areas are natural resource degradation, (a point 
which is not substantiated) health and food security. Donors need, however, to be more 
pragmatic, to pose fewer conditions and to be  more  contractual in their approach. 
2. Building capacities. 
The problem is that  when  dealing  with  crisis, the goal  is  prioritized over the process,  and it is 
pursued through  a  given project. The goal-based  approach has often undermined the national 
institutional capacity to address the  problem  once the project  is  over.  A  number  of  instruments 
to effectively  build  these  capacities  have  been proposed shared  analysis of problems, reciprocal 
arrangements,  accepting  higher  levels of risk,  making  goals  more flexible etc. These instruments 
are,  however,  hard to integrate in donors’  administrative  procedures. 
3. Providing  timely  and  targeted  aid. 
Aid is often  very  punctual stating a clear objective:  build  a  road, construct this, inform those, 
train  these  etc. The project has been the normal institution to deal  with these kinds of activities. 
However,  at times the goals of such  projects  have  been  confused, (build capacity, alleviate 
poverty, halt  degradation, improve living standards),  and  results  become more opaque as  well. 
Many opaque goals  have  been  treated  as if  they were clear  project goals. Especially within 
capacity  building  projects, this has  been  a  problem. 
4. Developing  strategies  and  innovations. 
Aid  agencies do all the footwork when  defining  what  kind  of  aid is to be delivered. The problem 
is that as  things  are,  they are not  knowledgeable enough to  understand the complex systems of 
production and power  in the Sahel to make  pertinent  interventions. Therefore, interventions 
become  based  more  on  preconceived  notions  than  empirical  facts. 
D. Conclusion: Why now and why the Sahel? 
According  to the OECD  report,  the  reasons  givenabove  are  grounds for extensive changes  in  the 
way aid is directed to the Sahelian countries. However, it  is often stated that donors are unable 
to drastically to reform  their aid disbursement  practices.  This  is  erroneous, as they  have done this 
many  times in the past. This time,  where  skepticism is at a  maximum,  a  reassessment of the 
overall  assistance  is  required,  and  must  be  viewed as an opportunity. Lessons learned show  that 
aid  “must  stay  in  touch  with  a  finely-tuned  understanding  of  the  dynamics  of Sahelian society”. 
External partners need to constantly  reassess  their standpoints and policies. Finally, the report 
concludes  that  OECD countries can still aim  at  ambitious  goals  with limited budgets, if they 
choose well-adapted  methods  and  instruments. 
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3.1.1 Discussion And Critique Of The OECD Report 
The OECD report is very critical and concise, pointing to certain very central problems in 
development  aid. The strange  thing  is  that it is  nevertheless  caught  up  within  a  developmentalist 
discourse,  and  a sort of developmental  political  correctness  which  prohibits the addressing of 
what I see as the  most  central  problems  in  development aid  to the  Sahel,  namely the failure to 
treat political  problems  as  political and not  technical. 
Furthermore it is a illustration of what happens if one does not adopt an “actor-oriented 
approach” based  on  methodological  individualism.  The  report starts to stipulate  what donors, 
nations, states, recipients  and  other  ill-defined  groups  “ought” to do in order  to  improve the 
quality of aid, thus resorting  to  normative  ideas and  over-looking  that  actors  maybe  prefer to 
pursue their own  projects. In addition  to  this,  there  is no serious  questioning of whether the 
premises of the critique as it is listed above are maybe in themselves wrong. The idea of 
administering aid for development  is  beyond  discussion.  The  report  is, thus, an example of a 
“tool-perfecting”  approach  to  development  critique,  not  seriously  questioning the premises onto 
which  aid is dispensed,  and  at the same  time  taking  a  very  technocratic and basically apolitical 
stand  in pinpointing the  shortcomings of aid.  As  mentioned,  many of the  recommendations  are 
quite similar to those outlined  in  Rondinellis  “adaptive  approach”  (cf.  Chapter 1). 
Having said this, the report  nevertheless points to  some  very  central  problems  in  development 
assistance, especially as it highlights  the  problems of some of the  central  notions on which the 
development assistance is based, namely  capacity  building,  participation  and  sustainability. 
In the following I shall  go  through  the  different  points  in  the  report, in order  to  clarify  my 
criticisms. I see certain problems in the search for aid effectiveness. First of all, it is an 
inadequate analysis of the problem of assuring commitment. Recipient groups are quick to 
understand which  types of aid  they  can  realistically  obtain,  and  therefore  position themselves 
accordingly, by requesting the type of aid  whichthey  are  likely  to  get.  The  “real commitment” 
which  should  be  assured by reversing  the  aid  design  procedure is therefore  likely to reflect some 
of the  same  types  problems of pragmatism  and  adaptations  to  the  logics of the  aid business. But 
other  problems  occur. What is meant by “real  commitment”?  And  what is “true partnership”? Is 
it opposed  to false partnership or patron-client  relationships? A long  anthropological  tradition 
devoted  to  the  analysis of systems of  gift-giving,  starting  with  Mauss  (for  recent  contributions ee 
Laurent 1996; Olivier de  Sardan 1996) stresses  the  importance of  reciprocity  when interchanging 
aid  and gifts. But these  more  elaborate  thoughts  about  donor-recipient  relations  are  virtually 
absent  today,  when  “partnerships”  are  created  between  extremely  affluent  donors  with, even for 
insiders,  at  times  very  odd  economic  management  procedures on the  one  hand  and  very destitute 
local  institutions on the  other. It seems  that  this  lack of reciprocity  and  conditionality  might  in  fact 
erode  the  legitimacy of the  partnerships,  in  the  sense  that  calling t anything  other  than  a  “patron- 
client”  relation  might  confuse  the  Southern  partners. On the  other  hand,  accepting  these  unequal 
terms  might  be more productive  in  the long run, as well  as  accepting  that  “sustainability” is an 
ideological  donor  conditionality  rather  than  a  realistic,  shared  vision  which  everyone  has  a clear 
idea about. 
The discussion of partnership  practices, is not critical  enough,  and it seriously  underestimates  the 
social  processes  underway  in  Sahelian  society by virtue  of  the  mere  presence  of  aid.  The  question 
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of intermediaries  deserves  more  attention  than  given  here.  When,  as  the  report  rightly notices, all 
NGOs do the same, it  is not  only  because of compromises  over  preconceived notions, but also 
because  local NGOs deliberately  adapt  a  certain  development  discourse,  and  engage  in activities 
likely to attract the attention of funding agencies. The question of how these processes are 
negotiated  and the question  of  “development  brokerage”  (Bierschenk & Olivier  de Sardan, 1993; 
Blundo, 1995),  i.e. the modes  of  intermediacy  between  donors  and  target  groups,  which  have 
become an important business for certain  new  rural  elites  with experience of the rhetoric of 
development  within the different  camps,  is  not treated. 
Regarding  the  assessment of results, the report  portrays  the  donors a being  obsessed  with  control, 
thus  destroying  relations  between  donors  and  recipients.  One  might argue the opposite,  that “he 
who pays the piper  calls the tune” on the one hand and  more  seriously,  that this control is 
unfortunately needed as recipients, especially at higher levels, have earned a not always 
undeserved  reputation for embezzling  and corruption, making  very strict procedures necessary. 
The report is “politically correct” mainly blaming donors, who are in  fact often very  slow to 
crack  down  on  recipients  that  do  not  follow  procedures  as  they  were agre d upon. 
There  is  an  interesting  contradiction  within  the  problem  of  control  as it i explained in the report. 
The report is very  right to point to the fact that  donors  in fact demand  a degree of control and 
“over-planning”,  that  they  would  never  get  away  with in the  Northem  world.  Funnily  enough  this 
is contradictory in two senses. It is contrary to the discourse of structural Adjustment, 
emphasizing that everything  can be left to the optimally  regulatory automatic pilot of the free 
market. But it is equally contrary to the discourse of modem management, emphasizing 
decentralization of decision-making procedures, construction of “corporate cultures” etc. 
(Tendler,  1997) 
In the third  section of the paper, the setting up of propositions for the improved targeting of  the 
aid is constructive,  but  equallysomewhat  problematic.  There is an  initial problem in establishing 
a “crisis perspective”. With this point of departure it is too easy to define a more or less 
permanent  crisis, as the  report  itself  also  states  (But  does  anyway).  Again the political  dimension 
of the aid  is  underestimated;  emergency  aid s even  more  than  “normal aid” a  political  weapon, 
as the emergency  is  most  often  caused by political  unrest.  Defining  natural resource degradation, 
health  and food security  as  special crisis areas  seems  a  bit  rash,  and  may result in  hasty  and ill- 
conceived  solutions to issues  that  might  not  be  seen as any special crisis by the recipient  groups. 
Especially  within  natural  resource  management  what  has  frequently  been  termed as crisis,  i.e. the 
unsustainable use of resources,  in fact often  refers  merely to a series of  problems that rural 
populations are seen as facing. Treating it as a crisis that  needs to be addressed  or  reversed 
therefore  often  produces the wrong solutions to problems that were  never  conceived of as such. 
Likewise,  the  capacity-building  discussion  needs to address  much  more profound problems  with 
development  aid.  It  is  clear  that  capacity  building has often, as the report itself states, been  very 
donor  driven.  Institution  building  efforts  have  mainly  been  creations  of  institutions  through  which 
aid  could  be  channelled,  or the creation of planning institutions that  mainly  reflected  normative 
donor assumptions  about  what  would  be  beneficial. Serious problems  with the implementation 
of these plans have however  rendered the end  results  very meagre (Speirs & Marcussen  1998). 
Even  within  a  “tool-refining”-framework it seems fair to say  that capacity building to a  large 
degree  rest  upon  a  belief  in  a  process of knowledge transfers from donors to recipients. There is 
a  clear  tendency  to see the  capacity  building  problem as a  problem of  certain  social actors  lacking 
the abilities to undertake development.  The  question is whether  this is an  appropriate  way of 
looking  at  things.  Instead  of  looking at  what people  do,  the  focus  is on what  they  ought to do. 
Instead of looking at what  they  know,  the  focus is on what  they  do  not  know. 
Furthermore, capacity is often  seen as a  very  unpolitical  issue  as  well.  When  people do not do 
things in this or that way, it might  be  because  they  will  get  into  trouble if  they do, not because 
they  lack the knowledge.  Capacity is too  often  looked  upon  as  merely  a  technical  issue, not one 
implying  power relations. 
In an  attempt  to put forward  suggestions  as  to  how  to  provide  “timely aid”, the  report criticized 
the fact that aid was  very  “punctual”.  This is very true, and  donors  now tend to go  in the other 
direction: they downsize punctual aid, as  they see this  as  uncoordinated  islands , that are not 
sustainable.  The focus is now  more  than ever on “sustainable  human  development,”  “capacity- 
building”,  “poverty  alleviation”,  “environmental  protection”,  “programme  approach”, all issues 
that are extremely difficult to translate into measurable activities, and whose meaning is 
vehemently contested once it is  translated into concrete  activity.  The  report  is  therefore correct 
when it states  that  many  nebulous  goals re  treated as if  they  were  clear  objectives.  Very true,  but 
the  problem  is  more  serious  than  that,  as  development  discourse  shapes  the  way  development is 
conceived  in a much more profound  way.  Preconceived  notions  are  not just at the  basis of how 
activities  are  planned,  but  are  decisive  in  the  way  that  we  are  at  all  able  to  think of social change 
in  Africa. It has become virtually  impossible to think of  any issue within  rural Burkina Faso as 
anything which is not a  problem that some  kind of development  has  to  address. It is not just a 
question  of  explaining, as VS.  Naipaul  does;  “When you lack  the  means, you compensate  with 
beautiful declarations” (Naipaul, 1983). 
It is obvious  to  compare  the  OECD-study  with  a  study,  they  carried  out on the  future of the  Sahel 
in  1988 (OECD, 1988).  Which  trends have  changed,  where  has  the  focus  moved, or is it still the 
same agenda? The 1988 study,  which  is  not an aid  assessment,  stresses  even  more  than current 
documents  that the Sahel  is  in  a  situation of crisis.  It  focuses  especially on agriculture,  livestock 
and  natural  resource  management,  and it is especially  interesting to analyse,  what  they  saw as the 
main causes of this crisis, and how  they  assessed the different  possibilities of addressing them. 
In  explaining the environmental  problems, the 1988  report is very  crude  in  stating  subsequently 
challenged  orthodoxies  about  the  distorted  equilibrium of the  Sahelian  environment,  the  carrying 
capacity  that  has  been  exceeded  (citing  a World Bank  report  stating  that  in  certain dry areas of 
the Sahel, where the carrying  capacity of the land is at  0,3  human  being  per Kmz, whereas the 
population at that  time  is now at 2,0), the  overstocking,  and  the  vicious circles in agriculture due 
to the disappearances of fallows. It states  rather  bluntly  that  more  than 10 million  people are 
affected by erosion. 
Another feature that the future study  mentions is the disintegration of the rural  Sahelian society, 
due to massive  migration  and  alienation  from  traditional  values. This threat  has  not  been evoked 
that  often since. 
The  1988  report  shows  a  subsequently  moderated  optimism  regarding  what  they conceive of as 
“genuine  farmers’  associations”,  local NGOs and  civil  society, an optimism  which  characterized 
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the 80s. The urban  parallel  to  this  optimism  comes  from  “the  informal  sector”,  which is also  seen 
as  especially  dynamic. 
What is interesting is  that  the  report  also  points  to  the  lack of linkages  between the sectors as a 
factor  exacerbating  to  the  crisis.  This  argument has  been  virtually  forgotten.  It  is  not  stressed  that 
multipartism, the great panacea of the nineties, should be a sine qua non of development. 
Development  and  democracy  are  not  linked  to  the  extent  that  they  became  later. Last but  not  least, 
sustainability is not  the  buzzword it later  became. On the  other  hand  there is a lot of mentioning 
of dependency  and  maginalization on the  world  markets. 
In short, we see a  tendency  towards more emphasis on ideological  notions  based on nonnative 
ideas about democracy,  effective  management, good  governance  and  sustainability,  and  away 
from explanations based  on  geophysical  and  geopolitical  factors like demography, climate and 
world  conjunctures. 
3.2 Gabas et al. 
Gabas et al. (1997)  have  made  a  specific  study of  the  effectiveness  of  French  aid to  Burkina Faso. 
This document is somewhat less accessible,  and  not as clear  in its presentation of its findings and 
recommendations  as  the  OECD  paper. It states as its  objective  that  it  intends  to  search for answers 
to the rarely answered question concerning why African states have not been able to take 
advantage of the aid,  or  ensure  growth  etc.  The  Gabas et al.- report  endeavours to study  the 
norms, procedures and  institutional  structures that determine the effectiveness of aid. It tries to 
pinpoint factors that enable governments  to  identify,  plan,  supervise,  coordinate  and assess aid 
programmes  and  projects.  The  document is, however,  rather  difficult  to  analyse more carefully 
as it states a long list of objectives,  but  does  not  succeed in following  up on them.  It  claims  not 
to focus on the donor, but on the recipient, in all its diversity,  and  delves into donor-recipient 
relations. It stresses the  heterogeneity of the actors  involved,  the  donors,  the  recipients  and the 
“executioners”.  Nevertheless,  this  heterogeneity  is  not  reflected in the  analysis,  which  seems  to 
suffer from methodological  simplifications,  and  a  lumping  together of “interests” to certain 
institutions, which ought to be further  disaggregated  in the analysis.  Neither  does it stick to  the 
promise of  not focusing  on  the  donor.  Furthermore  the  report  becomes  normative  in  the  sense  that 
it resorts to dichotomies like “wantedhnwanted effects,  positive  and  negative effects”, etc. 
The report outlines a  number of effectiveness criteria for  development  aid. The emphasis  is on 
the following four points: 
l )  thefuljilment of the objectives,  i.e. 
. the extent of fulfilment of direct  stated  objectives  (yields  increases, km. of road 
. the fulfilment of implicit  objectives,  objectives  too  general  to  be  addressed  in  the built etc.); 
report (but which nevertheless often are!) i.e. growth, development, political 
support; . the satisfaction of emerging  objectives; . the realisation of indirect effects. (not  clear what is meant by this); 
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. learning  effects  observed  through  the  durability  of the results  and the sustainability 
of the  activity. 
The report  furthermore  calls for a  scrutiny  of 2 )  adverse effects: 
. incentive  effects,  e.g.  price  drops in scarce  products, resulting in decreased 
production  and  increased  imports.  Increase  in  labour  supply  due  to job creation, 
disruption of labour  market  (Was there ever  an  equilibrium?); . local  ctivity  substitution,  when  the  opposite  was the intention; . effects of  dependence on assistance.  It often  poses  problems for the self-perpetua- 
tion of activities if there  is  a  huge  projects  with jobs and logistics running  them. 
The report  states  looking  at 3) Lateral effects: 
. Effects on variables  other  than goal-variables. . effects resulting  from  the  fungibility of aid. This implies  comparison  between 
projects/programmes  that  receive aid and  public  outlays that don’t. 
And finally, it examines 4) costs of projects. 
. estimated  co s; . cost  overruns  compared  with  es imates; . deadline  ov rruns and their costs; . balance of the costs of adverse effects and  negative  lateral  effects. 
These  are  indeed  all very interesting  points to look  into,  but  instead of elaborating on them, the 
report  merely  lists  tham  and  goes on to  discuss: 
3.2.1 The Causes Of Effectivenessheffectiveness 
The report  hereafter  goes into looking  at  the  causes of effectiveness in development  aid. 
Causes of effhneff. are to be pursued iteratively, as unexpected outcomes of aid are to  be 
expected.  Causes  may be 
- The extent of project ownership. Does  an  approach exist that incorporates aid not as an end in 
itself, but as a  means  for  the  recipient  state  to  manage  the  project? 
- Relations between recipients and donors. Is it supply  or  demand  driven? Is there a constructive 
dialogue? Or is  there an atmosphere of mutual  recrimination.  Are  donor conditionalities felt as 
overtly  harsh. 
- The cost of uncoordinated actions. Demands by donors  sometimes prevent governments from 
finding their  own way of doing  their  work.  Accompanying  missions  and  living  up to donor 
reporting  procedures  canplace  a  heavy  strain o government  work. 
- The quality of supervision  and  assessment  by the sector’s players. Project  success depends on 
their ability  to  adjust  to  change and  learn  from  mistakes. This involves deciding which criteria 
mean that one  project  rather than the  other is able to do this. 
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- The behaviour of ‘clients’. States are  usually  seen  as the main culprits of aid fiascoes. The 
Burkina Faso experience might be used to nuance this picture, to include certain donors and 
NGOs. 
I shall not go into a  more  thorough  assessment  of the remarks the report makes on the different 
components of French  aid, as I am  not  sufficiently  familiar  with t e details of this programme to 
judge whether their  assessments  are  pertinent. 
It seems to me, however,  that the assessment is built  on  a set of  very normative notions related 
to aid, which lead to a series of superficial assumptions about the mechanisms of relations 
between donors and recipients, as if everybody had a common goal - development - that 
everybody  ought to strive  for.  Institutions  and  even “the state” are attributed interests, as if  they 
were social actors with  clear  agency. And these  interests are formulated as being clearly in line 
with the overall  development  objectives of the  French  cooperation  programme.  This  is translated 
into  a  series of  problematic  methodological  statements  that  merit  attention, as they highlight  how 
the development discourse  sets  the  agenda for the way the French  team is able to analyse their 
findings.  There is very  little  reflection  concerning  the  interpretation of the report’s  findings. Take, 
for instance, the following  quotation: 
The pertinence and  sincerity of the remarks made by interviewees 
was in no way  distorted  by  the fact that they were  asked their  views 
about French aid by non-Burkinan team members. In fact,  it was 
often noted that the presence of a Burkinan in interviews with 
Government  ofJicials  hampered discussions. Using Burkinan 
researchers for surveys of recipients’ opinions does not, in itself, 
necessarily produce truer results than those obtained and analyzed 
here. (p.42) 
The problem  with  the  above  quotation  is  that  there  is  not  a  true  answer,  or  degrees of t uth in  what 
respondents answer to questions  related to aid. In that  sense it is not correct that the pertinence 
and sincerity was  in  no  way distorted.  It  seems essential to recognize  that  any  answer in such a 
situation  must be analyzed  carefully  taking  into  account  that the researcher is a potential ally  in 
the respondents  struggle to remain  within  the  aid  sector. It is thus a  simplification to say that it 
is better or worse to have  a  Burkinan. The answers  will  vary  accordingly. 
Or take a  quotation like the  following.  When evaluating training it is stated that: 
“Positive effects on the training and provision of mechanics- 
blacksmiths can  be  seen  in  the intermediate mechanization project. 
The same holds true for the PAFI project, where the Burkinans 
interviewed  expressed  their appreciation for the  in-service training. ” 
(p. 53, 0p.cit.j 
Show me an interviewee,  being  interviewed by the  donor  who  will  not  claim  that  yes, the project 
has  been very helpful! The above  might be a  valid conclusion, but the way it is  put forward is 
simply not convincing enough. 
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Other examples from the report witness the unreflected acceptance of certain institutional 
procedures,  not  attempting  a  more  thorough  analysis of what is actually  happening: 
(..) relations with donors are becoming institutionalized through 
frequent meetings, which increase the number of opportunities in 
during which the Burkinan party can show its proposal capacity and 
express its goals and ideas (p.51). 
The  problem  is  whether this is not  what one  could  also  call  a  seemingly  endless  series of seminars 
held  in  Ouagadougou,  where  discussion is more  or  less  unfathomable, as debate  is  tied  to  a  certain 
technocratic development  discourse  making it virtually  impossible  to  address  crucial  issues  of 
power  and  politics. In that  sense  ‘showing  capacity’ is more  submission  to  certain  narratives  and 
rationalities,  and  kowtowing  to  donor  conditionalities  by  paying lip service  to  developmentalist 
orthodoxies. 
The  report  continues,  asking has the French aidfulfilled its goals? The  pages  on  the  effectiveness 
of French  aid  simply do not  to  a  sufficient  degree  answer  the  question  posed  at  the  beginning  of 
the article, it does not  follow  the  different  points  as  they  were  listed in the  beginning,  where 
different criteria for effectiveness  were  listed.  They  point  to  the fact that  certain  sectors  (sector 
however  not  explicitly  defined  but  implicitly  assumed  as n analytical  category)  have  received 
more attention,  especially  the  cotton  business,  and  that  French  aid  has  been  rather  successful  in 
this  regard. 
Concluding,  the  article  restates  a  number of the  questions it began  by  posing as essential,  but  they 
remain  unanswered. It points  to  five  crucial  points  that  are  seemingly  important s recommenda- 
tions: 
. The  quality of technical  assistance.  There  is an increasing  awareness of the 
need  for  proficient  technical  assistance  and  the  ability of these  players to 
‘understand  local  concerns.’ 
. The quality of coordination.  This is a  fundamental  issue  when  looking  at 
aid  effectiveness,  and there is  considerable  room for improvement. 
. The clarity of well-defined,  circumscribed  goals.  These  are to  be shared 
by projects  and  beneficiaries. 
. Communication.  There  isnot  enough  awareness of cooperative  activities. 
Communication  should  be  improved. 
. Finally the  report  points  to the  necessity of subsequent  assessment,  i.e. 
iterative considerations as to where projects are going. And lastly it 
questions  whether  aid is planning its own  demise. I would  say that at the 
moment it is not. 
These are however  somehow  meagre  conclusions that I think  are so commonplace  that  hardly 
anyone  would  disagree  with them. And  there is no analysis of all the points put forward at the 
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beginning of the  article  concerning  ratchet  effects,  adverse effects, lateral  effects,  etc.,  only  very 
simplistic evaluations of certain French  projects  seen  as not so bad  after  all,  given the many 
players  and partners involved. 
It  is  strange  to  read  a  report by some of the  best  and  most  experienced  French  researchers,  which 
is so uncritical of the  political  implications of the French  development  aid.  It  seems  that  part of
the  explanation can be  found  in the fact  that  the  article  is  a  bad  summary of a  larger  report, and 
that  the  translation  into  English is quite  poor as well. Parts of the  report  will  be  treated  later:  one 
of the team members has  written  a  very  interesting  article  about  NGO-assistance. 
My main critique focuses on the following: 
In  dealing  with aid effectiveness,  the  report  has  some  rather  unsatisfactory  conclusions  about  the 
importance of assuring  “ownership” by the  recipients of the  aid.  Strangely, as we saw  in  the 
former  example from the  OECD,  the  projects  that  worked best had  in fact been  the ones where 
local  involvement  and  contribution had  been  minimal. “Ownership” is seen as the  appropriation 
of the  project by the recipients,  that  they  accept it as “their own”,  are  willing  to  invest their own 
resources  in  it etc. But  this,  it  seems,  is not  the  way  projects  are  viewed. A project  is  a  means for 
a lot of different actors  to  get  access  to  a  range of different  resources,  and  “ownership” is not  a 
fruitful way to look at  the  way  projects  are  appropriated.  Assuring  the  continued  financing  and 
seizing control of resource flows seems  more  important in this respect. 
Neither does it seem fruitful  to  look  at  donor-recipient  relations  within  a  simple  dichotomy of 
trusddistrust, dialogue/recrimination,  supply driveddemand driven  etc.  Within  these  relation- 
ships,  what  Giddens  calls  “double  hermeneutics”  prevail,  and  these  social  processes  should not 
be  reduced  to  simplifications.  For  instance let us take  the  case of  “supply  or  demand driven”  aid. 
Demands are made according to what it is  possible  to  obtain.  And  supply  is not created  within 
areas  where  demand  is  already  met  through  the  mobilization of l cal  resources.  Both  demand  and 
supply are shaped by a lot of other factors  than  what  “recipients”  immediately  request etc. 
Finally,  although the report states that it is  important  to  disaggregate the different  donors  and 
recipients, the state is seen as a  homogenous entity, having  overall  societal  objectives to pursue. 
This is  contrary to a  more realistic view  of the state, seeing it as the  central  arena for primitive 
accumulation  and  conflicts  over  power,  closely  connected in an African  context  with the ability 
to  accumulate capital. 
We are, thus, once again  back to a  view of aid  as  mainly  technical  assistance,  not  involving 
politics,  except when it  “goes  wrong”,  becomes  politicised,  and  development all of a  sudden  is 
in  danger,  aid is reduced to dichotomies,  seen as “successful”  or  “unsuccessful”,  “effective” or 
“ineffective”,  and  a  lot f normative  parameters  are  thus  attached  in  order  to  explain  this,  whether 
it is  “participatory”,  “sustainable”,  “planning it’s own  demise”,  “effective” or  whatever.  Again, 
this is the  “tool-perfecting”  approach  to  development  assistance,  the  recasting of political  issues 
as technicalities. 
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3.3 NGO-aid in Burkina Faso 
The next research that  will  be  dealt  with  here  concerns  assessments  of  work done by NGOs in 
Burkina Faso. Edwards & Hulme  (1995)  refer  to wo main  beliefs  that  have  largely  facilitated he 
explosion of development  NGOs  operating.  First,  the  belief  that the market  economy  and  private 
initiative are the most  effective  instruments  for  achieving  economic growth. Secondly, the belief 
that NGOs constitute an  important  element  when  wanting to “democratize” societies, hence 
assuring transparency, human  rights,  participation  etc. in  the attempts to introduce new players 
within the field of  development. In a  sense  they  have  been  synonymous  with the notion of “civil 
society”. By means  of  a  remarkable  instrumentalisation  of  an old concept, the strengthening of 
civil  society,  support to NGOs  has  been  seen  by  a  wide  range  of  donors - Northern  NGOs  and the 
World Bank alike, as a  means to achieve  a  more  sustainable  and emocratic development. 
It  is  obvious  that  the first belief  is  based  upon  some  rather  simple  assumptions  about  markets  and 
states as mutually exclusive. The  less  state  you  have, the more market and the more “civil 
society”. The result  is  that you  sack  the  people  within the state  apparatus  and  then  expect  markets 
to “fill in” the voids  that  occur. The second  belief is also based  on  a  rather simplistic assumption, 
namely  that  a  weakened  state  and  alternative  ways of financing  development  assistance are likely 
to be able to reduce  corruption  and  make  things  more  “democratic”.  As  discussed elsewhere, the 
results  in Burkina Faso tend to be quite  the contrary. 
It is  interesting to note  that  these two  beliefs  are  shared  by  left  and  right  alike  in  a  Euro-American 
context,  among  “progressive” NGOs  and  the “right  wing”  Bretton-Woods  institutions.  These two 
beliefs are the cornerstones of  the  ideology  of the structural  adjustment programme applied in 
Burkina Faso, although they are coupled,  as  mentioned  above,  with the somehow ideologically 
contradictory demand for extensive  initiatives to establish  planning at all levels of society. 
After an initial period of extreme  optimism in the eighties  (Belloncle  1980, Pradervandt 1989, 
OECD 1988), skepticism has  grown as to the possibilities of expecting NGOs to  be able to 
address  poverty  alleviation  issues,  and  reach  more  remote  “target  groups’’. Is ues like the lack of 
coordination, lack of common  grounds  for  assessing the results,  lack of significance (small is 
indeed  beautiful,  but at times it is  too  insignificant to make a difference), have been highlighted. 
An idea that  NGOs per se should be less conupt and  embezzlement-prone  than  the  state  has also, 
in certain cases. needed  revision. 
There is, thus, a“new wave”  of  more  critical  assessments of NGO-work, of which  the  ones below 
deal  with  rural Burkina Faso, and  therefore  have  special  interest. It is my argument that most of 
them, though critical, tend to resort to the same  normativism that they set out to banish. 
3.3.1 Maclure 
The first case is  a  study by Maclure  (1995)  conducted  in  the late eighties and the early nineties 
in the province of Namentenga.  The  three  NGOs are Le Plan de Parrainage International de 
Boulsa with 16 extension  agents in  the  area, the Projet de S a t 6  Matemelle  et Infantile, funded 
by Catholic Relief Service with  a  field  staff  of  ten  and  finally L’Association du D6veZoppement 
de Kaya, financed  primarily by Dutch  and  German  Catholic  Churches  and  with  a  permanent staff 
of eight. 
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Maclure,s study is  based on extensive fieldwork in four villages  in the Namentenga  province, 
where one or more of the three  foreign  NGOs  had  been active for a  minimum of five years. The 
evidence is based on  what he terms  "naturalistic  methods of inquiry", a  method he does not, 
however, reveal much about. It involved participant observation and extensive informal 
interviewing  with  villagers  and NG0 staff.  Furthermore, it involved  a  more  systematic  household 
census and  a  number  of  semistructured  interviews. 
The argument of Maclures  study  is  that  these three foreign-funded  NGOs in Burkina Faso and 
their  "animation  rurale"  efforts tend to lead, not to self-reliance and to a situation where people 
take "theirfuture in their own  hands",  which is the explicit goal, but rather to a situation where 
patron-client relationships between villagers and donors are enhanced. It reveals  that the overall 
impression among villagers of development  interventions  is  generally very positive,  especially 
if the development intervention  includes  important  components of logistic  support. But the 
granting of support tends to  reinforce  dependency, and to stress the importance of establishing 
"vertical"connections  within the aid  system  in  order to assure  the  continuity of relations  between 
village  society  and  donors,  thus  assuring  sustained  aid. The study  furthermore  seriously  questions 
the notion that structural inequities underlying rural poverty can be alleviated through the 
acquisition of  new  knowledge,  organization  and  increased  awareness,  as  it  is  implicitly  assumed 
in the "Animation rurale" approach. 
NGOs  working in Africa  face  a  number of problems according to Maclure.  First of all,  they are, 
along with their increased  importance  in  replacing state agencies,  increasingly  dependent  on 
finance from abroad,  with  the  conditionalities  that his implies. Secondly, facing this  need for 
increased  professionalism,  they  tend to become  bureaucratized,  which  may  diminish  their g ass- 
roots orientation. This, according to Maclure,  necessitates  a  re-evaluation of the ability of the 
NGOs to "strengthen civil society" and the democratization  processes, as there  is  a  tendency  to 
overestimate the ability  and  the  interest of  NGOs to influence  socio-economic  set-ups  and  power 
structures in rural Africa. 
The boosting of people's knowledge  through initiatives like "animation rurale" has  done little 
to enhance the villages'  capacity to collectively  and  independently  manage  community 
development projects.  This is hardly  surprising, as socio-economic  structures are in no way 
challenged through the approach. Maclure, however, claims that it has  led to the emergence of 
patron-client relationships between the recipient  communities  and the donor  NGOs.  This leads 
him to pose two questions: 
. Why does relatively  small-scale  development  intervention so often  confound 
the intentions of itsproponents by leading to - or  exacerbating - relations of 
dependency? 
. What implications does this externally induced contradiction  have for 
"animation rurale" programmes,  specifically  aiming  at  reducing  dependency? 
In the accounts  from  Namentenga,  where the answers to these questions are sought, it is  shown 
that logistical support in connection with the animation rurale programmes was generally 
received  with  great  enthusiasm by villagers,  and  they  in o way  seemed  to  worry  about  the fact 
that there was no reciprocity  in  the  way  logistics  were donated. From the NGO-administration, 
there was however an  idea  that this logistic  support  was  second to the actual  content of the 
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development programmes,  namely  the  training  components.  These  were,  however,  much less 
successful,  literacy skills were  not  used  after  the  training  and  were forgotten; improved stoves 
were  abandoned  after  having  been  introduced,  agricultural  equipment  was  not  used,  and  a  return 
to old  techniques  was  observed, etc. 
This  can  to some extent  be  attributed  to  the fact that  training  is  often  done  in  a  pedantic  and not 
very  pedagogic  manner,  turning  villagers  into  passive  recipients of knowledge  transfers,  in  a  way 
that has little to  do with  local  knowledge  transfer  systems,  or with more effective knowledge 
transfer systems known  in the West,  which  stress  "situated  learning" etc. 
Furthermore,  Maclure  claimes  that it is  erroneous  to  assume  that  new  skills  transmitted to certain 
villagers  should  automatically  be  transferred  to  the  rest of the  population.  And,  finally, it appears 
that people tend to forget what  they  have  leamed  at  these  training  sessions. More seriously, 
Maclure also claims that the diffusion of  new knowledge  may  serve  as  a  "cultural invasion", 
leading  to  the  erosion  of  existing  local  knowledge  and  the  neglect  of  indigenous  know-how and
modes of behaviour. In short,  there  is  a  danger  that nimation rurale leads  to  a  dismissal of local 
knowledge  and faith in local resources,  precisely  the  opposite of its initial objective. 
Among the  reasons for this were  that  some of the  animateurs  were at the same time project 
managers. There was, thus, an  incentive for them  to  assure  accountability  and  not delegating 
responsibilities to  the villagers, but  to  monopolize  accounts  etc.  The animateur, in this way 
deprived the villagers of the possibility of testing their new knowledge by managing their 
projects  themselves. 
Maclure is, however, sympathetically cautious of blaming the extension workers for the 
shortcomings of the animation rurale efforts,  drawing  attention  to  the fact that these agents are 
obliged to manoeuvre within  a  local  arena of conflict and power  struggles  where one has to  be 
careful as an outsider when  taking  sides.  Furthermore,  the fact that  there is an enormous social 
difference  between  the  local  people  and  the  animateur,  even  if  hisiher  salary  is  low, leads to the 
isolation of the animateur  vis-a-vis  the  local  population. The "animation rurale" thus becomes 
a  "transfer point of power  and  knowledge",  where  the  power  differential  leads to patron-client 
relationships  between  the  rural  population  and  the  outside  agencies. 
It  is therefore unavoidable, according  to  Maclure,  that  dependency  becomes  a consequence of 
animation rurale, especially given  the  current  situation  where  the  Burkinan  peasantry is facing 
increased  marginalization  and  internal  stratification. 
Maclure thus concludes that it is  erroneous  to  assume that self-reliance  and  self-sufficiency 
should  be  goals of external  development  assistance.  Likewise, it is not realistic to envisage that 
the  poor  be able to  "determine  their  own  destinies"  without  external  assistance. Instead it seems 
more fruitful to explore ways  to  improve  systems of dependency, so that they become systems 
of interdependency. Maclure is, however,  not  very  clear  as  to  how  this is going to happen  but 
seems  content  with  suggesting  that  more  durable  associations  be  made, not just at village level, 
but  also  between  villages  and  that  relations between  donor  agencies  and the villages be made on 
more equitable basis. This should be done through "increasingly engaging representative 
segments of the rural poor" in  planning,  decision  making  etc. On a concrete level, this means 
cost-sharing  and  communal  contributions  to  infrastructure  etc,  more  participation  in  the  outlining 
of  what should be the aims and  contents  of  education,  etc.  The NGOs should  come  to grips with 
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their own lines of authority,  decision  making  and  accountability,  in  order to assure that their 
programmes  remain  vested  in  their  own  agencies,  enabling  them to generate  relations  of genuine 
parity. 
3.3.1.1 Critique 
Maclure provides a  very  needed  contribution  to  a  critique  of the work  of  NGOs  in Sahelian 
societies. My  concern  with  his  work  is  that,  while  being  sharp  in  his  criticism,  his  suggestions for 
improvement tend to end  up  risking  being  repetitions  of  past errors. I shall  briefly outline what 
I see as the reasons for this. 
First  of  all he is not  very  thorough  in  his  definition f the  different  concepts he is operating with. 
He operates with notions  like  "dependency",  which  has  led to "patron-client relationships", but 
fails to provide  more  exhaustive  explanations as to  what he means by these  notions, except that 
this is unfortunate.  Dependency  is  seen as the  opposite of "self-reliance",  one  of the primary goals 
of the "animation rurale", the central  theme  of  the  programmes that are the focus of Maclures 
analysis.  He  then  convincingly  points  to  the  fact  that  it  might  be  erroneous  to  talk f elf-reliance 
as a development goal per se, but fails to  analyse  the  concept  of  self-reliance more thoroughly. 
In whose  interest is "self-reliance"?  Self-reliance  seems to be  a  very  moral  and  ideological  notion, 
which one may find appealing,  but  should  maybe  be  cautious  in  imposing on others. It seems 
quite logical for marginalized  rural  populations to try to do the direct opposite. There seems to 
be  no incentive to try to avoid  making  outside  logistical  support  a  perennial  thing, especially as 
this  support is often so costly  that the local  acquisition of such is considered prohibitive. And it 
is not only the rural  populations  that  have  an  interest in the perennity of, for instance, NG0 
activities. NGOs constitute a high-wage area for educated "animateurs", and even foreign 
consultants  may  have  an  interest  in  sustaining the activities of an NG0 in  order  not o spoil their 
own careers. The remarkable  lack of self-criticism  within the NGO-movement  in Burkina Faso, 
purporting to uphold  an  image of a  non-antagonistic  framework for NGO-work, is revelatory in 
this respect. 
Maclure  swiftly  touches upon this  when  saying  that he "animation rurale" becomes a "transfer 
point  of  power  and  knowledge".  But  he  fails  to go into  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  how the NG0 
becomes an arena for these  power  transfers. 
Maclure  says that the idea of self-sufficiency is enoneous because of the marginalized position 
that the rural  populations  are  in.  They can  therefore  "not  be  expected to fully  determine  their  own 
destinies  or improve their  lot  by  relying  solely  on  their  own innate and learned capacities." But 
implicitly he seems to assume  that  they  should  have  an  interest  in  doing so. Even if we could find 
such a "self-sufficient social actor" it is hardly likely that he/she would be able to "fully 
determine hisher own  destiny". Upon closer  scrutiny  this  idea is ludicrous, nobody does that, in 
Africa or elsewhere. 
He does not see perennial  dependence as necessarily  objectionable  though.  He suggests that, 
given the way things are, work should be done to assure that this dependency evolve into 
interdependency, thus developing  durable  associations  and  ways of management and exchange 
not just within  village  communities but  between  communities  and  other non-village institutions. 
Dependence, being inevitable,  should  thus  at  least  give way to linkages of structural parity and 
interdependence between  village  and  non-village  social structures. 
85 
The  propositions  that  Maclure  makes for establishing  this  interdependence  are,  however,  not  very 
convincing.  They  include "the active  involvement of local  people  in  analysing  their  own  problems 
and needs." Secondly, the "formulation of proposals should originate from procedures of 
partnership  established  between  NGO-staff  and  community  representatives". But it seems  that 
it is exactly this "active involvement"  which  is so difficult  given  the  very  uneven  status of the 
different  actors on this NG0 arena,  and  the  very  different  interests  they  pursue. 
Finally,  a  remark  about  methodology.  There  is  surprisingly  no  mention of he  problems  occurring 
when interviewing villagers about development activities. This is somehow strange as the 
"patron-client  relationships"  that  Maclure  claims  tend  to  emerge  could be expected  to be reflected 
in the way  respondents gear their  answers  to  the  interviewer,  who could be  seen as a  potential 
partner  who  wil  provide  sustained  assistance to the  community.  No  reference is thus  made  to  the 
problem of respondents answering questions according to what interests they might see in 
presenting  a  certain  view to the interviewer. 
This  is  reflected  in  the  rather  simplistic  way  animation  rurale  is  perceived as "cultural invasion". 
When  quoting  a  peasant  saying "I cannot  advise  you. You know  more  than  we do", Maclure  takes 
the  statement  for  granted,  and  sees it as  an example  of  how  the  villagers  consider  themselves 
ignorant vis-&-vis NG0 animation  agents. This is probably  an  underestimation of the  villagers' 
ability to use  what  Olivier de Sardan  has  termed "les savoirs  populaires  sociaux",  which  is  the 
villagers'  accumulated  knowledge  about  how  to  take  advantage  of, f r instance,  a  credit  scheme; 
how  to  behave  in  meetings  with "Zes animateurs"; how  to  deal  with  interviewers,  etc.(Olivier  de 
Sardan,  1995,  p. 146.). Maclure  does  not  get far beyond  the  simplifications of Franz Fanon, who 
sees outside influences  as  a  sort of cultural  imperialism  to  which  the  villagers  can  react  with 
nothing  but  alienation. When the  villager  claims  that "You know more than I do", it is actually 
an attempt to create linkages of dependency  between  the  interviewer  and the respondent. 
The reception of outside influences  and  the  way  these  are  incorporated into local society  thus 
needs  a  more  nuanced analysis. When  Crehan & van  Oppen  (1988) described how fanners told 
people from the  national cotton board  in  Zambia  that  "we  are  your sons and  daughters,  you  are 
developing us", they  highlighted  the  fact  that  this  was  to  be seen as an  attempt from the  peasants 
to establish perennial relations with providers of certain commodities (agricultural inputs, 
transport  of  cash  crops),  rather  than  example of total  submission  to  the  state,  and an alienation 
towards  local  values. 
To  sum  up,  Maclure  provides  a  number of very  important  points of critique to the  debate of the 
role of NGOs  in  rural  development, not only  in Burkina Faso but in all very  aid-influenced 
societies.  His  point  regarding  the  impossibility of avoiding  dependency  and of reaching  self- 
sufficiency is pertinent  and  provides  a  needed  contribution  to  a  debate  that  has  suffered from too 
much rhetoric and reluctance to deal with antagonisms. The problem is that he ends up 
contradicting himself by suggesting a perfection of the very tools, which he condemns as 
inadequate. 
3.3.2 Atampugre 
Atampugre  (1997)  constitutes  a  second  case  in  recent  studies  more critical of the work of NGOs 
in  Burkina Faso and  their role in  rural  development.  Atampugre  delivers  a  harsh  criticism  to  two 
English-based  NGOs  working  in  Northern Burkina Faso, Oxfam UWEire and  ACORD. 
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He  claims  that NGOs are  no  longer  just  a  Northern  phenomenon  but tha it is now in the  interest 
of the  African  middle  classes  to  create NGOs as  these  "pay  off", i.e. constitute important  career 
prospects.  Following the debate  triggered  off  by  the  failure  of  international NGOs to  address 
problems  in  conflict  areas  with  need  for  emergency  help like Somalia  and Rwanda, he  attempts 
to  draw  attention  to  Burkina  Faso,  a  very  peaceful  country,  where NGOs have  nevertheless 
equally  faced  enormous  challenges. 
Atampugre  puts  forward  the  following  essential  points  in  his  article: 
. He  insists  that  he  development of local NGOs and local  community-based 
organizations  be  understood  in  a  historical  framework  taking into account 
especially  the  colonial  heritage,  where  village  organisation  was  a prerequisite 
if a  village  wanted  to  deal  with  external  markets;  and  the  legacy of the Sankara 
years,  which  showed the importance of social  organization  at all levels of 
society  in  social  transformation. 
. As with Maclure, his major concern is that village organizations often become 
entirely dependent  upon  external  aid from foreign  donors,  both in terms of 
means  and  organizational  capacity,  and  they  therefore do not become 
sustainable. 
. He stresses the importance of the decentralization process and the link between 
this and the  success of village  organisations.  However,  he  seriously  questions 
whether  the  dominant  social  class  will  relinquish  the  power  necessary  in order 
to  make  this  decentralization  effective.  Their  reluctance  to d  so has  led  many 
donors  to  shortcut  and  reach  decentralized levels through NGOs ,and it is 
within  this  framework  that  their  upsurge  should  be  understood. 
. He claims that  foreign NGOs have  had  severe  difficulties  in establishing a 
feeling of ownership of their  projects  among  the  local  population. The transfer 
of their  activities  to  local  organizations  has  not  changed  this  situation,  and  local 
NGOs suffer the same  problems. 
Atampugre  provides  a  good  historical  account of the Burkina Faso cooperative experience, 
stressing  that  rural  organization on village  level has always  been  a  condition for receiving  outside 
assistance, be it in  the  form of governmental  credits,  commercialisation of cash crops or NG0 
support in  whatever form. The existence of local  "groupements villageois" has  always  been 
conditional,  in  order for external  agents  to  have some kind of institutional  linkage.  This is still 
a  common  feature of village  groups,  which  are  often  created  with t e sole  purpose of attracting 
aid. 
Atampugre  however  claims  that  this  village  organization  has,  despite the conditionality, in  certain 
cases,  and  especially during the  Sankara  years,  succeeded  in  advancing village interests.  He 
furthermore  claims  that  the  legacy of the  Sankara  years  has  played an important part in current 
efforts by village  groupements  to  improve  their  situation,  and  has  showed  that collective action 
could  help  overcome  problems  that  normal  coping  strategies  were  incapable of dealing  with. 
Furthermore,  decentralization  and  adjustment  efforts  in  the 8 0 s  and 90s have  encouraged  donors' 
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interest  in  surpassing  the  government  level  by  channelling  them  directly  to  decentralized l vels 
and  local  NGOs. 
The fact that the local  organizations  have  been  externally  driven,  however,created  a dynamism 
where there is a  risk that the local  institution  immediately  becomes  void of  any content the 
moment the outside support  disappears or an  opportunistic  objective  has  been met. It is, thus, 
difficult  to  estimate  how  many  village groupemenfs currently  exist  in  Burkina  Faso, as they exist 
in virtually every  village  (and  there  are  often  several  in  each),  linked  either  to  the government 
extension service or to  an  NGO. 
In the two  cases  that  Atampugre  cites,  foreign  NGOs  have had great  difficulties in transfemng 
responsibilities to local  associations, as these have  been  dependent  on  continued funding and 
unable  to  generate  surplus  themselves to  sustain  their  efforts.  It seems as well  (though  Atampugre 
does not dwell too much upon this) that the local NGOs operate with objectives that are 
extremely vague  and  impossible to assess  more  precisely.  Objectives like "improving living 
conditions  and  assuring  sustainable  development" are appealing  goals  but  do  not  include  any  kind 
of strategy. In fact, they  risk  blurring  the  outlining  of  the  NGOs'  activities  rather  than clarifying 
them.  And  there  might even be  social actors that  see  this  as an advantage. 
Finally  he  argues  that  there  is  a  need  to  "match  resource  flows t  the  absorptive  and  managerial 
capacities" of a local association  to  assure  sustainability. 
Atampugre  concludes  that  only  activities  that  respond  to  the  pressing  and  lasting priorities of  the 
rural  populations are sustainable.  The  way  certain  activities  have  been  managed  shows  a  strong 
ability to deal with  specific  problems  when  the  necessary  capacity  and  commitment is there. 
There is, however, a huge institutional problem in the sense that when the foreign NG0 
withdraws and  a  local NG0 continues, it is  unable  (and  uninterested)  obtain  autonomy  and 
becomes  very  dependent  upon  foreign  support for its continuation. 
3.3.2.1 Critique 
Atampugre,  like  Maclure,  has  methodological  problems. In analysing  village  dynamics,  he  quotes 
an  analysis of the  objectives  behind  the  formation  village  groups.  Distinctions  are  made  according 
to  whether  groups  were  formed  at  the  initiative  of  the  villagers  or  of  the  extension  agents,  whether 
it was to  attract  aid,  to  "develop  initiatives" or to  imitate.  This  very  interesting  exercise  shows  that 
village groups are mainly  created by villagers  themselves  in  order  to  deal  with  local  problems. 
There is,  unforhmately, no account of how  these  questions  were  posed. It seems that once again 
it is not  taken  into  account  that  respondents  react  strategically  when  answering  these qu stions, 
analysing  which  answer will serve the  respondent  best  in  the  case  that  the  interviewer becomes 
a  potential  partner  (which  he  apparently  did, as it was the  donor  institution  that conducted the 
study). The same problem  recurswhen  he  evaluates NG0 activities. The famous diquettes are 
deemed entirely successful by the farmers,  but  their  construction is not  replicated, Atampugre 
says.  This is because of the  inability of poor  farmers  to  assure  transport.  Probably so, but it might 
as well be that farmers. say that they  are  successful in  order  to  assure  relations  with the donor 
agency that provided them (See next chapter for an  elaborate  discussion of this). 
Like Maclure,  Atampugre  sees  a  problem  in  relations of dependency.  Local  NGOs  or unions are 
as dependent as ever on external  funding;  the  transfer of responsibilities  from  foreign to local 
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organizations  has  done  nothing  to  change  this.  The  problem  for  Atampugre  is  that  in e transfer 
of responsibility  and  resources  to  local  NGOs  as  mentioned  above,  one  has  to  understand th t it 
is important to match  resource flows with the absorptive  and  management  capacity of local 
institutions. 
But  again, who says that  dependency is bad? It is a  normative  concept like "self-reliance",  and 
it is hard  to see the  incentive for a  rural  peasant  organisation  in  proving as quickly as possible  that 
it is independent i.e. that it can continue without  support. 
Another  complicated  question relates to  Atampugre's  idea of "matching  resource flows with 
absorptive  and  management  capacities".  Again,  it is very  difficult on a  concrete  level  to do this, 
and  an  organisation  will  rarely  have  the  incentive  to do it itself. An organisation like the UNDP 
has an enormous  absorptive  and  management  capacity,  but yo  only  very  rarely see any  concrete 
results of their work. "Absorptive and management capacity" remains a very abstract and 
normative  concept. 
Like with  Maclure,  Atampugre  raises  some  very  central  points  for  a  more  thorough critique of 
NG0 activities in Burkina Faso. We are far beyond  the  uncritical  praise of NG0 activities as 
genuine grass-roots mobilization in a society where antagonisms are virtually absent and 
everybody  was  in favour of "development".  However,  he  does not get  much  beyond  regretting 
that  relations of dependence  prevail even when local  institutions  have  replaced  donor  agencies. 
This is a  shame as Atampugre  seems to have  an  intimate  knowledge of the  organizations that he 
is  analysing. A more  thorough  account of  how the  NGOs  develop  into  arenas for gaining  access 
to resources for development or, as Maclure puts it, become "transfer points of power and 
knowledge",  would  have  been  very  interesting. 
3.3.3 Other N G 0  studies 
A number of other  studies on development  NGOs  could  be  mentioned.  (Stringfellow et al. (1997) 
is an attempt to produce certain recommendations regarding what to do (as a donor) and 
especially what to avoid  when  working  to  support  farmers'  groups  like  the  Burkinan 
groupements. It focuses upon an analysis of the successes and shortcomings of different 
intervention forms of donors  and  NGOs.  The  shortcomings  listed  are 
. That donors  tend  to  rush the group  formation  process; 
. That they tend to have inflated expectations as to what these groups can undertake; 
. Donors are often too focused upon credits and subsidies in the initial phases of group 
development. 
These factors lead  to the creation of groups  that  are  not member-driven and  not homogenous. 
What  should  be  avoided is attracting  peoplemerely  seeking  handouts, as in  these  cases the groups 
will collapse the moment the handouts  stop, and this will  not  lead  to genuine farmer  cooperation. 
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What should be done  is,  rather,  to  support  groups  in  improving  market  access  i.e.  access to banks, 
suppliers,  traders,  exporters etc; to  carefully consider the  different  improvement options; and to 
listen  carefully  to  the  farmers'  preferences.  This  increases  the  likelihood  of membership control. 
Outside support  should  be  provided  at  the  community's  request  and  might include training, 
knowledge and  contacts,  thus  facilitating  linkages  with  markets.  This  goes for what  is  termed 
"linkage-dependent" groups  (groups  working  with  a supplierbuyer on which  they are, to  some 
extent, dependent),  sometimes  for  their  mutual  benefit,  as  well  as for "autonomous" groups. 
3.3.3.1 Critique 
Clear  in  its  recommendations,  Stringfellow et al. is nevertheless frustrating reading. The main 
problem is that in  a  country like Burkina Faso the  linkages  that  farmers  would like are not 
linkages  to  the  market  but  linkages  to  funding  institutions like NGOs and  bilateral donors. It is 
therefore hard to imagine  a  situation  where the donor  delivers facilitating inputs  in the form of 
training  etc.  when  expectations from farmer  communities  are  more that the donor should supply 
logistics  (water,  dispensaries,  schools,  farming  equipment.)  The  article  seriously  underestimates 
the  influence of the  donor  by  virtue  of hidherhts mere  presence,  and  does  not  pay  attention to the 
sorts of clientelism and brokerage  that  exist  in  connection  with  the donor's presence. 
Another  problem  stems  from  the  way  the  paper  on  the one hand  insists  that  support be provided 
at the community's  request, but at the same time quite thoroughly defines what type of support 
should  be  provided.  This  support  is furthemore clearly  focused on "soft" inputs,  training,  contacts 
etc.  and  not  on  what  research  suggests  is  mostly  in  the  interest of Burkinan  farmers (see Maclure 
1995 and  below),  namely  logistics,  buildings, credits and jobs. 
The  authors  have  a  set of implicit  beliefs  about  rural  development  that  are  not  clearly  defined, but 
normatively assumed as common consensus when dealing with rural development. The 
development  activity  supported by the  donor  is  supposed  to  be sustainable. This  means  that  after 
a  phase of intervention,  the  farmers  are  supposed  to  continue  the  activities  that  were  initiated  with 
the  help of the  donor  at a higher  level  than  before  intervention,  and  without  further support. For 
an activity to be sustainable the cooperation has to  be genuine, which as far as I can see means 
small-scale , member-driven,  with  face-to-face  contact  and  homogeneity among members. Why 
this  should  reflect  genuity  is  not  revealed.  The  paper  does  not  discuss  that  one  should expect that 
farmers' groups will normally fight actively to assure the continuity of assistance from the 
outside, thus trying by all  means to avoid  sustainability. 
At one  point,  the  paper  also  claims  that  there is a trade-off  between economy of scale and  group 
cohesion. There is,  however, no analysis  or  even  taking into account of village  hierarchies and 
local power structures, which are often very central elements in the construction of local 
institutions,  structures  that  are not  necessarily  homogenous  at  all,  and  which  have little to do with 
scale. 
By way of conclusion,  one  could  say  that  the  paper  is  a  sympathetic  attempt  to av id the most 
common  errors in institutional  support  project design, but it nonetheless overlooks certain more 
fundamental  problems  in  institution-building  attempts  and  development  aid.  First of all, it ignores 
local  power  structures  and  secondly, it projects its own  normative  assumptions concerning the 
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development of African society. It implicitly assumes that egalitarianism, homogeneity and 
market forces will  lead to genuine cooperation  for  sustainable  development. 
3.3.3.2. Holm6n & Jirstrom. 
A  fourth  paper  (Holmen & Jirstrom, 1997) dealing  with  NGO-work  within  development is more 
critical and more theoretical  in its approach,  and  much  less  policy  oriented. It gives a quick 
review of  a number of writings  on NG0 work,  and  provides  a  precise  critique of some of the 
more populist development discourses  related to NG0 work. 
The paper  reflects  upon  the  many  expectations  different  people  have  had of  NGOs,  and  questions 
whether these have been realistic. Especially the tacitly-accepted "non-profit" and altruistic 
character of the NGOs  is questioned, and it is  suggested  that "it would  perhaps  be  better to 
recognize individual economic self-interest as a  decisive  cross-cultural  driving force in social 
reproduction  processes." This is  a  long and complicated  discussion,  that I shall  not deal with  at 
this point. But initially  one  may  ask  what is actually  meant by economic  self-interest in a society 
where interpersonal relations,  adherence to groups,  families  and  clans  are central elements in 
resource  allocation  mechanisms.  Anyway, to look  at  self-interest  as  decisive  when  analysing the 
actions of social actors  seems a better  entry  point for a critical analysis  of  NGOs, as these are so 
often attributed characteristics like "grass-roots",  non-profit",  "empowering" etc. without any 
other reason than the fact  that  they  themselves  claim to be so. 
The authors provide the following points of critique of  NGOs: 
their  activities  are  often  uncoordinated  and  hampered by authoritarian  structures; 
Although they  often  claim to do so, they  are  unsuccessful  in  reaching the poor 
populations; 
when  acting on the basis  of  social  considerations,  NGOs  tend to ignore  that  there 
is no economic viability in the activity  unless  outside  support is maintained; 
NG0 activities, subsidized from abroad  as  they  are,  render it impossible for 
unsupported  businesses to enter the market,  and  they  therefore delay develop- 
ment; 
The very  common  objective of  NGOs  to empower people  is  highly  debateable. 
The authors  suggest  that  empowerment  be  dismissed as a  myth,  as  the concept 
implies that people who have not been  empowered  do  not assess their socio- 
economic  situation,  and  that  they  need  training in  order to do so. The opposite 
is often  true.  People  know  very  well  the  socio-economic  realities  that  they are 
facing and they also know why action is impossible without running into 
conflict with oppressive forces; 
Empowerment efforts by NGOs often generate new claim-making groups 
which support patronage networks existing in developing countries, thus 
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reinforcing  clientelism,  and  "perpetuating  aid-dependency rather than  giving 
rise to genuine  development from below"; 
. Holding up  NGOs  as  panaceas  to  development from below is completely 
unrealistic  as it  is premature to believe that  a certain type of organization will 
be  able  to  cure  the  resource  access  problems of poverty  and  underdevelopment; 
. NGOs tend to work parallel to the state and the result is often an undermining 
of the state, as resources  go  from  the latter to the former, as these are more in 
vogue  within the donor  community; 
The article finally suggests  that  a  less  sacrosanct  view  of  "small-scale" be adapted, that more 
large-scale  work  and  more  partnerships  between  governmental  and  non-governmental  institutions 
be initiated, as the one part  cannot  work  without  a  strong presence of the other. 
Finally  it  is  noted  that  international  trade  works to the  detriment of developing countries through 
trade  barriers  that  are worth double the annual  development  aid  flow. Furthermore the debt trap 
works as a  more  fundamental  impediment to development,  rendering the patchy  and dispersed 
small-scale NG0 activities  ridiculous. 
This article is more  interesting  than  Stringfellow et al. in the sense that it attempts  a critical 
deconstruction of some of the ultimately  meaningless  development discourse. 
However, this article, like the  former  ends  up  not  going  far  enough  with this deconstruction,  thus 
ending up  suggesting  what  should  be  done if "real development" is  desired. 
For instance, they state that  they fear that by establishing  new  claim-making  groups (through 
"empowerment"-initiatives), NG0 work is  "likely to perpetuate  aid-dependency  rather  than  giving 
rise to genuine development from below". All of a sudden, the authors become extremely 
normative: what is so wrong with aid  dependency?  And whose goal is it to have a situation 
without aid? What is "genuine development from below"? Suddenly, the authors become 
entangled  in the very  development  discourse  they  criticise so vehemently. Genuine development 
from below  which is not based on establishing  claim-making  groups, and not based on foreign 
aid to me seems very hard to obtain, especially as (as they rightly point out) "it would be 
premature to believe  that the cure to under-development  would be found in  a certain type of 
organization". 
It furthermore contains  some  confusing discussions about  when  a state is too strong, too weak, 
as if a state's strength or weakness was something to be measured. This is derived from a 
simplistic notion of the state as  something  which  can  be  weakened or strengthened by, for 
instance,  NGOs outside the state a  dualistic  interpretation  of  state-civil society relations, where 
something  is inside, or  outside the state. The idea that  NGOs  might be "undermining the third 
world  state"  (p.14)  seems  to  be an underestimation of the  capacity of dominating groups to build 
a power basis outside a narrow state institutional  framework. Furthermore, it  is a reification of 
the state as merely  a set of bureaucratic  spheres,  which excludes a  more elaborate discussion of 
power. 
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3.3.4 Piveteau 
The most  interesting,  and  least  ideologically  biased  NGO-study from Burkina Faso is by  Piveteau 
(1996). He  was  member  of  the  Gabas et al. team,  but  his  report is quite clear and more cautious 
in the goals it sets. He asks the simple question of whether NGOs promote agricultural 
development  in  Burkina Faso. The  question is extremely  interesting,  as  overall measurements of 
the social impact of NG0 work  in Burkina Faso  have  had  a  tendency of being unanimously 
assumed  as  significant  rather  than  empirically  verified. 
Piveteau  stresses the commitment of the  government  in  associating the NGOs  with development 
work,  which was  shown  by  their facilitating efforts in creating the national  bureau for NGOs 
BSONG,  under the auspices of the president (later moved to the Planning  Ministry.) This is 
coupled with a  demonstration of  how the NGOs  have  made  a significant change from disaster 
relief  to  "development  activities",  especially  within  social fields and on a  relatively small scale. 
Like  Maclure and  Atampugre  he  seriously  questions  whether  it  is  reasonable  to  speak  of  a  genuine 
partnership  between  NGOs  and  beneficiary  groups,  as it is in  the  majority  of cases the NG0 that 
designs,  implements  and  executes  development  activities  at  village level, putting the villagers in 
an "attentive" role. 
Piveteau  concludes  that  NGOs  have failed to promote  participatory  development,  and have, 
consciously or  not,  imposed  their  own  models on Burkinan  villages,  creating  new forms of 
dependency. 
Piveteau is not, like the two other  cases, focusing on a  few specific NGOs,  but tries to draw  a 
more general  picture of NG0 activities in Burkina Faso, especially,  as mentioned, the NGOs 
working  with  "development"  as  opposed to disaster  relief. It is especially  within  what is termed 
the  "social  sector",  that  NGOs  are  active,  i.e.  training,  health  and "promotionf~~inine". Within 
agriculture it is especially  within  horticulture  and  anti-erosion  measures  that NGOs are active. 
These activities are  object of Piveteau's  scrutiny. 
Piveteau has some interesting accounts of the relations between donors and beneficiaries, 
concerning who  takes the initiative for the development activities and  who defines what the 
activities  should  be.  The  initiative to contact  is  taken  more  or  less  by the 50-50 village/NGO, the 
conception of  the  activities  predominantly  done  by  NGOs,  their execution predominantly by the 
villagers and the  financing  almost  entirely  taken care of  by the NGO.  He  then points to a very 
interesting methodological  aspect  when  researching  these questions. Having interviewed the 
beneficiaries expost, villagers  were  asked  what activities they  would  have prioritized. Here one 
notes  that  there  is  a  great  synergy  between  what  they  termed as their difficulties ex ante and the 
demand which  was,  however,  only  expressed  in 1 out of eleven  cases. Participation is thus not 
stemming  from  a  strategy  aiming  at  meeting  an  expressed  demand,  but  rather  from  a  wait-and-see 
attitude aiming at formalizing  some  kind of relation  with an external operator, susceptible of, 
sooner or later,  answering  needs  that are still "latent".  Hence,  in the first place any proposition 
from the NG0 will  be  accepted  and  welcomed. 
This  according  to  Piveteau  reflects  that  relations  between  donors,  NGOs  and  beneficiaries  remain 
very  hierarchical  and  limit the possibility  of  establishing  "genuine  partnerships".  Villagers do not 
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possess the  necessary  means  (financial,  discursive,  educational ), but  this  does  not  necessarily 
mean that they are unable to produce answers to change, or that they are passive and un- 
innovative. Their apparent  passivity,  should  according to Piveteau,  rather  be  understood  as  a 
reluctance towards  taking risks with  adventurous  experiments with technologies that have  not 
proven  their  worth.  The NG0 thus  "affirms  itself as an expert in the  evaluation of popular  needs, 
whereafter it falls into  an  aid  model  which fails to  provide  support  to  internal  dynamics"  (my 
translation). 
Piveteau  goes  a bit further  concluding  that he NG0 activities  he  scrutinizes,  especially  village 
gardening  projects  and  the  construction f "diguettes", are maybe  beneficial  for  certain  recipients, 
but  that  their  overall  impact is negligible,  and  too  small to have  any  effect on capital  investments. 
Every  year,  the fanner is going  to  start  over  again  at  the same level as the  preceding  year,  and the 
NGO-initiated  activities are not going  to  change the overall  marginalized  situation  he/she is in. 
Investments in diquettes show extremely varying results, and should be evaluated more 
systematically  and  over  a  longer  timespan  before  definitive  conclusions  can  be  drawn.  In  this  case 
it is  interesting  to  couple  Piveteau with  Atampugre,  whose  investigation  showed  that 97 % of the 
fanners said  that  the diquettes were  beneficial.  Given  what  was  mentioned  above  about the 
farmers' "wait-and-see"-attitude, these figures should possibly be further analysed before 
conclusions regarding their effectiveness  are  drawn,  as  the  farmers  according  to  Piveteau  have 
no interest in putting forward  a  negative  evaluation of a  new  intervention  in  their  village. 
It is interesting  and  understandable  that  in  certain cases, according  to  Piveteau, funds raised 
through  NGO-initiated  activities  are  invested,  not  in  natural  resource  conservation  measures, but 
in financing the "chef de village's" journeys  in  order to assure  that  he  nourish the village's 
relations  with the donors  (See  also  Laurent 1996). 
Investments in  repairs  and the expansion of projects  initiated by donors  are  extremely  rare  at 
village  level,  and  the  benefits  obtained  through  the  implementation of  new  agricultural  techniques 
are negligible  and do not permit the  continuity of the  activity.  The NG0 thus  constantly  has to 
ensure its own survival in an area where it has  started  to  work. 
3.4 Critique on NG0 studies 
Piveteau is more precise in the objectives he sets in his study of NGOs than Maclure and 
Atampugre, and avoids  being  normative  in his expectations of NGOs  working  in Burkina Faso 
like the other  four.  Furthermore,  his  methodological  considerations are  much  more  sophisticated 
and reveal more  reflection  upon  the  positioning of villagers vis-a-vis development institutions. 
All NGO-reports point  to  a  number of very  central  issues,  and  their  conclusions,  that NG0 
activities lead not to  increased  self-sufficiency,  but to some  kind of clientelism seem valid. 
Furthennore it is fortunate  that  they  point  to  the  fact  that  this  clientelism  may  be  unavoidable,  and 
that suggestions on  how to overcome  problems  related to this  are  put  forward. They are  all, 
however,  a bit sparse  in their theoretical  analysis of how  things turn out this  way. 
Maclure  and  Atampugre's  suggestions  are  somewhat  contradictory as well, as they do not suggest 
a rupture of the system that they criticize so heavily; neither do they attack the structural 
contradictions of  aid assistance, but  they come up  with some very  general  notions  on  the  need 
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to assure the participation of locals, not  only  in  project execution, but  also in the planning.  But 
this  is  exactly  the  problem.  With  such  inequalities, it is  always the donor  that  calls the shots, and 
the way the interface between donor and  recipient is constructed is more  complicated  than just 
assuring the genuine participation of all parties.  Piveteau is more  cautious  and  does  not make 
recommendations  apart  from  excusing  the narrow basis on which his  conclusions are made,  and 
calling for more thorough research. 
My  main criticism is  that there is  a  tendency among especially the first four authors to avoid a 
more  thorough  analysis of the  relations  between the donors, the local NG0 and  the  villagers,  and 
they end up with somewhat normative assumptions about "dependency", as if this were 
necessarily  a  bad  thing  being  incompatible  with  genuine  development as it  will  not  be  sustainable. 
Although  they  would  probably  argue  that i is beyond  the scope of their  studies,  a  discussion of 
the  relations  between  governmental  and  non-governmental i stitutions would  equally  have  been 
interesting,  but is virtually  absent  in  all  three  studies.  Piveteau  recalls  the  positive  attitude  of  the 
government  and  its  initiative to coordinate NG0 work  in  an  overall  national NG0 bureau,  but  this 
is primarily seen as a  sign  of goodwill, not  as  a  mechanism  of  control,  which  would  be  another 
equally valid  way to look at it. Atampugre dwells upon the Sankara  years,  and stresses the 
importance  that his period  has  had. But this, again, is contested  elsewhere  (see  Otayek 1988), and 
is  not empirically founded  in  his  accounts. 
It seems obvious though  that the relations  between  government  development institutions and 
NGOs must undergo interesting transformations  in  a  period  when  the  state is being  dismantled 
and its services transfened to the private  sector  or "civil society". A  series of hypotheses could 
be put forward 
. With the dismantling of the state and the introduction of alternative channels 
through  which  development assistance can  be  handled,  services  will  improve 
because of the competition; 
. Because of the huge transfers of resources to NGOs, government institutions, 
in order to get  their share, enter into a  conflictual  relation  with  NGOs: 
. A large number of the government employees quit the ministries and join the 
NGOs,  where  payments  are  higher and prospects seem brighter; 
. Nothing much happens. The NGOs work alongside the state agencies, but make 
no significant difference. At village level no distinction is made between 
Governmental and  non-governmental,  any outside assistance is OK. 
It is on the basis of the fieldwork presented in the next chapter, that I shall try to pursue these 
questions. In the town of Dori, multilateral, bilateral and NGO- development assistance is 
inserted into a complex, highly politicized setting. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The review of the different types of aid to Burkina Faso, from the OECD-report to the 
assessments of small NG0 initiatives  shows  a  number of similarities  in  the  different forms of aid. 
It  seems that a  problem  is  that  many of the  “shortcomings”  stem from the fact that the aid does 
not  fulfil  certain  objectives,  which  are on closer  scrutiny  based  on  very  normative  and  ideological 
notions of development which  are  not  subscribed  to in the  “beneficiary”  society. Notions like 
sustainability,  independence,  self-reliance  and  participation  which  are the objectives of 
development  projects  seem  to  be  contested  and the object of struggles.  Furthermore,  the  outcome 
of the different  development  interventions  cannot  be  reduced  to  a succedfailure matrix, as the 
social positionings  within the projects  constitute  rather  complex social processes. 
What is striking is also that  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any  significant qualitative difference 
between  the  types of aid, i.e.  whether it is N G 0  aid, bilateral  or  multilateral, it runs into  the same 
type of problems:  lack  of  “sustainability”,  problems of “ownership”,  tense  “partnership”  relations 
etc. In the following chapter we  shall see how  this  is  played  out  in  a local context. 
Finally, all research,  except  maybe  Piveteau’s, is caught  up  in  a  “tool-perfecting’’ discourse, 
where  a number of preconceived  notions  about  what  development is supposed to  be about are 
taken  for  granted,  and  where  political  issues  are  not  taken  sufficiently  seriously, b t downplayed 
for the sake of development. 
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Chapter 4. Development  projects  and  local  politics.  The  Picture of a  Dorian 
Greyzone. 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I shall  argue  that  development  intervention is better  analysed  as  a contested and 
negotiated process over externally  provided  economic,  political  and  symbolic resources rather 
than as a  planned  intervention,  carried  out  with  varying  degrees of success. This is, of course, 
hardly  very provoking, but  nevertheless  demands  a  different  view  of  development projects and 
institutions  not as agents  of  induced  social  change  but as arenas of conflict  and positionings over 
different resources. 
I am  drawing from field  experience  in  two  regions  of Burkina Faso, where Danish development 
aid  within  natural  resource  management  to  Burkina  Faso  has  been  concentrated:  Boulgou  in the
South-East and Seno in the North of the  country.  Both  these  regions are influenced by projects 
based  on the "Gestion de  terroir" approach,  developed  by  the UNDP and  the  World Bank. I shall 
attempt to describe these  projects,  not  as  simple institutions of development, but as parts of a 
local political struggle. 
The idea behind the "Gestion  de terroir" approach  is to strengthen  local  peoples' capacities to 
manage  their  natural  resources  in  a  more  sustainable  way,  thereby  avoiding the depletion  of their 
production  basis. The approach  suggests  that  the  enhanced  pressure on natural  resources requires 
more formal institutional arrangements at village and inter-village level in order to halt 
degradation through the establishment of "Cornifis de  Gestion  de Terroirs" (CGT) at village 
level  and the creation of "Unitis agro-pastorales" (UAP),  grouping  together  representatives from 
different CGTs at zonal, inter-village level. It is, in other words, a policy which is clearly 
influenced by the World  Bank  approach,  emphasizing the need  for  institution building and 
optimizing the scarce institutional capacity, and stressing planning as a means of utilizing 
resources in a rational and sustainable way. One might conclude that this approach is a 
sympathetic recognition of the fact that villagers know more about their resources than 
government officials,  and  that  when  they  embark  upon  practices  that deplete their resources, it 
is  not  out of ignorance  but  necessity.  At  the  same  time, it is  recognized  within the approach  that 
different  user  groups,  within  and  outside the village  may  have  different  interests  and  will make 
legitimate claims concerning the use of resources,  involving  negotiation  and potential conflict. 
On the other hand, it is remarkable  that the Bank  believes  that  mere  management can solve 
problems of this kind and magnitude. And finally, as we shall see below, it is a serious 
misinterpretation of the institutional  set-up  within the villages to believe  that such committees 
operate in  a  void. 
The "Gestion de Terroii' approach  is  to  be  seen  in a  context of a  national  policy  of decentraliza- 
tion,  a  slow  and  complicated  process  embarked  upon si ce the new constitution was adopted in 
1991. It is so far not  clear what  the  outcome  of  these initiatives will  be. It can be concluded that 
97 
so far the initiatives have  been  very  dependnt  not  only on donor funding, but also on donor 
initiative. 
A UNDP  Evaluation of the  PNGT-programme  from  1995  (PNUD  1995) is optimistic in the  sense 
that  the  PNGT-programme  according  to  them  has  given  the  population the knowledge  enabling 
them  to  regenerate  soils, assure food  security,  improve  conditions of life, improve  their “cadre 
de vie” (the same thing?) and  take  charge of local  development.  However, in order for this  to 
materialize it was seen as necessary to enhance literacy programmes through more project 
involvement;  that  projects  put  more  economic  means  at  the  disposition of villagers;  that  projects 
aim  at  implementing  programmes  that  would be able to keep the  younger  people in the  villages 
so that  they  didn’t  go to  Cote d’Ivoire. 
The  evaluation  is  interesting  in  the  sense that it states  that  knowledge  has  been  transmitted,  but 
makes no  mention  whatsoever of concrete activities that  have  led to any  changes  in  natural 
resource  management  techniques.  The  alleged  positive  impact  of  the  introduction  of Gestion de 
Terroirs is derived  entirely  from  questioning  villagers  as  to  how  the  programme  has  worked,  not 
from empirical  verifications of changed  practices. 
Once again, it is an example of stating  the  problem as lack of institutional setup  and  farmers’ 
knowledge  about  their own situation.  And  once  again,  the  apparent  cure to the apparent  absence 
of visible  changes is more of the  same. 
The  evaluation  stresses a point that is also  reflected  elsewhere  (Engberg-Pedersen  1995), that the 
Gestion de Terroir programme  is  very  dependent  upon  financing  from  external  agencies  in  order 
to  become  translated into concrete  action. The Programme Sahel Burkina  (PSB),  which  groups 
together three natural resource management  projects  in  the Seno Province  one of which is the 
Danish  DANIDARSB-project,  is  one of the  most  important of such initiatives in the country. A 
common  criticism  is  that the Gestion de Terroir has  become  a  process initiated “from  above” 
(Engberg-Pedersen  1995),  as  opposed  to  being  an  initiative  “from  below”.  Other  researchers  point 
to the fact that there are necessarily losers and winners within the implementation of this 
approach, but that it is, nevertheless,  a move away  from  a  more  purely  technicist  approach  to 
natural resource management to an approach that acknowledges the political dimensions of 
natural resource management,  which  calls for a  cautious  optimism  (Batterbury 1998, Degnbol 
1996a). This optimism  is,  however,  derived from other  areas  than Seno and  Boulgou. 
4.2 The Seno Province 
The  Seno  province in the  North of the  country  is  characterized by  an emphasis on livestock as the 
main  rural  production  form,  rainfed  agriculture  being  subject  to  great  variability  due  to  insecure 
rainfall patterns.  Conventional  wisdom  has it that lands  in the region  are  degrading  because of 
increased pressure on grazing  lands. Statistics are  not  good,  but it is  widely  accepted  that  the 
number of domestic  animals  in  the  region is higher  than ever, due  to  a  number of good  rainfall 
years  since the great  droughts of 1984-85,  profitability  in  livestock  raising has increased  due  to 
the  devaluation of the  CFA  in  1994,  and  market  access  has  improved.  Livestock  thus  remains  the 
central  investment  object  among  both  rich,  poor,  rural  and  urban  segments  of  society.  Agriculture 
consists of rainfed millet cultivation with low yields and a  low  degree of input of fertilizer etc. 
Conventional  wisdom  indicates  that  agriculture is spreading into lands formerly used as grazing 
areas (For a  discussion see Nielsen,  Reenberg & Rasmussen  1997).  At village level, conflict 
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between villagers  and  between  farmers  and  uanshumant  herders  because of the intrusion of 
animals  in  cultivated  fields,  is  the  most  common  source of discord.  An  interesting  new  tendency 
in the form of a de facto privatization of the  grazing  lands  is  occurring  due to the spread of 
donkey carts in  the  region.  People  have  thus  started  constructing  "hangars" in order to store 
harvested  bush  grass  in  them  for  stall  feeding of their  animals. 
Dori is the  provincial  capital of the  Seno  province  in  the  Sahelian  part of Burkina  Faso, but it is 
the administrative centre of not only Sen0 but the entire Sahelian region of the country. 
Furthermore, it i s  the centre of the  ancient  but  still  very  present  Liptako  Kingdom.  It is a  town 
with  roughly 30.000 inhabitants, of  which  the  majority arefulmi speaking. 
The region is the  driest  in  the  country,  and it has  been considered  drought-  and crisis-ridden for 
a  number of years. This has  resulted  in  the  establishment of  an above  average  representation of 
development  initiatives  aiming  at  addressing  problems  related  to  degradation of natural  resources. 
The bulk of these projects  have  their  headquarters  in  Dori. There are approximately 400jobs 
within and  around  development  institutions  in  Dori  dealing with natural resource management, 
and these are among the bestpaid in town (based on  my  own calculations). 
4.3 The PSBDANIDA Project 
The  PSBIDANIDA-project  was  launched  in  1990,  aiming  at  establishing  local  institutions  capable 
of assuring  a  more  sustainable  use of natural  resources.  At  the  time the project  was executed by 
UNSO (United  Nations  Sudan-Sahelian  Office),  but  financed by DANIDA  in  a  multi-bilateral 
arrangement. With the changed mandate of UNSO, now being the UNDP-agency for the 
implementation of the International  Convention  for  the  Combat of Desertification,  DANIDA has 
taken  over  the  execution of the  project.  It  is  part  of a  larger  programme,  the Programme Sahel du 
Burkina  Faso (PSB),  which is made up  of three  natural  resource  management  projects in the 
Sahelian  region,  the two others  financed by GTZ  (German)  and  Dutch  cooperation. These are 
based  in  Dori  and Gorom Gorom, 52 km  north  of  Dori.  The  three  projects  have split the region 
between them, and all work  with  the  same 'Gestion de Terroir' approach. A very important 
difference  between the DANIDA-project  and  the  two  others  is  that  the  latter  have  a  white  Chief 
Technical  Advisor  and  a  few  other  white  employees,  whereas  the  DANIDA  project  is run ntirely 
by local staff. In their setup and  approach,  the  three  projects  are quite similar. 
The DANIDA project aims  at  supporting the creation of different  producer  and  user groups at 
village  and  intervillage  level  in  order  to  assure  a  more  sustainable  use of natural  resources. These 
established  institutions  are  meant to  be  able  to  make  decisions  regarding  the  use  of  common  and 
private lands. The  support  provided by the  project  to  the  village  populations consists of : 
-Training programmes, 
-soil  and water conservation  measures  (SWC), 
-credit  programmes, 
-water facilities. 
The training programmes include  literacy  training,  and "animation" in the form of information 
about  the  need  to  combat  environmental  degradation  and  support f  the creation of CGTs. The 
SWC measures  consist  mainly of  support  for  the  construction  of 'diguettes', i.e. stone bunds that 
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are meant to halt water run-off  in the fields and  thus increase the productivity of soils and 
decrease  water  erosion.  The  support  needed  for  the  construction of these is first and foremost the 
transport of the stones,  and  secondly  some  advice as to how to construct  them.  Credit  programmes 
are  very  small-scale, are addressed mainly  at  women  and consist of credits for animal fattening 
and other small-scale income generating activities. Finally, water facilities consist of the 
construction of  wells,  boreholes  and the so-called boulis, large dug-out tanks collecting surface 
water  mainly for watering cattle in the dry season. 
The  project  has  made a “zonage” of its  intervention  area,  and an “animateur” is  attached to each 
zone, covering 10 to 15  villages.  The animateur is responsible for  the creation of CGT’s  and 
U N ’ s ,  and is furthermore expected to monitor their activities, run training activities and assist 
in credit disbursements. The success of the project at  village level is thus closely linked to the 
performance of the animateur.  And the animateur is under pressure from several sides, a point I 
shall elaborate on later. 
4.4 Institutions  facing  the  PSB/DANIDA  Project 
Although one might get the opposite  impression from the above,  the PSBDANIDA project is  in 
no way operating in an institutional  void.  First of all the project  is  working  within  a  local  political 
context, which  is  an  amalgamation of powers  based  on the domination systems of the Liptako 
Kingdom  and branches of the Burkina Faso  government.  These two types of government  are  often 
referred  to, simplistically, as traditional and  modem  powers. 
4.4.1 Local  power 
The ethnic composition of the population is  rather complicated, dominated by fulanis and their 
former slaves, the rimaybe. Other ethnic groups include tamackek, songkai; bella, mossi, all 
comprising  modes of identification  that  are  far from stable.  Power  has,  however,  historically been 
in  the  hands of thefulani nobles, theferroBe, the descendants of old jihad warriors, originally 
coming  from  what is now  Mali. TheferroBe ousted the dominant goumantcke people from the 
area in a  successful  war  in 1709. The  superior  of the kingdom, the Amirou, i.e. the Emir is 
picked from these Dicko’s, the family name of theferroBe. The title is normally inherited, but 
competition for the title has been  subject of bitter rivalries, which are very alive and reflected in 
the c h i c  setup of the Don community  today ( Irwin  1981,  Lund,  1999a). The title of Emir was 
formally  abandoned as an institutionally-recognized category within the Burkina Faso state in 
1963,  but he has  continually  held  considerable  influence.  With the new constitution of 1991, the 
present emir has  recently  been elected mayor  of Don. 
The “Dicko’s” are  made  up of different clans constantly fighting each other or opportunistically 
uniting  against  each  other  in  unholy  alliances. An important  arena for these struggles  is  the  CDP, 
the ruling party.  The  mayor leads one of the three most important clans. The two others are led 
by the former MP, Sanda Dicko and  the  present MP Ismael Diallo, and the rich businessman 
Birabia Dicko. 
The  project  is  constantly  solicited by local  powers as a potential  partner  in activities proposed by 
these  clan  leaders.  The  mayor  constantly  proposes  activities that the project should participate in 
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financing, especially cultural events or campaigns to clean  up the town. A few youth associations 
and a women’s  association have  been created, two of them by the mayor, in order  to address 
development institutions  in this sense. The project  is, however, very careful not to “take part in 
politics”, i.e. not to take sides in the  on-going  struggles between the  differentferroBe  clans, as 
they are played out in the ruling CDP party. The project is engaged in development, a sphere 
which is considered outside politics. “Politics”, on the other hand, is regarded quite narrowly as 
struggles  over  state  resources fought out within the  political  parties. 
This is probably part of the explanation as  to why the  local powers are remarkably uninterested 
in the development activities of the  project. The project is, first and foremost, seen as a means to 
get access to resources in  the form of vehicles,  fuel and  as a potential  employer of the  ferroBe 
subordinates, the latter point apparently the most delicate aspect of relations between the project 
and the local powers. The German PSB-project has taken a more harsh stand than the DANIDA- 
project in this  question,  and according to  the  mayor the Germans  “do  nothing  for  the town of 
Dori, but only hire  people from Burkina Faso”. The  Germans  have  recruited  their staff on the 
basis of  tests and C.V.’s,  and therefore their staff is, to a large extent,  from  other egions than the 
Sahel. The National Director of the DANIDA project is in a delicate position as he is under  heavy 
pressure from local powers  seeking cooperation with the affluent project. The national directors 
of the two other PSB-projects can  more easily refer to  their white counterparts  when suggestions 
for  alternative  management procedures are  proposed by local  partners.  The  German  CTA is 
oblivious  to  the mayor’s critique: “I will have  nothing  to do with the mayor, what he does has 
nothing to do with development”. This is an interesting clash  between  two sets of rationalities of 
compliance. The mayor sees it as a natural thing that the project should support his Liptako-based 
systems of subordination if it wants to help Dori, whereas the CTA adheres  to  Western  principles 
of performance and nationhood. 
In a sense, the  clan  leaders were also remarkably ignorant  as  to  the  more  specific  objectives of 
the projects. Dicko Sanda  in fact  confused the bilateral projects within the  PSB  programme with 
the NGOs operating in Dori, lamenting that  “being basically a politician, he was not that much 
into  development”.  The projects were mainly interesting to  him  inasmuch  as they could be 
helpful  in  his  political work as providers of jobs and logistics  for  his  subordinates.  He  did  not 
distinguish between “good” or “bad” projects, but only mentioned that  certain  people in certain 
NGOs were easier to  reach agreements with than others. These  people  were  local  elites running 
certain NGOs. 
TheferroBe clan leaders  are, however, incontournable when it comes  to  mobilizing  support in 
political conflicts at village level. Systems of brokerage and protection are well established and 
play an important role in conflict mitigation in  the area (See Lund 1999a, 1999b). It is, therefore, 
most likely that  were  the project within the  PSB-programme to  embark  on  more d cisive  moves 
within natural resource management practices, which weredetrimental to  ferrobe interests, the 
projects would  face  severe obstruction from  the  latter. 
The  term  “local power” is  in a sense as misleading as “traditional  power” , as  power  in  Dori s 
closely tied to networks that are not fixed within a spatial context. It does not make sense to make 
too rigid distinctions  between different levels or topographies of power,  relations  like  central, 
local, external etc. are fluid; the  local NG0 has a huge international network; central government 
representatives in  Dori  are  left a the mercy of theferrobe rulers; clientelist relations  with  offices 
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in Ouagadougou play a very important role; external agents may be economically very important, 
but  remain  defenceless when trying to determine modes of resource  allocation and decision- 
making  processes.  One may, however, consider as Gould does (1997) how locality and tradition 
become  modem  weapons  within  struggles  for resource mobilization,  a  social  construction  with 
political significance as issues around which support can be mobilized. This difficulty in 
operating  with  too narrow an interpretation of locality is equally  reflected in the  problems of 
implementing "Gestion de Terroirs" and decentralization policies. 
4.4.2 Development Institutions  In Dori 
The CRPA (Centre  Regional  de  Promotion  Agro-pastoral) is the central Government agricultural 
extension  agency.  The  CRPA  has 12 different  centres throughout Burkina  Faso.  The  regional 
division of the  respective  services of the different Ministries is  somewhat  complicated  as  the 
forestry/environment agency is  divided  into 10 units, the Ministry of Planning  into 10 (but  not 
the  same  ten),  the army into 4, the  Ministry of Health into 8 etc. This of course  does not make 
cooperation between different  ministries and services easier. It is often stated  as an institutional 
problem  that  the  services  under  the  different  Ministries a e not divided  along  similar  lines,  and 
this  is  said  to  have  a  detrimental  impact on the  degree of co-operation  between  the  different 
institutions. It is hard to say whether more uniformity  in  the bureaucratic setup  would  necessarily 
lead to more concerted efforts. It might as well serve as an excuse  for  lack of co-operation  at  the 
moment. 
The  backbone of the  CRPA  is  the number of employed "encadreurs", each  responsible  for 
agricultural  extension  in  a  number of villages. This  extension agent normally  covers 10 to 15 
villages, of which  he  (sometimes  she) (in principle) visits one a day, thus  visiting  every  village 
once a fortnight. These encadreurs are equipped with a house of reasonable  standing in the  area, 
a  salary of roughly 50.000 CFA  per month (appr. 100 USD), plus  a  small  motorbike. These 
motorbikes are  financed by the PRSAP-programme, the huge World  Bank  Support  programme. 
Apart  from  fuel  for  his  motorbike,  the  extension agent has nothing but his good advice and his 
authority as a  state agent to  offer  to the peasants. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that this system 
functions  relatively well in Burkina  Faso, compared to other countries in West  Africa. 
In certain areas, especially  in the south of the country,  there seems to be a  certain  satisfaction with 
the work of the encadreur, who has in some places apparently played an important  role in the 
introduction of new agricultural production techniques such as plowing with ox traction, 
composting and the  construction of dikes. Furthermore the encadreurs have been active in setting 
up applications  for  credits, and have been acting as arbiters in disputes  over  land,  especially  in 
cases where  animals have been grazing in the fields of agriculturalists. The peasants acknowledge 
this role, and critical remarks are usually limited to complaints about the  irregularity of his  visits, 
or encadreurs who have been "too busy chasing the women of our village"  and the like. There  do 
seem to be examples of rather rude treatment of farmers who have had their  animals  confiscated 
when loans to the CNCA (Caisse Nationale de Cridit Agricole) were not repaid, but the 
encadreur was  not  accused of this, and the encadreur usually makes an effort  to  make  farmers 
understand  that  there is an institutional  separation between the  CNCA and the  CRPA. This  is 
p&ly  why the  provision of agricultural  inputs,  formerly the responsibility of the encadreurs, is 
now being  privatized.  CRPA  employees  admit  that  misuse of funds has  occurred, and that  this 
has had  a  highly  detrimental  influence on farmerlencadreur-relationships. 
102 
It  should,  however,  be noted that in answering our questions farmers were very cautious  in 
making  negative  statements  about agricultural extension agents, as  they have no assurance  that 
the interviewer  will  take  their  side in a  possible conflict following the revelation of unpleasant 
facts. In one  village  the  villagers  claimed that the former  extension agent had embezzled  a 
reimbursed  credit. But this  information was probably only revealed because the man was now 
dead and had been  replaced by another. 
The  CRPA leadership  claims that CRPA is the only institution that has the capacity  to  give 
qualified information to farmers about agricultural improvement  techniques. The encadreurs have 
the necessary training, and there is a continuity in the effort of the encadreurs that  permits  the 
establishment  of  decent  relations with the farmers. Too many examples of small and uncoordi- 
nated NGOs diffusing imported, non-adapted  ideas in a superfluous  manner serve as  proof of this 
statement. However, the PSB-projects claim that  their staff are  better  qualified for these tasks, and 
that  the cooperation with the extension service is more an obligation than  a need for the running 
of the project. Furthermore, the director of the SPA (Service Provincial Agricole, the  provincial 
branch of CRPA) in  Boulgou claimed that problems of misappropriations were not  exclusive  to 
the  CRPA,  but also occurred within the NGOs: “Ils sont plus bouffeurs que nous”. 
The structural adjustment policy includes the de facto abolition of the CRPA (Gbikbi 1995). This 
is, as one can imagine, a very severe step to take involving the dismissal of thousands of 
functionnaires.  As  it is furthermore widely recognized that CRPA is  performing  relatively  well 
compared to similar institutions  in other countries in West Africa, total closure is a very drastic 
step to take. The institution at the moment continues  in a dangerous vacuum: the  closure has not 
been implemented, but disillusionment is spreading, resources are increasingly scarce, and there 
is a risk that their credibility  is now diminishing, facilitating closure in  the  future.  According to 
certain  observers, the CRPA is currently falling apart, and any CRPA activity nowadays  must 
necessarily  be  closely  linked to  some kind of externally-funded project, which runs  its  activity 
with the CRPA as its  executing agency. 
The outcome of the restructuring is not  yet  clear,  and is to be analysed within a  larger  context of 
decentralisation  as  it is currently  occurring in Burkina Faso. 
To give an example of the resources available, reference could be made to the director of 
the“Service Provinciale de I’Organisation et Formation Professionnelle des Producteurs 
Agricoles” (SPOFPP)  in  the Boulgou Province. The service works  as a branch of the CRPA, 
formerly  under a now defunct ministry for  Cooperation, but severe  cuts  have now made  it a 
semiautonomous entity of the Ministry of Agriculture, and is thus not under the  financing of the 
PRSAP  programme. 
The director of the SPOFF’P gave a  long  list of the objectives of the service, including organising 
agriculturalists,  informing  them on how and  why  to organize, following up on the  support and 
further training as the first task and training of young  agriculturalists  as the  second.  Nonetheless, 
it was obvious  that the means were so limited that it  was  very  hard to see how these activities 
should  be  implemented.  The  service had one motorbike and four  mopeds (all four in very bad 
shape) and a  budget of 40000 CFA (lFF=lOO CFA)  for the motorbike per month  (petrol  and 
maintenance), 30000 for an agent de faation des jemes (sic.), and for the five Chefs  de  zone, of 
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which only three were operational, a total of 25000 per month, i.e. 3500 CFA per zone centre per 
month! 
His  main job was to evaluate applications  for  village "groupements". He clearly  recognized  the 
fact that apart from this  attribution of a kind of legal status, many of the groupements were  devoid 
of any  content, but  ascribed  this to the complete lack of resources. It  is thus evident when looking 
at the performance of the different services under the  Ministry of Agriculture,  that  they  are 
extremely  "donor-driven",  i.e. that activities  are restricted to  the  areas where donor  means  are 
available. It thus becomes difficult to  assess to what degree a shift in the  funding from one branch 
of CRPA to another will result in improved performance as it  is only the branch that  gets  the 
funding  that  performs. 
In the endeavours of the World bank to reform the CRPA  two  activities  (approvisions and 
commercialisation)have been privatized. CRPA will thus be left with control, training and 
"encadrement". 
According to people  both  within the World  Bank and the  CRPA, these attempts  have had some 
rather unfortunate consequences. Especially within the livestock sector they have proved 
inappropriate as the "private" sector has not been  prepared for this transfer. This has allegedly led 
to  increased mortality amongst livestock as vaccines have now been marketed  among  private 
tradesmen who have not had the  technical  skills and interest  in  assuring  vaccination  campaigns 
of sufficient quality. The World Bank Project, PRSAP,  is engaged in  initiatives to encourage  the 
private sector in this respect, but  has apparently not been entirely  successful.  It could be argued 
that in fact it is within approvisions and commercialization that the CRPA should have a 
comparative advantage, as their  extension and training  efforts (the activities they are  now  left 
with) have always been very "top-down'' and technicist, and therefore  perhaps  better  taken  care 
of by other agencies. A problem is that the way the encadrement is currently run is very 
expensive, despite attempts  to cut spendings;  it is run entirely by the World Bank PRSAP project, 
and  the encadreur is often left without much to offer the farmers.  The encadreur of the  village 
of Boudoungel said he "had nothing to offer the farmers", as  they consider  themselves  more 
knowledgeable  about their land than him, and  when he does not provide access to  agricultural 
inputs  his  presence  in  the village is redundant. 
It  seems  that the opening up of possibilities  for the transfer of means from  the  CRPA to other 
development  institutions has caused a  certain  jealousy and bitterness  among the CRPA agents. 
The closing down of the CRPA will  in  any case  result  in  a temporary void,  as  private  and non- 
governmental institutions are  in no way able to  take over its central role within rural development 
in Burkina  Faso. 
In Dori, the DANIDA-project is collaborating with the different services of the different 
ministries, the  CRPA, the Sewice de I'Environnement, or as it is still known E a u  et  Forgts, and 
the Service de I'Hydraulique. These  offices all have  extremely  limited  budgets  to  run  their 
programmes and are therefore highly dependent upon collaboration with  projects  capable of 
delivering per diems, fuel  for the vehicles, etc. Collaboration between the project  and the services 
was earlier based on formal cooperation agreements, but  because of difficulties  in  measuring  in 
more concrete terms to what degree  the  collaboration had lived up to  project  expectations,  the 
collaboration is now based  on '?fiches d'ophation", punctual  agreements on concrete  activities 
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to be undertaken by the services. It  is no secret that the collaboration between the project and  the 
services is at  times seen as an obstacle to the efficiency of the execution of the  project, as the 
services do not perform very effectively and often do not have the capacity necessary to undertake 
the  jobs. Staff often do not have the technical skills necessary to  dig water points,  undertake 
training, graft trees or whatever; and skilled people have often left the government  services for 
better jobs among donors. 
4.4.3 TheNGOs 
Finally, a number of NGOs operate in Don. They each have their own agenda and no 
coordination exists between the work they do. There is very little  collaboration between the 
bilateral projects and the NGOs. The  PSBDANIDA project tried hiring the N G 0  BERAP  to 
impart training courses to its staff. This turned out  to  be very costly, however, and  the  message 
given  was  equally dubious, as this N G 0  has an ideology exclusively of its own based on the ideas 
of its charismatic leader. Sometimes villages succeed in obtaining financing from an N G 0  
alongside working with the bilateral project, a fact which raises some frustration at project level 
as the intervention approaches are often different, and  the level of "local contribution" to the 
development activity may differ significantly, which translates into misunderstandings regarding 
the participatory character of the project. All NGOs are funded from external sources with a very 
low level of "self-financing". They are run by influential local people with good  contacts to 
ferroBe clans, and are monitored carefully by their funding agencies. Their  overall  importance 
seems exaggerated, considering the attention  and expectations which have been devoted to them, 
and  some of them are very badly managed. 
One NG0 deserves special mention as it has been active in the organizing of farmers and herders 
in the Sahel Region of Burkina Faso: the CRUS (Comite' Re'gional des Unite's de  production  au 
Sahel). CRUS was created in 1990, in order  to establish an  institutional  framework  for  the 
distribution of cereals in the Sahel Region, a region which suffers a constant cereal deficit. CRUS 
is the result of an initiative taken by the DutchlBelgianBritish NGO, ACORD, which has worked 
in the  Seno province since 1983. ACORD has supported and facilitated contacts with other 
external donors, and  is  currently withdrawing. CRUS is currently trying to "stand  on its own feet" 
as, from  the start, the idea was that  it  should  develop  into a sustainable  institution,  able to 
function without being dependent upon foreign assistance. CRUS  consists of nearly 600 village 
groupements, organized  in 23 Unions, grouped in 4 provincial committees, the CPUS, and finally 
with the  CRUS  as  the central coordinating unit in Dori. 
The picture described above does not, however, completely reflect reality. The majority of the 600 
groupements are de facto non-existent. Of the 23 Unions, only two are economically active. The 
CPUS only exist on paper. And the direction of CRUS is very divided  and rather unaccountable 
to the rest of the organization. 
The two active unions, UGVO (Union des  Groupements  Villageois de Oudalan) and  UGVA 
(Union des  Groupements  Villageois de Arbinda) have been successful in establishing  contacts 
with donors and have acquired a reputation for considerable professionalism within the  grain 
trade, thus providing a number of groupements with food at  highly competitive prices,  in an area 
where grain traders have been able to make  large profits due  to  the  extreme  scarcity of food  in 
critical periods. These two  unions, however, operate autonomously of the  Dori-based CRUS 
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direction, and have their  own  contacts with external donors. UGVO is headed by the  president 
of CRUS. There are, however, serious problems between him and the Don-based General 
Secretary and his entourage. UGVO is comprised of big cattle owners from the town of Gorom 
Gorom, who control  a  large part of the huge cattle  market on Thursdays ( much more  important 
than the one in Dori).  They  are,  in other words, among  the most economically powerful people 
in the  Oudalan  Province, and the  extension of business within the grain trade has not been 
unfamiliar to them.  The  president of UGVO has strong  links with European donor agencies; he 
has been successfully involved in campaigns in Europe against EU  beef exports  to  West African 
coastal markets (a cause that brought him to Denmark in  1993),  and  donors  seem  to have a certain 
confidence in him. He lives, however, in  Tinidja,  112 km from Dori  in a rather remote village, 
and  it is hard for  him to keep up  to  date  with the  doings of the Dori- based leadership. UGVO  is 
therefore  increasingly  working autonomously from  the  CRUS, through the direct linkages they 
have with  foreign  donors. 
The  same patterns emerge with UGVA. Arbindais  a town 100 km west  of  Dori  on  the Djibo road. 
There are no less than 5 Unions in the town. One was started by a young man with affiliations to 
the  famous Yatenga-based NG0 6s in Ouahigouya. He started forming Nuam groupements in 
Arbinda and in  surrounding  villages,  promoting  the construction of diguettes and mobilizing 
small  credits. The union, however, broke up, as he was, according to the ones breaking away, 
“always trying to control things”. The protesters were, on the other  hand,  accused of stealing grain 
from the cereal bank.  They  have now created  their  own  union.  A third  union  was created  as  a 
union of cattle  owners, in collaboration with a dynamic CRPA agent  in order to  attract  support 
for  credits and vaccines. And finally the Red  Cross created a  Women’s  Union at a time when  they 
had certain activities going on in the Arbinda Area. UGVA was, however, the only Union 
undertaking any concrete activities. Like UGVO they consist of local chiefs, the rich etc. And like 
UGVO  they were able to circumvent  the  Dori-based  CRUS leadership. 
It seems  that  the  reasons why these  two Unions are successful are that: 
. They consist of some of the richest and most skilled local businessmen; . They have managed to keep activities among a well defined group of people; . They have gained confidence with donors outside Dori, and have been able to establish 
links  with them. 
What  is wrong with the CRUS direction in Dori?  A simple answer  to this question was given by 
Birabia, the rich  trader mentioned above: “Ces sont des  escrocs”. Or  by a friend of mine: “C’est 
les  vieunfuux types  de  Dori”. At the OXFAM office in Ouagadougou, staff  said that they were 
the  worst  case of mismanagement of donor  funds that they  had  ever experienced not even  the 
most elemental accounting, reporting, or  even showing up  at  meetings  with  international partners. 
As  it  will  be shown below the secretary general had been brought to  court and accused by the 
government-based FEER (Fonds de I’Euu et  de 1’Equipement Rural) of embezzlement. Millions 
of CFA and tonnes of millet  were not accounted  for. I met a Dutch delegation of six,  who had 
come  to Dori  with  a  proposal to finance  a  series of activities. They were, however, frustrated, 
because  nobody  showed  up at the meeting convened. 
We are,  in  other words, very far  from  the  model  initially  thought  out,  where  ACORD  should 
gradually  withdraw, and CRUS  should  take  over, running the NG0 as an increasingly 
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autonomous local organization, independent of external assistance. CRUS has instead developed 
into a mechanism for enriching a few leaders, because of lack of rigidity on  the part of the  donor 
agencies,  who  have taken the very rhetoric-rich documents of CRUS too much at face value. 
There has been very little sanctioning of the  CRUS by the donors when insufficient accounting 
and the like has occurred, and there has been too  little awareness of reports being made which 
merely pay lip-service to donor agencies by stressing what is deemed as fashionable within 
development discourse. Atampugre (1997) is rightly concerned that the disengagement of 
ACORD might not lead to an "independent" and sustainable CRUS. This is, however, an 
underestimation of the drive within the leadership of CRUS  to run CRUS  to benefit their  own 
personal interests. Certain members of the leadership have apparently not seen a discrepancy 
between prioritizing personal interests and running a non-profit, non-political organization. And 
it  is pertinent to ask whether it  at any time has been realistic to expect that the  leadership of 
CRUS should work actively to become "independent", as this would mean an  end to the supply 
of capital which they have easily been able to  seize  control of. 
4.4.3.1. Pag la Yiri 
The CRUS-story resembles the story of Pag-la-Yiri in the Boulgou province.  Pag la Yiri is a 
women's organization created  in 1975 by Monique Kabore, who is the founding  president of the 
organisation. She is, furthermore, a member of the second chamber of the parliament, and  she is 
now  based in Ouagadougou. During my  stay  in Zabri in the far south of Burkina Faso,  where 
Pag-la-Yiri is based, both president and vice president were constantly absent even though  there 
was an important meeting with an international delegation headed by representatives  from the 
World  Bank  on the second day of my stay. 
When investigating Pag La Yiri and their activities, one is immediately faced with the 
methodological problems mentioned in Chapter One: the interviewer is a potential donor,  and 
the members of Pag La Yiri see no interest in becoming "self-reliant". The women of Pag-la-Yiri 
gave a good and dynamic impression when answering the questions. One woman stood up at a 
meeting I attended, where an international delegation headed by people  from  the World  Bank 
came  to visit the association, and  said  that the mere  fact  that  she  spoke  freely now in front of all 
these people was a sign of the emancipating influence  the association had had. She  furthermore 
emphasized that the association "had enabled them to work autonomously of the CRPA, 
autonomously of the state and  now  they  knew how to avoid getting A D S  and had learned  about 
family planning." A surprising familiarity with what donors like to hear, especially donors 
favouring  the privatization of state institutions, and  the correlation between population growth 
and environmental degradation. 
The organisational strategy and philosophy of Pag la Yiri are broad and not very concrete, valuing 
traditional solidarity and mutual aid, a qualitative transformation of society for  the  benefit of the 
women, the elderly, the children, etc. 
General obiectives include: Improving the quality of life of the rural populations,  promoting  the 
blossoming of women (sic!), encouraging women's participation, improving their traditional 
economic activities, integrating women into the modem spheres of production, helping  women's 
access to education, reinforcing solidarity and mutual aid systems, and  improving the relations 
107 
between men  and women within the families. Very ambitious and at  the  same time, as noted in 
CRUS'S case, lacking in any  concrete strategy. 
The activities of the organization  likewise  cover virtually all aspects of "development", divided 
in their own presentation, into three categories of activities, communitary activities, social 
activities  and  economic  activities. 
Communitary activities include: collective  fields, construction of anti-erosive dikes (diguettes), 
wells, composting, creation of nurseries, individual as well as collective reforestations, plus 
information about the need for anti-erosion measures. 
Social  activities  include literacy campaigns, health education, nutritional education, food  aid, 
construction of latrines, maternities,  informing about ADDS, creating pharmacies, organizing 
health workers  and creating weaving and pottery workshops. 
Economic  activities, that have as their objective to render the organisation more financially 
autonomous, and also the women vis-&vis their husbands, include: 
a petrol  station, a bar, commercialisation of agricultural produce, the sale of gathered natural 
resources, transformation of natural and agricultural produce (production of oils, soap,  juice), 
cereal banks, village nurseries, grain mills, small village shops, dry season gardening, fattening 
of small ruminants, small savings  cooperatives  and credit schemes, and an organisation lorry. 
As one  can see a very wide range of activities requiring the vigorous management of large funds. 
Upon closer scrutiny, these activities were in fact defunct. Finally, it is highly questionable for 
how  long  the  ones that function will continue,  as the means  to reinvest in logistics were not 
available. 
It appeared  that the organisation was going through a period of financial crisis. After an initial 
phase  where  the organisation had received substantial support  from a number of international 
NGOs, of which the  most  important was the  Swiss "Fr2res des Hommes", the organisation 
seemed to  have lost credibility because ofits inability to manage  the  funds that had been granted 
to them. The Association is currently being supported through a Swiss support programme, but 
not to the  extent it  was before. And donor  agencies in Ouagadougou talk openly about a lack of 
"pedagogie d'argent" and the incapacity to  produce a clear vision of where the association is 
going. 
The response to this problem is interesting. An auto-evaluation was made, depicting some of the 
shortcomings of the organisation's program so far, and a was made, outlining objectives for 
the  future  and  estimating the costs.  This was stressed again  and again, as if to prove that  the 
organisation had gone through a "responsabilisation". The  sponsoring  institution, "Fr?res des 
Hommes" had vehemently recommended this. 
The self-evaluation is, however, not very informative as to  the results of the different training 
programmes. These have, according to the evaluation, all been useful and the only way to 
distinguish any difference in  the  level of success is the fact  that a few activities are highlighted 
as especially successful. No concrete reasons for this are given. Furthermore a direct link is made 
between training activities and an alleged increase in agricultural surplus, but this is not 
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quantified, which would have been interesting. There is an implicit assumption that the training 
automatically leads  to changed behavioural and production patterns, thus ignoring the  forms of 
appropriation of the  development initiative which are often central parts of self-evaluations. 
In general, the auto-evaluation cannot be said to be an evaluation per se. It is mainly a repetition 
of the objectives of the activities of the association, plus some more general thoughts about 
certain difficulties in their execution. There is a general lack of quantifiable data concerning what 
has actually been done. This is, admittedly, also difficult to  find, but it makes the report jump  to 
doubtful  conclusions  like,  for instance, that the firewood consumption has gone down because 
of introduction of stoves, which has increased humus  cover,  etc. 
The evaluation only states thenumber of training activities but reveals nothing  about their quality. 
This is a very common shortcoming when it comes  to training programmes; a lack of reflection 
about the utility of the training, and  the ill-founded assumption that training in itself will change 
rural people's behavioural patterns automatically, notwithstanding the way the training is 
conducted. Again ,the forms of appropriation, and the deconstruction and selection of the 
development  packages are not discussed. 
When questioning villagers about the training it was  often  stated  that  the women of Pag  La Yiri 
"Came  from ZabrC and told us a lot of things about  the need to organize". This was by some 
villagers  deemed a waste of time, as this information revealed nothing new. Others stated that 
"even  though  we know it all already there is no harm in having it repeated." But again, it was 
unanimously stated that it was the provision of logistics which was considered the most valuable 
assistance. 
The quality of the training was, however, a central point of critique from CRPA, who openly 
contested the superficial way Pag-la-Yiri conducted their extension activities. This  critique,  on 
the other  hand, should be weighed against the  fact  that these two institutions are in potential 
competition for external resources for  this  purpose. 
The Pag-la-Yiri five year D I ~  is an equally weak document. More than a plan, it is a description 
of a number of features of rural society and a shopping list of activities that  the association would 
like  external agents to  finance. 
The  execution of activities is not specified in detail. Instead some general explanations are given 
as to why certain activities are important, but their linkages are not  always evident; their  purpose 
is implicitly  assumed  (trees  should be planted to improve soil fertility, reduce degradation and 
secure fuelwood supplies; men should be educated so that the workload of the  women be reduced, 
etc.) 
The implementation costs of the plan are also unrealistic. 5,3 billion CFA is the estimated cost, 
of which 3,9 billion is to come from external sources and 1,4 billion  is to be mobilized within the 
organization. Both contributions seem extremely ambitious. 
After a short period where Pag La Yiri constituted an important source of capital in the remote 
Zabr6 area it  seems valid to conclude that  the association suffers the same problems as depicted 
by Maclure and Atampugre. The minute donor fundings disappear things start falling apart. It  is, 
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however, very doubtful that a more careful “matching  to the absorptive and managerial capacity” 
of Pag La Yiri  (to use Atampugre’s  expression) would have  promoted  greater  sustainability. In 
fact, addressing  the  urge  for  sustainability in a  case  like this might  be  missing  the  point. And in 
many  ways the association has  been  successful.  It  has  given jobs to a number of “animateurs” and 
Mme. Kabork now has her seat  in  the  Second  Chamber. 
Pag la Yiri  is now waiting  for  donors to return after these  planning  assessment  exercises. In a 
sense, this is another example of the “cargo cult” effects of development  intervention.  Christoplos 
(1994b)  refers to  cases where local  NGOs have made  similar  self-assessments,  whereafter they 
were shocked  to see that after the not too  positive results of these, the aid was suspended.  The 
local NG0 had thought that  when  they  had made such an assessment,  disbursements  could  also 
be expected to continue. “For them the assessment was a ritual which would  bring,  not  repel  the 
cargo. (..) their training had  been a form of initiation,  whereby they had learned  to  perform  these 
rituals”  (Christoplos, 1994b p. 11). 
4.4.3.2. A new look at NGOs? 
There is a need to change the  way we look  at these NGOs. To  look at them as “the  resurgence of 
civil  society“ may not be the most fruitful approach. It seems more fruitful  to look at them as 
what Bierschenk and Olivier  de Sardan have termed  “development  brokers”  (Olivier de  Sardan 
1995). In this connection, it is important to stress what Boissevain (1974) said about brokers: that 
in order  to  function effectively as such, one has  to  withhold information from  the  actors  between 
whom  the  brokers  are  intermediating. 
It is, furthermore, debateable as to  whether  this pluralizing of the development apparatus and the 
entry of the  NGOs on the  development  scene  has  led to greater  transparency,  higher  quality  aid 
and more  participatory development projects. The  examples of CRUS and Pag la Yiri  seem to 
suggest  that  this  pluralization may instead open up a new type of clientilism,  where  mastery of 
developmentalist  jargon  is an essential  tool. 
At this  point it is worth noting that  CRUS  and  Pag La Yiri are by no means considered as failures 
within NGO-work in BurkinaFaso. Quite the contrary! CRUS and Pag  la Yiri are  in  fact  seen  as 
some of the more interesting attempts to  establish grass-roots organizations, not only in  Burkina 
Faso, but  in  the  whole of West Africa, and  at several conferences  that I have been to,  these  two 
institutions  have been highlighted as especially interesting. After  having  looked  into  what  they 
have done  more  thoroughly  (but by no means exhaustively),  a  quite  depressing  picture  emerges 
of the NG0 scene  in West Africa, if these are to  be seen as the  success  stories of the  region.” 
15 An interesting event occurred in early 1999, when all of a sudden I ran into an old 
acquaintance from the time when I lived in Senegal (1989-92) at  the  CDR in Copenhagen. 
He was at the CDR attending a seminar,  as the “Nature and  Society-theme” had manged 
a session where people were to come up with examples of success stories from rural 
development in Africa. My Senegalese  friend had found an interesting case  from West 
Africa - Pag la Yiri. His knowledge of the  organization  was  however  limited to meetings 
with the leadership, talks with observers and written documents. 
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A final point. The  idea of NGOs somehow being more “locally grounded” or  “sustainable” by 
virtue of their non-state status seems founded on normative assumptions of development thinkers 
rather than on empirical evidence. It stems from a belief  that  there is a clear distinction to be made 
between “state” and “non-state’’ institutions, plus that the former are by nature more  inefficient. 
The ideas behind  the DANIDA projects  that  greater  efficiency  and sustainability can  be  ensured 
through contracting NGOs is not based on experiences from  the  field,  but on assumptions  as  to 
what would be good development. And, furthermore, they seem to  be assumptions devoid  of a 
more serious analysis of what is meant by efficiency and sustainability. 
4.4.4 Development  Institutions  At Village Level 
Ferguson  (1998)  cautions us not to operate with a rigid topography of development, where the 
village “level” always ranks lowest, and the state level  in Ouagadougou highest. This topographic 
discourse  tends to place our development thinking within certain institutional  frameworks  that 
are unintentionally incompatible with “local” ways of conceiving social change. A typical 
example of this could be overemphasizing the nation state as an institution through which social 
mobilization  can be organized. 
When it nevertheless seems to make sense to make an analysis of institutions on village  level, 
this is because the village is often targeted as the social structure at which development is aimed. 
Only quite recently has it become accepted in academic as well as development  spheres  that he 
African village is not necessarily  indigenously egalitarian, an example of a primitive communism. 
Belloncle‘s (1980) idea that the egalitarian structure of West African villages constituted a vital 
triumph for  the  peasants, as this enabled the creation of strong peasants’ associations, has been 
effectively  refuted (Bayart 1989, Olivier de Sardan 1995). Two  things, however, remain vital: 
The  idea is still alive within development discourse (the  World  Bank boldly states  that  creation 
of farmers  associations  in Africa can effectively contribute to giving  the means for  action as 
“L‘action collective  est  profondement  ancrie  dans la tradition  des  socicftis Africaines” (World 
Bank 1989:123)) Second, the thing is that it is interesting how Belloncle could reach this 
conclusion at all. Two decades later, it seems obvious to look at rural West African societies as 
gerontocratic  and hierarchical, emphasizing the knowledgeability of the social actor  and  the 
power relations he/she has to live with. Belloncle,  however, did meticulous fieldwork; how could 
he reach conclusions  that seem so obviously erroneous today? 
It is with these reservations in  mind that the analysis of village institutions is to be  made. The 
DANIDA projects do not operate in  an  institutional  void. There is a long tradition of organization 
of rural populations in Burkina Faso. The “Comiti de Gestion de Terroir” of the project is not  the 
only attempt to organize the villagers.  Historically, it has always been a condition for  connection 
with external  agents (parastatals, state institutions, extension services, development  aid)  that a 
village be organized in some kind of cooperative institution. Virtually all Burkina Faso  villages 
have a ”Groupement”, organized by the encadreur and with a formal legal status. These 
groupements have served as the institutional framework through which credits have been directed, 
which has in many cases reduced their legitimacy in the eyes of the villagers, as groupement 
leaders have gotten away with  not reimbursing their debts, thus impeding others from  obtaining 
credit. With credit schemes vanishing and agricultural input provision privatized, the large 
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majority of these groupements are virtually non-existent, undertaking no  activities,  and without 
any dynamism if not brought to life by external funding agencies. A farmer  stated  that "we have 
the groupement in order to attract aid. Therefore the unity within the groupement is important, 
if you  don't show unity, the donor will find another village." This quotation quite well shows how 
far we are from  the Rochdale-model of the farmers' cooperative, where peasants unite to confront 
outside usurpers in egalitarian solidarity. Laurent (1996) describes the same mechanism. A 
villager tells how, after having successfully obtained a credit for  purchasing donkey carts, the 
neighbouring villages come  to them to ask how they did it. They then tell them to organize in 
groupements and make demands as groups to the donors. A villager in Boulgou told me that "the 
problem in our village is that we don't know  how to attract the people of development. We have 
created groupements, but it does not help." 
In principle,  the CRPA has its agents in every village in Burkina Faso. As  mentioned earlier, 
every village has an "encadreur", or extension  officer, covering between 10 to 15 villages. This 
officers job is to assist the  farmers, through the groupement, in learning  how to apply new 
agricultural techniques and come up with advice as  to how to use "new" inputs and technologies 
like animal traction,  fertilizers, pesticides and fungicides. Following  problems with bad 
management of funds, (and ideological assumptions on the part of the World Bank), the supply 
and commercialization of these inputs are however no longer part of the CRF'A staff's 
responsibility, they are to be taken care of  by private traders. The encadreur is now only supposed 
to pass on information and carry out training. 
The encudreurs constitute an important link between the state institutions and  the farmers. Unlike 
with  project-  and NGO-intervention, there has been a certain continuity in  the  farmedencadreur 
relationship, and especially in the south of Burkina Faso, where cash crops are more widespread, 
the encadreur has played an important role in farmers' commercial endeavours. Earlier the 
encadreur also apparently played a role as facilitator of access to animal vaccines. Furthermore, 
the relationship between encadreurs and farmers are according to my own investigations rarely 
hostile. A problem is that the current way the encadrement is run by the World Bank 
PRSAP-project is very expensive, and the encadreur is, as mentioned, left without much to offer 
the farmers. 
Another more unpopular local institution is the "paysan  forestier", existing  in every village. As 
mentioned above, the "Service de 1'Environnement" has the mandate to control and sanction the 
illicit cutting of trees in the countryside. They therefore appoint a local villager who is responsible 
for reporting violators of the rules  to  the Service, who will thereafter issue a fine.  The "Paysan 
Forestier" then receives a percentage of this fine. The "paysan  forestier" is also  responsible  for 
a nursery, which in the Dori area functions very badly. The "paysan forestie?' laments that after 
planting the seedlings, there are no means to assure that the  young trees are not eaten immediately 
by goats, which makes their efforts a little pointless.  The "paysan forestier" is in a very delicate 
position between the unpopular Service de Z'Environnement and his  fellow  villagers. According 
to certain sources he is often very unpopular, and he is often a young farmer,  who after a certain 
time as paysan  forestier eventually migrates. Many farmers in fact refuse to  be nominated paysan 
forestier, as they do not wish  to challenge their relationship with their fellow villagers, even 
though the position may be economically beneficial. 
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The organization of the project’s Comifis de Gesfion de Terroir can  be  explained  in part by the 
relatively meagre impact of the groupements. But a number of other  initiatives have been taken 
to organize the villagers, mainly with the objective of creating institutions capable of channelling 
external aid. With the pluralization of Burkinan society, a number of NGOs have created village 
associations and have been relatively successful in claiming that these groupemenfs reflect a more 
genuine organization at “ grass-roots” level than those recognized by the government institutions. 
The most significant initiative of this kind in the  Sahelian Burkina Faso is the  above mentioned 
organization of Groupements Villageois under the umbrella organization CRUS, grouping 
together more than 600 Groupements in the  four  Sahelian  provinces of Burkina Faso, these 
groupement again being organized in 26 unions. However, these unions and groupemenfs are  only 
visible when they have succeeded in getting some kind of external funding.  The  CRUS has, 
furthermore, recently faced  severe management problems, as mentioned above. 
The villages of Burkina Faso have systems of chieftaincy with different degrees of legitimacy and 
power. Each village has a chef de village, who  was the mediator between the colonial power and 
the village, one reason why the title is traditionally not very popular. In an attempt to break with 
the past and with “traditional” power structures, a new institution, the “diligue“’ was introduced 
by the  Sankara regime. The deligue‘ was supposed to work alongside the “Cornifis  pour la 
Difense de la Rivolufion” with the implementation of the new acts initiated along with the 
change of regime. In the countryside this especially had significance in the implementation of the 
RAF, the “Refomze Agraire Fonciire”, in which traditional claims to land were deemed 
illegitimate, causing certain movements of populations towards the south where especially Mossi 
people from  the  densely populated Plateau moved to new areas claiming land under to  the new 
legislation. 
In the Dori area these institutions are very weak. The Comitis  pour la Difense de la Rivolution 
have  vanished, the chef de village has most often been replaced by the de‘liggui, and even the 
de‘ligui is not necessarily in a very powerful position, serving mainly as  the mediator between 
the government  agencies  and the village. As this  most often entails little else than attending 
meetings in Dori, the post as de‘ligui is not always one in  which large resources are invested. In 
one of the villages visited, PCtCcolC, it  was said that the diligui had been chosen by the villagers 
because  “he was in Dori all the time anyway”. Apart from these formal institutions there is 
normally a religious setup of imams with a certain influence, and often a number of competing 
clans within the  village  or competing quarfiers within the village. 
All these local institutions are, however, living a silent life but are characterized by being 
instruments that can be revitalized if donors are on the lookout for institutions that  they  can  attach 
their  development  assistance to. How these conflicts are played out can  be illustrated by two 
examples from the villages of BoudoungCl and Kachirga, near Dori. 
4.5 Case 1 - The village of BoudoungB 
BoudoungCl is a village roughly 15 km east of Dori, consisting of fulanis and their former slaves, 
the rimaybe. Everybody in the village is somehow family related, and are all called Diallo.  There 
are roughly 800 inhabitants.  The inhabitants are mainly agro-pastoralists, and have strong  links 
with the town of Dori. A large  portion of the younger male  inhabitants  have migrated, mainly to 
Ouagadougou or Cote  d’Ivoire. Since the revolution, the “Chef du village” has not enjoyed the 
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power he used to and problems within the village! are now mainly  settled through the diligu&, the 
person appointed as the village government representative, and through calling upon authorities 
in Dori. 
In BoudoungCl there is a groupement villageois recognized by the CRPA, a groupement organized 
by CRUS and a Comite‘ de  gestion de Terroir, organized by the DANIDA project. 
Between the two groupements there is a considerable straddling and contingency. They have  the 
same president, the famous  (notorious) DD, who is General Secretary of CRUS  and  livesg in 
Dori,  and is the  brother of the de‘ligue‘. DD has had connections with influential people in  Dori 
and Ouagadougou, and has thereby been able to mobilize funds for credits, earlier through 
USAID financing, and recently through the Government-run FEER (Fonds de Z’Eau et de 
I’Equipement Rural). The considerable FEER-credits, around 60 portions, were however granted 
very selectively and, according to certain sources, only 5 households in fact benefitted. 
Furthermore, FEER has severe problems with the repayments of the credits; DD has not only 
taken  large  commissions in disbursing  the credits, he has allegedly also pocketed money that 
villagers  have reimbursed, and FEER has now taken DD to court. He is, however,  backed by 
influential  people in Dori, in particular the mayor. 
In BoudoungC1, however,  certain people were unsatisfied with the way the FEER credits were 
managed, and therefore a small group was established opposing the groupements, and at the same 
time  finding  support with the  DANIDA project animateur, who was aware of DD’s  strong  and 
weak  points, and therefore  eager  to establish a CGT outside a DD-influenced framework. The 
animateur thus willingly admits that this group is maybe  not “representative”, but on the  other 
hand,  he  says  that it is easy to work with. This group, led by a certain DB, one of the  richest 
villagers,  controls what is considered  the most important asset of the project;  the relatively 
modest  credit line. This  has  led  Mr.  DD to try to persuade the project director of the  DANIDA 
project to  drop  this new group  as  the  core of the CGT, claiming that they are drug  addicts (sic), 
which, however, does not seem to be  the case. This attempt to monopolize the  project  activities 
has  failed. The current situation  is, thus, a modus  vivendi, where there  seems  to  be a general 
acceptance  in the two camps  that they “divide the cake” like it has been done. The  credits of 
FEER - much bigger than the DANIDA-credits, are in the eyes of the involved villagers a one- 
time  event,  not likely to  be repeated (or reimbursed), so there is no need  to  have hard feelings. 
The  DANIDA credits are, on the other hand, rather insignificant, and  not worth creating too much 
of a fuss  about. 
4.6 Case 2 - The  village of Katchirga 
Katchirga is a village situated roughly 20 km from Dori, 5 km. from BoudoungCl. Here,  things 
have  developed  somehow  more dramatically. Katchirga is a large village, with roughly 2000 
inhabitants, and with moreserious divisions, it is known as a “village compliqu?’ by the Dori- 
based development projects. 
During the Sankara Revolution in 1983, a “Comite‘pour la Defense de la Re‘volution”, led by the 
current De‘lkgue‘ and an important local trader and tailor, AO, seized power  over  the  traditional 
“Chef de Village”, a very autocratic leader. This caused a certain division in the  village between 
the clan around the chief and the new  leaders. The chief  died  in the late 80s. The  CDR  long gone, 
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the dklkgue‘ and A 0  have maintained power, but the sons of the old chief are involved in a bitter 
conflict with them, a conflict that has been fuelled by the intervention of development institutions. 
DD has also provided credits to Katchirga, more than 100 portions, most of 120.000 CFA each, 
(certain only 20.000 for fattening of small ruminants), and in Katchirga it was A 0  who decided 
who was to benefit from  these  credits. According to himself and  the  dilkguk, this selection was 
based on the ability of the adherents to reimburse and to come up with a plan for investments and 
reimbursements. However according to other sources only about ten compounds  have received 
credits according to their relatioship with AO, everybody in these compounds has received 
(“ntEme les femmes en ont recu”, as  an angry supporter of the other camp noted), reimbursements 
are extremely low, DD has taken large commissions, and has furthermore not reimbursed credits, 
people have  trusted him as middleman. 
A 0  is also in control of the  CGT.  The project animateur apparently tried to affiliate the other 
group,  based the old chefdu village’s family, but without success, they backed out after an initial 
attempt. The credit lines of the DANIDA project are thus controlled by the small group of people 
arouns AO. 
Recently, this conflict has taken a dramatic turn. The dklkggukhas gained control of the board in 
charge of the management of the school, and has started using school  logistics  for alternative 
purposes. This has caused the temporary closure of the school as the majority of the parents have 
withdrawn their children. Now the opposing forces in the village are increasingly trying to involve 
outside powers to  mediate  the conflict. 
The delegue, however, has apparently done this for  some time. Through a broker he has bought 
himself protection from the politician Sanda Dicko,  who has very close ties with the Dori-based 
MP Ismael Diallo. Furthermore, they  are on good terms with DD, who enjoys a certain  protection 
from the mayor. 
This makes it difficult for  the sons of the late village chief. They call upon the prefet, but he is 
unable to act against someone protected by Sanda  and  the mayor. Furthermore they have called 
the attention of Nassirou Dicko, a leader of a credit  union, and at the same time local leader of 
PAI, a leading opposition party. Nassirou has family connections in Katchirga, and though a 
member of the opposition, also has the trust of the mayor. Nassirou claims to  be working for the 
family of the chief out of indignation, which is very likely as this is not contrary to nourishing 
political campaigns. But he apparently does not have the power to force changes. Getting support 
from the political leaders in Dori requires substantial means that the traditional leaders of 
Katchirga apparently do  not have. 
4.7 Association and power 
What are the interesting things to be learned from  these two cases?  First of all, that the project 
activities enter a battlefield of political power, not a homogenous village  that has no institutions 
that  deal with natural resource management. Second, that the project immediately becomes an 
instrument in the hands of the different political opponents. Third, it is interesting to see that 
certain  dichotomies and systems of categorization do not seem to be valid in this  case.  The 
“modern”  local power (the de‘lkggue3 gets protection from leaders that are traditional (but  at the 
same time representatives of the state, the traditional  leaders (The sons of the late chief) go to  the 
opposition and to theprefet. The dichotomy modern/traditional seems very difficult  to  purport, 
but  can be reinvented in case of new conflicts in an opportunistic setting. Finally, the villain in 
the  eyes of the northein  development projects, DD, straddles shrewdly between a number of 
social actors, all with their interests to pursue.And  how do we  draw the line between civil society 
and the state in these  particular cases? Finally the dichotomy often held as necessary if the 
development is to succeed, between development and  politics, seems hard to uphold. The project 
chief  technical advisor of the German PSB-project claimed that it was essential to  keep  local 
politics out of the activities of the projects, “what the mayor does has nothing to do with 
development”. If however you treat issues like credit  and  natural resource management as outside 
the political spheres, the result is likely to be limited as evaluations of the different PSB-projects 
also  show. 
Graphically we can show the way the  PSBDANIDA project  is inserted into the Don institutional 
framework in the  following way: 
bcal ”’Ttadi t i d” 
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This table is meant to indicate the institutional framework within which a project like 
PSBDanida is inserted. I have chosen to place the project in the middle, the state at the  top and 
the  villagers  at  the  bottom of the figure, in order not to create unnecessary confusion. I should 
equally have extended the use of arrows to  connect  all of the boxes, which would have been more 
correct,  but  at  the  expense of aesthetics. An arrow between the NG0 box and  the  traditional 
power box would also  have been suitable. 
As one can see, and as mentioned above, it is very  hard to distinguish between what is “state” 
and what is “society” or “civil society”. Furthermore it is difficult to operate at any given 
institutional “level”,  as networking goes on beyond these spatial categories. It is also  difficult  to 
speak of any  specific  space wherein power is exercised. 
In the  Boulgou province it was neither exclusively the government that had tried  to organize 
villagers in groupements. Pag-la-Yiri and a smaller NGO, Dakupa had equally tried to organize 
villagers. It, however,  seems that their highly acclaimed more participatory and  “grass-roots” 
approach does not differ significantly from more top-down  approaches  in the eyes  of the villagers. 
On the contrary,  it was at  times stated that “those people talked too much”, but  apparently had 
difficulties in providing  more concrete improvements. 
As noted by Olivier de Sardan, (1999) village institutions are often extremely weak and  lack 
legitimacy.  Institutions  like the “chef du village” and the “diligue“’ are associated with the 
government,  which is often  best avoided, and institutions like  the groupements are associated 
with projects, whose objectives remain  obscure for the villagers. In times when external  support 
declines,  their  importance therefore diminishes as well. The coexisting of these  institutions  at 
village level normally does not create problems. Villagers often adapt a “sweeping  the conflicts 
under the  carpet”-strategy (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan 1998), because  people are more or 
less  doomed  to stay together: conflicts are downplayed (especially in accounts  to  foreigners); 
systems of recompensation are encouraged; and in Seno conflicts are often solved by people 
moving to other places, or deliberately migrating.  Village institutions are often useful instruments 
in  internal  village  conflicts, where competing groups of villagers might use the groupement of 
a given project  or NG0 to strengthen their own power base. One therefore often sees that local 
conflicts between different groups in a village are enhanced or played out through these 
institutions, and the arrival of a new external agent  at times triggers off a struggle about who will 
benefit  from  this  new  intervention. 
4.8 Project  intervention at village level 
As mentioned  earlier in this chapter, the DANIDA projects intervene at village level in the 
training and establishment of village committees, credit, soil- and water conservation  measures 
and water supplies. In the following I shall further examine the different activities,  emphasizing 
the soil and water conservation measures, as I find them especially revelatory as an example of 
the complex  relations  between  donors and recipients. 
The two DANIDA projects have both had a very  slow start, as  it  has been a primary objective of 
both of the  projects  to  assure that a thorough diagnosis of the problems was made  and that 
solutions  to them were proposed in a way which would be sustainable and  at  the  same time 
participatory. As a matter of fact  this has meant that the Boulgou project only embarked upon 
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more concrete activities very recently,  after my visits to Burkina Faso. This new phase  follows 
a very long “phase diagnostique”, which caused some frustration among the farmers, who  asked 
me politely if the project was never going tostop asking questions and start  aiding  the  villagers. 
The Sen0 project also had a slow start, as it  was seen as essential to  make a thorough  diagnosis 
of what the problems were before outlining a policy for natural resource management  in the 
region. Furthermore, certain experiments were carried out, using new agricultural techniques 
which were seen as promising, especially the cultivation of water plants  in a lake near Dori for 
fodder production (An experiment which eventually turned out unfeasible). And finally work was 
done to work out a “zonage” of the project territory in order to help create  the  most  adequate 
local institutions for the management of the natural resources. A long “phase diagnostique” was 
followed by  an abrupt change.  The Project had a new CTA with an entirely different  approach. 
He found  it ridiculous to go on for years without arriving at concrete activities  and  therefore 
forced through a number of activities. After two years he was succeeded by the present leadership 
and no foreign leader has been in  charge of the project since 1994. 
In trying to answer the problem raised roughly 100 pages ago concerning how  to  assess  the 
impact of a project like the  PSBDanida, I shall in the following pages look more thoroughly into 
perhaps the most important activity of the project, namely diguette construction. The construction 
of the diguetfes constitutes an interesting example of the difficulties of assessing  impacts,  but it 
also pinpoints a more fundamental problem involved in aid assessment, namely the  positivist 
point of departure of many of the assessments, which  hinder a more hermeneutical, historical and 
discourse-oriented approach to  the analysis of development (Marcussen & Reenberg  1999). 
4.9 An example: Diguette construction at the  PSBlDANIDA  project 
The construction of diguettes in Burkina Faso has been one of the main soil conservation 
activities promoted by development agencies, governmental and non-governmental alike,  ever 
since the  desertification question came up in  the seventies ( Reij et al. 1996). The diguettes have, 
however, rarely been analysed as anything other than a soil and water conservation measure,  and 
are also seen as such by the Danish projects. In the following I shall go into more detail 
concerning this question of diguette construction as it provides a revelatory example of the 
donorkcipient interface  and the different logics that are confronted when a development  project 
is initiated. It becomes a concrete example of how the interpretation of the  notions  onto  which 
a development project is built leads  to unintended and unanticipated results, and I find  it is a 
good entry point to a more critical review of some of these central notions. 
4.9.1 Diguette construction  in  Burkina  Faso 
Diguettes are lines of stones placed in fields along contour lines with the aim of braking overland 
water flow and encouraging the deposition of sediment upslope (Batterbury, 1997). Digueffe 
construction is  fairly simple and cheap, but very labour demanding. The construction of diguettes 
can ,however, take place in the dry season at times when other agricultural activities are at a halt, 
where labour is normally relatively abundant. Digueffes have  become  quite widespread in rural 
Burkina  Faso in the course of the last two decades, especially in the central densely-populated 
Mossi Plateau. 
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Diguette construction has been seen by many development projects as an effective answer  to 
reverting  the degradation of agricultural drylands, and even of recuperating degraded soils in 
rural Burkma Faso. It is, however, a daunting task to estimate more precisely to what extent these 
initiatives are effective in rendering more sustainable the land use  or boosting the yields. On-farm 
trials  have been very difficult to undertake, as precise measurements of the yields before the 
construction of dikes are generally not available, yields differ  from of year to year because of 
erratic rainfall and all sorts of other contingencies (workforce availability, manure  availability, 
insect attacks, theft, animal intrusion, fire etc.), which makes more precise estimates very 
difficult. In Burkina  Faso a number of attempts have been  made (For a thorough review see 
Batterbury, 1997). Gubbels (1994) cites what he terms “informal evaluation”, indicating  that  the 
construction of diguettes on  this project in the Yatenga Province in the northwest had improved. 
yields by 40 % on treated versus untreated fields. Other tests (cited in  Atampugre,  1993) show 
increases of between 12 and 64 %. It is, however, very difficult to make a ceteris paribus 
estimate. At the same time there seems to be agreement that more time has to pass in order  to be 
able to assess more long-term impacts of diguettes. 
The most thorough analyses have been  made  under the auspices of Chris Reij, and the results are 
summarized in a World  Bank  Paper (Critchley, Reij & Seznec, 1992). This report notes that earth 
bunds promoted in the seventies were a failure, while the introduction of stone  bunds in the 
eighties was a “success  story.” Whereas approximately 150 hectares were treated in 1982/83, this 
had  jumped  to an estimated 5000 hectares in the dry season of 1987/88,  farmers  “engaging 
voluntarily in the field.” This  report estimates an overall yield  improvement of 40 % the  first 
year after construction. The 40 % increase is estimated through measuring treated fields vs. non- 
treated  fields. 
Certain estimates have been made in the nineties in connection with the  “Six-S”-NG0  based in 
Yatenga and financed partly  by DanChurchAid (Seddon & Kafando, 1996). These estimates state 
that a difference of between 15 and  165% has been observed between treated and untreated fields. 
Nothing is, however, revealed as to how these measurements have been made, neither are we told 
much about what the yield would have been on the treated field if the diguettes had not been 
constructed. In their discussion of the diguettes they largely refer to Atampugre. 
In the  course of the eighties, and  on into the nineties, diguettes develop  into  one of the  most 
widespread forms of natural resource management support from international donors  to  Burkina 
Faso farmers. Long-term assessments of yield impacts have, however, not been made yet 
(Batterbury,  1997). Furthermore, it is worth noting that investigations rarely take  into  account 
that certain  actors have no interest in proving  that  they  are not  effective, a point  that  shall be 
dealt with below.  There are, however, numerous accounts of farmers  and aninateurs praising 
the diguettes, “With diguettes, we  renew our hopes”, “the suffering (of constructing  them) is 
worthwhile” , “everybody  now  ventures to Mr.  Ouedraogo’s  farm to see his diguettes” etc. And 
project aid-workers likewise often refer to the farmers’ interest when justifying diguette- 
construction. 
However there is a concern  that  it seems that farmers do not continue constructing diguettes after 
a project intervention phase, even though they praise them as very helpful. Even though the 
diguettes seem to boost yields, they  remain a very labourious endeavour. The  transport of stones 
often requires the assistance of a truck as  stones are often not locally available. And the  work 
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involved in the construction of the diguettes amounts  to approx. 50 person daysha (Vlaar,  cited 
in  Batterbury  1997),  depending on the given surroundings. 
4.9.2 Searching for reasons for diguette construction 
Interviews with farmers in villages where the PSBDANIDA- project was operating  made  it 
apparent that an analysis of the relations between the farmers and the project that supported  the 
construction of the diguettes was crucial. In this area, farmers were seemingly much less 
enthusiastic regarding the diguettes than they were said to be in the central and Southern  part of 
the country, and  than they had  been  in the Boulgou  area earlier during my fieldwork there. Again 
there might be obvious explanations, that I was not able  to  quantify, as this takes many years of 
on-farm  studies, and as  mentioned above is associated with a long array of methodological 
measurement  problems.  Explanations may include  that: 
diguettes are more  effective  in high rainfall areas; 
diguettes make most sense when extensification of the cultivated area is difficult; 
diguettes make  most  sense  where labour is not  the principal production bottleneck. 
But apart from these  rather  ‘technical’  explanations it seemed necessary to  go more thoroughly 
into an analysis of the relations between the farmers and the development institutions  promoting 
the diguettes in order to understand why  they were being constructed. As Bierschenk states: “one 
must begin with  an analysis of the project’s participants and other interest groups, the  goals and 
reasons for their  negotiations, resources they have at  hand - in  short of their own respective 
projects”  (Bierschenk 1988: 174). 
Complicated  relations prevail between the project animateur who was hired by the DANIDA- 
project in order to  assist  farmers  in  the  construction of the diguettes, and the  villagers. It is the 
task of the project animateur to create village committees that are going to deal with the 
management of local natural resources,  according  to  the  objectives of the DANIDA gestion de 
terroirs- project. This work includes the creation of Comites d’Actions Spkccifiques (CAS)  which 
are mainly established to organize diguette construction.  The animateur of the project is under 
pressure  from  his boss  to produce  results.  Successful credits disbursed and reimbursed,  high 
numbers of truckloads of stones for diguettes delivered, high numbers of meetings with 
committees  from different villages held, large numbers of training programmes executed, all these 
activities are signs that he  does a good job.  When the animateur of the DANIDA-project  comes 
to a  village proposing the activities of the project, he  therefore  usually ends up with a small group 
of people with whom collaboration is possible. This group  might  represent the people possessing 
a certain power in the  village, or it  might be an opposition minority that tries to use the project 
to strengthen its own situation. In order to produce results, the animateur is furthermore tempted 
to persuade  the villagers to embark on the project activities, even if  they do not  immediately think 
it is  a  good idea. 
The  villagers, notwithstanding the participatory character of the project, often still fear sanctions 
from the project, such as they are used  to if they do not comply  with  the government institutions 
like,  for  instance,  the Service de Z‘Environnement. This  results in the paradoxical situation  that 
villagers sometimes engage in  work  in connection with the project when  they don’t see the  point, 
or even consider  it  stupid. This is the case  especially with the diguettes. The first year the truck 
arrives and everybody shows that they are grateful  that the project intervenes, so they take off to 
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collect stones. The next year people are more reluctant, it’s hot and there is a baptism in  the 
village, SO they send their sons off, they have never ridden in a truck and are eager to participate 
in  anything which disrupts everyday routines. The third year, however, the animateur finds  it 
difficult to mobilize  people, so he says to the villagers that if  they build the diguettes, he will 
make an  effort  to  see  that  the World Food  Programme provides a truckload of food  aid to the 
village. As he turns out to be unable to fulfill this promise, relations between the animateur and 
the village worsen, and he is often left with a small group of villagers constituting the Comite‘ de 
Gestion de Terroirs and the CAS, who will then decide on credit grants and other project 
elements  that  interest  people. 
James Ferguson (Pers. Comm.) suggested to me that the construction of diguettes might  be 
interpreted as  the  construction of “monuments of Development” in a society where magical 
notions of causality prevail. Referring to his own fieldwork in Lesotho on a rural development 
project making terracing for highland agriculture, he quoted a farmer’s remark that “I bet that in 
the US. farmers have terraces all over the place”. He had thereby gotten the idea that the 
construction of anti-erosive measures were not only to be seen as such but equally as a 
demarcation of symbolic frontiers. By adhering to these activities and following the. instructions 
of the development  project,  the villagers adhere to a modernity, which for  symbolic reasons is 
understood as a strategy to get out of their misery. The diguette is a symbol of their will to work 
actively for their development, and their will to submit themselves to people that apparently know 
what this development is and how to  get there. Supplementing this view, P-J. Laurent (1996, p. 
13 ), in his analysis of peasant associations among the Mossi in  central Burkina Faso, holds that 
certain villagers, especially the young with the  creation of their development association create 
a “culture of development”, based on unity and conversion to Christianity. These  two  elements 
are important as they are protective against  threats of witchcraft, very present in Mossi society. 
Simultaneously, they are consistent with adhering to a more “Western” discourse of moderniza- 
tion.  Laurent is thus in  line with the thinking of Ferguson, development becomes a ritual you 
perform  to  contract with external forces. 
Interviewing farmers in the villages round Dori about their views on the diguettes did  not directly 
corroborate these interesting views. Villagers were, perhaps because my interpreter had a good 
reputation in the villages, quite straightforward in describing benefits and inadequacies of the 
diguettes, and when questioned more thoroughly, quickly started denigrating the diguettes: 
“Ouad’Allahi! We are  Fulanis and  we like to show other  people  respect 
so we have participated in the construction of diguettes. But these  diguettes,  it’s 
really no use at  all, and they can even be damaging, creating one part of the field 
full of sand, and another  as  bare  laterite.  They don‘t take into  account  the wind 
erosion”(O1der farmer in  the village of Belgou). 
“With the  diguettes we can no longer control the circulation of water in 
the field, and we risk waterlogging. Ifwe need to halt the run08 we make a small 
dike of soil - this  we  have  always  done” (Farmer in the village of Petecolk). 
“The idea that diguettes should  be of any use is stupid. And even if it  were 
effective  it  would  never  be worth the  very hard  work of constructing them and 
paying for the truck.” (Farmer in village of Boudoung6l.j 
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As one can see, no hocus pocus, but  arguments  based on a rationality embedded in elements  like 
profitability, productivity and security. With such a clear rejection of the effectiveness of the 
diguettes as a productive measure it is tempting to conclude that they construct them  to  maintain 
contact  with  the project.’6 
However  it seems that the diguettes function as “monuments of development”  for  certain  other 
actors. The German anthropologist working at the “Projet  Agro-Ecologie”, a project  supporting 
the CRPA, stated  that this project especially encouraged the construction of diguettes, because 
“Here,  at  least we do something concrete and visible” (as opposed to training programmes where 
the actual  result is obviously very difficult to  measure).  The question as to whether  it is among 
donors  or  peasants  that magical notions of causality prevail may  furthermore  be  exemplified in 
the training in “environmental awareness” which also faces problems on village level. An 
animateur told me that “it is very difficult to  make peasants understand that  it is through  the 
planting  of  trees  that we can increase rainfall and halt desertification.” But  the causal link 
between tree planting and  rainfall is highly contestable, and is very  likely to mystify the villagers 
further  as to the capabilities of the project. 
4.9.3 Opposing reasons for diguette  construction 
I find it revelatory to use the example of the digueffes to illustrate in a wider context, the 
villagers’ positionings vis-a-vis development projects. If farmers are indeed rational, why do they 
accept the continued construction of diguettes? Below, I shall attempt to list a number of reasons 
why donors and recipients alike may have their perfectly valid reasons for this. Why  do donors 
encourage the construction of diguettes? Why do they see it as a good idea? It has to do  with  the 
influence of certain development discourses prevailing within Sahelian  natural  resource 
management: 
. Diguettes are a means to regain sustainability. Diguettes are seen as an instrument to 
restore an ecological equilibrium distorted by population increase and  other  unfortunate 
incidences. It is, however, highly contestable whether an ecological equilibrium  ever 
existed within Sahelian natural resource utilization practices. What has been  termed the 
“equilibrium paradigm”  is  being increasingly criticized (Meams & Leach 1996, Scoones 
1994, Hoben 1998), as  being an ahistoric narrative, with no basis in realities of the past. 
Natural resource management practices in Burkina  Faso  have not passed the threshold 
from  being sustainable to becoming unsustainable, it simply does not make  sense  to 
establish carrying capacity limits, which are the natural consequences of this  line of 
thought. 
. Diguettes provide a technical solution to the problem of development: a solution which 
is low-cost, locally available and  need  not be repaired with spare parts which are difficult 
to  obtain. And unlike fertilizers which are  imported, expensive, demand  certain  crop 
16 At this point we should however equally  remember  what  Drinkwater (1992) said  about 
critical  hermeneutics. My interpreter and myself have  certainly been spotted as suitable 
mediators of their  discontent with certain  aspects of the  project, which has made them 
outspoken  about  certain  elements of the  project. 
. ,.,. 
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varieties, may damage the environment etc., diguettes in a pleasant way merge local and 
imported  knowledge. 
In that sense it is furthermore an apparently unpolitical solution to the development 
problem. Anybody willing to construct diguettes can  in principle do so, it is done  during 
the dry season where underemployment is a fact (especially among the men).  It  thus 
reinforces the belief, very common among development workers, nationals and foreigners 
alike, that it is possible to separate development and politics. And in constructing 
diguettes, you apparently do not have to  address  issues of local power and politics. 
The construction of diguettes is seen as  creating growth. Increasing yields in Sahelian 
agriculture is an objective which is very rarely questioned, and diguettes seem to 
constitute a local and technical solution. However, it is questionable whether farmers find 
it worth the toil to engage in diguene construction when it is easier to extend  cultivated 
areas. An obsession with maximizing growth and productivity often conflicts with 
farmers’  emphasis on security. 
Donors furthermore see the construction of diguettes as participatory. By mobilizing 
people at village level only providing the truck for the transportation and introducing the 
very simple technology of diguette constructing,  the activity lives up to a number of 
ideals often stressed as important: it deals with a target group which is difficult to reach 
without providing very costly solutions to  local problems. 
Diguenes are visible. Training programmes, credits etc. leave the development worker 
with the unpleasant and not unrealistic feeling that three years of toil in a dusty town of 
Northern Burkina  might not have  made a great impact. With diguettes his project  has a 
perfect  example of an impact which can be shown to evaluation missions and others 
looking  for  justifications to prolong the  project. 
And why  do  farmers  want  to establish contacts with development projects? 
. The adherence to the construction of diguettes creates dependency vis-&vis the project. 
Unless a project is clearly detrimental, one might argue that a farmer has little  interest in 
providing a critique of it. It seems to me to be important to pay sufficient attention to the 
fact  that there is a strong urge among farmers to adhere to ‘assistencialism’ (Olivier de 
Sardan, 1995: 136), as this is their only linkage to external agencies and ‘development’. 
By assistencialism I mean a desire on the part of the villagers to ensure that the project 
intervention is prolonged as much as possible. In Burkina Faso it is my firm conviction 
that  being dependent on somebody (especially somebody rich) is clearly preferable  to 
being independent. When somebody notices that “you have to live up to your responsibil- 
ities as chief’,  it not only means that you have to give precise orders, it also means  that 
you have to take care of a lot of problems of your subordinates (Fiske 1992). Independ- 
ence, on the other  hand, resembles expulsion. 
. Farmers seek to avoid self-reliance. Self reliance is an important notion within 
development discourse, but  it is clearly a strictly normative and ideological term.  Trying 
to benefit as much as possible from a development project seems a natural  way to position 
oneself vis-&vis donors. Being self-reliant within a village  logic means being left  alone. 
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“Taking their future in their own  hands”, a common term within NGO-rhetoric, remains 
a very unattractive option for the villager. 
. Farmers stress security. Adventuring into new agricultural techniques and technologies 
can be a matter of whether you  and your family are going to eat  or not next  year. A 
technique thus has to show not only that it increases production.  It has to  show  that  the 
extra labour put into e.g. the  production of diguettes is not better invested elsewhere. And 
it  has  to show that it does not render the production system more vulnerable  towards 
climatic irregularities and other calamities. 
. Farmers  dread sustainability. In his interesting book about diguettes in the  Yatenga 
province, “Behind the lines of Stone”, Atampugre (1993, op.cit) describes how the 
OXFAM-funded Projet Agro-Forestier introduced diguettes. In a final discussion of the 
successes and shortcomings of the project, Atampugre is especially worried about the lack 
of overall environmental importance of the project, he sees no foundation laid for change, 
he is concerned about ensuring sustainability (ibid. 134).  .A  farmer  comforts  him: “It is 
like when you teach a child to walk. You stretch out your hand to enable it to take  its first 
steps. If you leave  it  at  this moment, it will fall back to its  sitting  position. You have  to 
guide it a  bit before you leave it. We are the children of PAF. PAF is teaching us to walk, 
but we  cannot yet walk on OUT own. It will come but we don’t  know  when (ibid,  p.135). 
What worries Atampugre though is that he cannot see when this will be. When will the 
farmers be independent? It seems to me he fails to recognize that self-reliance, 
sustainability and independence were never the objectives of the farmers,  and what the 
farmer tries to  do with  his  child/parent metaphor is trying to assure the continuity of their 
patron/client relationship. 
Donors  and beneficiaries alike, however, share the objective of promoting development. For 
certain farmers, especially the  younger, diguettes might be  visible  signs  that the village  adheres 
to development.  By adhering to this type of discourse, the villagers show their  willingness to 
work on the donors’ terms. As noted elsewhere, it is not uncommon for rural inhabitants in their 
interaction with development workers to confirm outsiders’ preconceived ideas, given the  power 
relations in such interfaces (Leach & Mearns 1996: 28) Following this  line of thought, it seems 
relevant to see the adoption of diguettes in connection with intra village  conflicts  between  older 
generations  and younger, or between different clans fighting for  power within the village. 
Donors equally  strive  for development. But this is for very different  reasons, which are often 
rather vaguely enunciated, and pursued in a quite ambiguous manner. But  for  donors, 
development  remains a very normative version of a special conflict-rinsed modernity,  which 
seems to  be hard for the fanners  to equate with the realities they are facing. 
4.10 Concluding  remarks  about diguette construction 
It has not been the intention of this section to reject the relevance of soil- and water conservation 
in Burkina Faso, neither to refute any  effectiveness of these as they are practised. The aim of the 
diguette case has been to question the positivist basis onto which the diguettes have been 
advocated, by moving  the  emphasis to an analysis stressing the  complexity of donor/recipient 
relations of power. First of all this implies a constant and critical reconsideration of the 
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normative notions on which  development  orthodoxies  are built. In this light, self-reliance means 
being  left marginalized, and sustainability means you, literally,  get  stones  for  bread. On the 
other hand, dependency becomes an opportunity  which needs to be nurtured through careful lip- 
service  to  development projects, where knowledge of development discourse is an  important 
element. 
Secondly,  when implementing and evaluating projects like  the DANIDA-projects in Boulgou 
and Seno, one probably has to be much more aware of not taking the statements of the 
respondents, farmers and  aid  workers alike, too much at face value. Rather, one  ought  to adapt 
a verstehende approach by which I mean that one should try to understand whether  one would 
have done  the  same thing in hisher situation, in  addition to analysing what kind of interests are 
at stake. The interviewer is always a potential  partner, able to help the farmer  out of hisher very 
marginalized  position. 
This is,  howeve,r not what the DANIDA-project in Dori intends to do, although farmers, when 
questioned  more thoroughly, were so critical to the continued construction of diguettes. In a 
recent evaluation (PNUD 1996), the evaluation team admits that the overall ecological  impact 
of the project is negligible. Their solution to this is however not to change course but  to  increase 
the  construction of diguettes five- to tenfold (PNUD 1996:2). The “fatigue” that many of the 
people  attached  to  the project in the villages mentioned is cured by enlarging  the  scope of the 
project activities. The absence of measurable development is cured by adding more development 
activities. 
4.11 Theoretical  consequences 
This  chapter has tried to show that development intervention does not enter an institutional  or 
political void, but a very  lively  and complex sphere of power and struggle over scarce  resources. 
This dissertation initially suggested that the development project be seen as an arena of conflict 
and positioning over economic, political  and symbolic resources. “Participation” in development 
activities may, in this perspective, be  interpreted  not  only as compliance with project objectives, 
but also as strategic positionings to create linkages to external agents. Seen from this perspective, 
diguettes are to  be seen as an element in the ongoing positionings and negotiation between the 
development project and the villagers. 
It was, likewise, proposed that development discourse and narratives become influential in 
development policy-generating within natural resource management, actualized in specific 
programmes,  projects and methodologies of data collection and analysis (Hoben 1996,  1998, 
Mearns & Leach 1996, Roe 1998, Speirs & Marcussen 1998).  The construction of diguettes 
constitutes  exactly such an example. 
Furthermore, it was  mentioned  that  certain theorists have questioned the notion of development, 
by analysing donor/recipient relations not merely as ‘partnerships’ or ‘patron-client-relation- 
ships’, but rather as a field within which symbolic frontiers are demarcated through the 
enunciation of narratives of development (Ferguson 1990, Laurent 1996). Diguettes may 
constitute  such a symbol of people’s perception of ‘development’, which one can adhere  to by 
constructing  them. 
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These theoretical entries seem to provide important elements for a more thorough understanding 
of diguette construction in Burkina Faso in particular, and to  the analysis of development 
intervention in  general.  The problems in interpreting respondents’ answers, in a context where 
many different agendas as to the usefulness of enhanced ‘partnership’ between external and 
village actors, prevail. It is  my argument that the construction of diguetfes is better understood 
in the context of an analysis of the difference between donor and recipient rationalities and 
objectives than merely as an agricultural technique  to improve productivity and sustainability. 
I have attempted to highlight that these rationalities are at times conflicting, and tied  to different 
discourses of development. The encounter of such different rationalities, the negotiations, 
unpackaging and  differences  in the logics of donors and beneficiaries, which are very common 
within  rural development projects, constitute a complex social phenomenon which has not been 
given enough attention in the case of development intervention within natural resource 
management in Burkina  Faso, and calls for a reassessments of the possibilities of building 
partnerships on the basis of activities like the diguettes. 
But this discussion of development assistance through the interpretation of diguette construction 
has further theoretical dimensions to it.  It is a part of a reflection where “research has moved 
largely away from the measurement of biophysical processes as a guide to degradation, and 
instead has increasingly undertaken the accessing of local adaptations to change and social 
movements. This reflects a more general transition in most social  sciences from positivism - or 
the “scientific method”: the inference of laws by testing hypotheses and theories - to a more post- 
modern or qualitative analysis which stresses the uniqueness of environmental perception and 
response”. (Forsyth, 1998:lOS). 
With these theoretical entry points we leave rural Burkina Faso, and take a last round of 
theoretical discussions before we attempt to say anything decisive about the impact of 
development aid. 
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Chapter 5. Going  through  the  notions 
5.1 Introduction 
In the initial theoretical Chapter 1 we ended on a somehow incomplete chord.  Departing  from a 
Giddensian interest in understanding relationships between structure and agency, avoiding on the 
one hand the determinism of structuralism and functionalism and on the other hand avoiding 
voluntarist explanations, I tried to end on what Gould calls a “constructivist” view, merging 
structure and  agency and at the same time stressing notions like knowledgeability and power. In 
these attempts, Long  and Olivier de Sardan were especially useful in providing entry points to 
the analysis of the social conflicts over aid, observing the different logics, systems of knowledge 
and specific  rationalities  at play among the different social actors involved in the development 
business. This involved,  among other things, an analysis of a number of central notions onto 
which these social processes are built: notions like development, sustainability, and participation 
immediately come to ones mind. The different interpretations of these notions among the 
different actors are of central importance to the understanding of what goes wrong in 
development work.  Each social actor has hisher own “project” within the project, which they 
pursue through appeals  to reason, science, tradition, democracy, through  coercion, persuasion, 
evasion or struggle (Blaikie, 1995). 
As I mentioned in Chapter One, it was, however, primarily at the methodological level that  this 
“actor-oriented approach” served as an adequate analytical instrument. The tracing of different 
farmers’ logics, selection, deviation and accaparement has proved an effective instrument in the 
analysis of the donor-recipient interface. At  he theoretical level, its commonsensical 
compromises  merging  the actor/structure dualism, its unwillingness to  accept  the implications 
of methodological individualism and its somehow unfinished treatment of relations of power  and 
knowledge and its implications  for how this influenced the way politics were constructed and 
pursued, required further elaboration and epistemological anchoring. It was, therefore, necessary 
to  substantiate the argument with theoretical reflections upon how development discourse and 
narratives became instrumental in defining the agenda of the development projects and 
programmes  under  scrutiny. As I have tried to show, development programmes are based on 
narratives of causalities which appear flawed or at least grossly simplified,  and this again is 
turned into policies that  are based on notions, which are based on Western ideas of what would 
be desirable, rather than upon an analysis of conditions in the field. This has serious implications 
for  the perception of different actors’ knowledge about what is going  on in the development 
process. 
At this point, towards  the end of the dissertation, it therefore seems  necessary  to review our 
venture to Burkina Faso through theoretical glasses. In the chapters above it is my hope that I 
have shown why things keep  going wrong. The difficult point now is that I would like to avoid 
the “tool-perfecting’’ error, which reassures us that now that we have  leamed  from our mistakes, 
we can prescribe more development in order to cure the illnesses within the development 
processes. A consequence of  an untheoretical approach is that we may end  up becoming “tool 
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perfecting”  like the people that I have been criticising, in the sense that we become  unable  to 
provide a critique of the development efforts that  is  thorough enough. In this case, the risk is that 
we content ourselves with concluding that “we must be better  at doing the job”, assuring that next 
time it’s going  to be “real participation”; curing the lack of effect of development  projects by 
prescribing more development  as  the medicine etc. 
A second  problem  with an untheoretical approach is that we do not get beyond positivist  and 
reductionist interpretations of man’s interaction with the environment, leading  to  an  insufficient 
understanding of the shortcomings and success stories of natural resource management  ventures 
in Burkina Faso. We remain unable to answer to any reasonable degree what was the impact of 
the development activity. In the preceding chapters, I have  tried to argue that a more  precise  and 
concrete  answer  to  this question does not make much sense. In this  sense  Rondinelli is right: 
projects are  fundamentally unpredictable, and a question of causality when analyzing  social 
change  emerges very quickly. 
When  looking  at natural resource management and rural development in Burkina  Faso  it  is 
tempting  to question as Blaikie (1995) does, the “truth” of scientific interpretations of what is 
seen as a “crisis”,  and  perhaps see these as contestable discourses about development and the 
environment, discourses that are very often formed as narratives with beginnings ends, and 
morals, reflecting an ethnocentric and teleological starting point. As he eloquently puts it in the 
title of his paper, are we talking of changing environments or changing views of them?  (Blaikie, 
1995). 
This questioning of scientific methods is, of course, not unproblematic. The  claim,  for  instance, 
that diguettes are ineffective is even more difficult to prove  than proving that they were  effective 
in the first place. The  moment  we start seriously questioning the representations of reality by 
what is known as “science”, we open up for a dangerous  relativism where any theory  or belief is 
as good as the other, we reject any kind of accumulation of knowledge as possible, and  we  reject 
the idea that we know more now  than we used  to. Scientific methodologies have after all, as Peet 
notes (1999)  contributed by insisting on evidence, contrary to  mere beliefs. On the other hand, 
it might be noted with Latour  (1999),  that many scientific methods deliberately are temptations 
to produce order  and  patterns,  “The  most incomprehensible thing in the world would  be  for  the 
pattern to remain incomprehensible after such rearrangements”, as he notes, following the work 
of pedologists. We all, in one way or another, try to avoid what Huxley has called “The great 
tragedy of science - the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by  an ugly fact”. 
The diguettes constitute a beautiful example of how “order” can be produced, and the 
effectiveness of development aid can be proven. Have we  not increased yields? Careful mention 
as to what fields were treated with dikes, and whether these fields were at the same  time  the  ones 
that received the highest labour  inputs to the detriment of other fields is, however, important  to 
question. One may ask what kind of fields were not treated? Maybe the ones that were not very 
productive already? Did the treated fields, however,  not receive an extra weeding by the  farmers 
to honour the donors? Or an extra amount of manure? As Latour notes, the way we  measure  the 
effectiveness of diguettes, and thereby of development as such, constitutes a specific 
transformation of soil (or  stones)  into words, thereby leading us to a transformed constructed 
world of scientific data. 
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And  we should not forget  that with diguetfes we have a rather “easy” example of an ex posr 
impact. As long  as we stick  to assessing the increase in  field yields, we are within measureable 
spheres. But how do we proceed from here and state with  any clarity that this  construction  of 
diguettes has led to an “improvement of the living conditions among the rural poor”? To the best 
of my knowledge, these questions remain impossible to answer. 
5.2. A discursive look at “cross  cutting  issues” 
Having tried in the analysis of development intervention to see how to merge  poststructuralist 
views with actor-orientation, let’s try to look at some of the notions, that I have been criticising 
as being central to the misunderstandings of the deficiencies of development aid in Burkina Faso. 
In the following I shall elaborate upon  three of these, Sustainability, participation and dependency 
(and its antonym self reliance). The reason I treat these three is that they have  special relevance 
to  the analytical framework I have tried to establish, as they are cornerstones in the normative 
point of departure for Westerns donors’ views of and aspirations for development. Furthermore, 
they are interrelated, i.e. there  can be no sustainability without participation, no independence 
without  sustainability  and  no participation without etc. As noted in Chapter 2, these  are  the 
cornerstones of development in the nineties, whereas I argue that earlier developmental problems 
were ascribed to geophysical and geopolitical features, a point which is nowadays downplayed 
to  an astonishing degree.. 
5.2.1 Sustainability 
A central,  current concern of development assistance as a whole, is the  sustainability of the 
development  projects.  The meanings of sustainability and sustainable development as “cross 
cutting issues’’ are, as Peer and  Watts note, “hotly contested, but the new lexicon is so endemic 
it  appears with as much frequency in the frothy promotional literature of the  World Bank as in 
the rhetoric of the Sierra Club, the US military or the myriads of Third World grassroots 
environmental  and  community movements”(Peet & Watts, 1996, p.1). 
Wolfgang Sachs (1999), in his polemic denigration of the discourse on sustainability, traces the 
proliferation of the notion’s status as a worldwide panacea back to 1987. From  this  moment 
sustainable development was launched in the Brundtland Report as the way to  square  the circle: 
bridging the gap between the two grand world-political opposites, ecological sustainability and 
international  justice,  sustainability being a word every interest group, nation  or  alliance  could 
reach  some sort of agreement about. Along with democracy, education and participation (and 
certain  contenders  and  upcomers), sustainability is on every page within development  projects 
and  programme reports. All activities should be sustainable in  one way or another. And any 
activity can be criticised  for not being  it. 
On a world political level, sustainability meets the Northern donors’ pledge to right of nature and 
its resources,  and  the  South’s pledge to global equality, according to Sachs. It is, however, a 
concept that is designed  to  maximize consensus rather than clarity. Sustainable  development is 
“development  that meets the need of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs”  (Brundtland Report, quoted in Sachs, 1999). It thus  merges 
an interest in economic growth and capitalist expansion with preservation of the pandas. It 
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proposes a way to merge the North’s interest in its continued right to pillage resources worldwide, 
and the  South’s pledge for global social equity. 
In the  Burkinan project documents it is not more precisely defined what is meant in concrete 
terms by the notion, it seems implicitly assumed that the reader is aware what is meant. 
“Diveloppement  local  durable” is to take  the  forme of “un appui souple d l’uutopromotion” 
(Danida, 1997) This vague statement, which is rather tautological, does not give us much idea of 
what is meant by the concept, but sustainability apparently has to do with  attempts  to  transfer 
decision making from the project to the beneficiaries. The World Bank has an even more 
tautological definition of sustainable development: “Sustainable development is development that 
lasts” (Quoted in Sachs, 1999, p. 81). It seems, however, that sustainability in the eyes of Danida 
includes following elements: 
. an ecological  sustainability, stressing that natural resource management 
activities supported by projects should enhance natural resource 
management practices that are not causing a degradation of the environ- 
ment, and which help to reestablish an ecological  equilibrium; 
. 
. 
an institutional sustainability, stressing that  support should be  backed by 
a capacity-building component, assuring that institutions are created which 
enable the continuation of project activities beyond a project intervention 
phase; 
afinanciul sustainability, aiming at scaling activities to a level where they 
do not become economically prohibitive the moment they are not 
supported heavily by external sources. 
This report is not the place for a more thorough discussion of the genealogy of this  omnipresent 
status of sustainability as a central cross-cutting issue within development  practice  and  studies. 
The  concept has been severely criticized by writers with very different objectives  and 
backgrounds (see e.g. Escobar 1995, 1996; Mearns and Leach 1996).  Most  often, it is accepted 
as a general objective which all development activities strive for, an attempt to design 
environmentally sustainable development interventions, assuring that the  development activity 
does not undermine or overexploit the natural resources that the  development is based upon; 
institutionally sustainable, assuring the creation of the necessary local capacity to run activities 
after an externally-supported phase; and economically sustainable, so that it does not fall  apart 
the day after the project has left leaving local institutions with prohibitive  running costs. 
As mentioned above, environmental sustainability is a problematic  concept, as this is to be seen 
within a narrative purporting that a sort of equilibrium has been distorted, which should  be 
restored, a “paradise lost” narrative as  it has been called (Hoben 1998; Marcussen,  1999).  It 
eventually tends to lead to policies operating with notions like “carrying capacities”, which are 
extremely difficult to operationalise in accordance with the aspirations of rural populations.  This 
narrative is, however, extremely strong and is an underlying principle in virtually all environment 
programmes and projects in Burkina  Faso.  Even though “carrying capacities” are constantly 
surpassed and people still survive, this  narrative  lives on despite all empirical attempts  to  refute 
it. 
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The environmental sustainability concept also  opens  up  another interesting avenue. Sachs  (1999) 
notes that the shift  from the sustainability of nature (which meant that a degree of conservation 
became  necessary)  to the sustainability of development meant a theoretical shift.  Looking  at 
nature as a resource, it became something which could be value-assessed, where quotas of 
carbondioxide,  biodiversity and whatever could be exchanged. As Sachs rightly notices,  this 
might, however, lead to “a lesson more in the sustainability of money than of the environment.” 
Following the Rio conference in 92, environmental  sustainability has become a central  objective 
for virtually every rural development project in  Sub-Saharan  Africa. In the Burkina Faso case we 
see a rather  simplistic approach to  this problem, where environmental sustainability is equated 
with  the  protection of the forest,  the planting of trees and the production of diguettes. It has so 
far not been  possible to measure any impact of this activity (PNUD 1996), partly because it is 
unclear what the indicators  for an improvement in the environment consist of. 
A related  problem which we have already touched upon is that of institutional and economic 
sustainability in Burkina Faso. This ends up being synonymous with economically  balanced 
accounts where expenses and incomes are equal. Sustainability becomes “able  to fun according 
to  market  forces”.  Market forces are, however, a relative notion if anything. To run public 
institutions according to market forces, as structural adjustment programmes attemt in the name 
of institutional  and  economic sustainability, is however unrealistic. This is not the way public 
institutions are run anywhere else in the world. This demand for sustainability completely ignores 
the political implications involved in  downscaling  and expanding service institutions, a surprising 
fact given the  severe political struggles such social processes trigger off in European  countries. 
Sustainability thus becomes the ultimate “tool-perfecting”  notion, able to recast whatever political 
problem as a technical one. 
What we can see is that the  donor’s quest for  sustainability in many  ways seriously conflicts with 
the interests of the different actors involved. In the name of sustainability, subsidies on 
agricultural inputs, credits and animal health have been  reduced. In the name of sustainability, the 
villagers  now  have to mobilize substantial contributions when logistical support  in the villages 
is provided. Altogether features that in  the eyes of those involved resemble budget cuts,  and 
which do not point towards longer-term commitment on the part of either donors or beneficiaries. 
This is linked to the logics of “ussistencialism” as mentioned  in Chapter  Two, there is no  reason 
why  the  beneficiary groups should try to send home the hand that  feeds them because of some 
moral conviction that long-term “sustainability” is important, especially if the development 
activity has been introduced from the outside and  will have problems going on without continued 
support  as promised. 
A differing conception of sustainability among the “target groups” is, however, very central  to 
the understanding of the villagers’ strategies vis-&vis external agents like development projects. 
Sustainability among the farmers  means stressing security against crop  failures  and  guarantees 
for long-term commitments from providers and buyers of input and produce. This  means  that if 
a project wants to introduce “improved” agricultural techniques, it has to guarantee a long-term 
commitment, not all of a sudden pulling out because of second thoughts as to the sustainability 
of the new crop, new technique or whatever - technologies, that farmers have often been 
persuaded to invest considerable resources in. External agents have failed considerably in this 
respect. 
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It is exactly this conflicting understanding of the meaning of sustainability which is at the  heart 
Of the problems between donors and beneficiaries. The projects, whose understanding of 
sustainability is that anything which cannot run according to free market forces is unsustainable, 
demands that the villagers understand that subsidies and handouts will not  be  able  to go on,  The 
farmers, on the other hand, see this as yet another abandonment by the  external  agents, a further 
sign of lack of long-term commitment. This leads to frustration as the premises upon which the 
activities were started change drastically, necessary inputs become prohibitively expensive  and 
eventually the activity is abandoned. 
The problem is more serious when  cash crops are involved where huge  increases in input  prices 
are often introduced in the name of sustainability, and farmers are left with seriously diminished 
incomes,  but with no immediate alternative but to gradually shift back to  food  crop  production 
(See Kaare &Nielsen 1999). 
Post-modernist critiques of grand development theories as meta-narratives have  attributed the 
failure of development theory to a modernity discourse with untenable  metaphysical  starting 
points (Schuurman 1993). Much of this critique has been helpful in  the sense that  the  focus has 
been redirected to less normative notions, analysing the  dynamics of social  processes in e.g. 
Africa from an interest in uncovering the dynamics rather  than  the deficiencies of societies (Berry 
1993,  Bayart  1989).  The  interest in sustainability is a serious drawback in this  respect, in the 
sense that it is a completely metaphysical, normative and nebulous concept without any 
theoretical foundation.  The notion of sustainability is, therefore, often best dropped entirely,  as 
it is a source of confusion rather than clarification when a concise  statement of development 
objectives is to be made. Another less radical solution is to narrow the definition down  to  mean 
something specific in the given context, so that the concept is not interpreted differently by the 
actors involved. As things are now, it is clearly a notion embedded in normative Western 
assumptions, dangerously detached from the realities of rural Burkina Faso, making us address 
the wrong issues and raising the wrong questions. 
5.2.2 Participation 
No other word within development discourse has achieved such popularity as  participation. 
Hardly  anybody within the entire development apparatus is against participation: World  Bank 
bosses, NGOs, government officials, everybody adheres to the principle of popular participation. 
Mitchener (1998) attempts to round  up the debate on participation, exemplifying with cases from 
Burkina Faso in a recent edition of the acclaimed “World Development”. She constructs a 
typology of different forms of participation differentiating between “planner-centered” and 
“people-centered”. The planner-centered participation focuses on administrative  and  financial 
efficiency,  its goal being “to provide the masses with a broader understanding of the national 
development effort” (Vengroff, cited in Mitchener 1998). People-centered participation, on the 
other hand, holds that participation is both a means  and  an  end in itself, a means  to  redistribute 
scarce resources meeting “felt” needs, but equally a process which “empowers the  poor by 
enhancing local management capacity, increasing confidence in indigenous potential and  raising 
collective consciousness” (Mitchener, 1998: 2106). She  furthermore  suggests  that  participation 
can be subdivided according to other typologies as well: “Genuine participation” based on 
empowerment and cooperation aiming at citizen control, delegated power and partnership and on 
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the  other hand “pseudo-participation”, based on assistencialism and domestication  leading to 
placation, consultation, informing and manipulation. 
According to another classification system, Mitchener quotes  White  describing  four types of 
participation: nominal, instrumental, representative and transformative. White stresses that 
stakeholders do  not share the same expectations of participation. Planners have top-down interests 
whereas beneficiaries have bottom-up interests. At  the nominal, instrumental and  representative 
levels the different stakeholders employ concurrently conflicting definitions of participation. Only 
at the transformative level are both groups interested in the empowerment of the  beneficiaries. 
Finally, Mitchener mentions Cohen and Uphoff, who have a more applied focus.  They  do not 
only define types  of participation, but also who participates and how. The types of participation 
refer to the different project cycles: participation  in decision-making, implementation, in benefits 
and evaluation. The definition of who participated is based on different groups of actors: local 
residents, local leaders, government personnel and foreigners. Finally the how-question is based 
on the form, extent and effect of participation when it takes place. 
It is on the basis of these typologies that Mitchener ventures  to  the field in Burkina  Faso to look 
at the level of participation among different stakeholders within a community school project. She 
finds out, however, that problems at field level indicate theoretical weaknesses in the  concept of 
participation. She particularly notes that among project staff, participation refers to  the 
responsibilities of the beneficiaries in making the project successful. Participation is a duty, a 
“local contribution”, you do not get something for nothing. She furthermore highlights the 
difficulties of drawing a line between the “felt” needs of a community and  needs  defined by 
outsiders, an issue that challenges the participation rhetoric seriously. She indicates that 
beneficiaries do not act on the basis of ideological rhetoric, but on the basis of past  experiences, 
including an impression of participation as meaning physical and financial payment for 
development assistance. 
She therefore concludes that notions of power should be taken more seriously into  account. 
Project personnel see participation as beneficiary contributions, and are not ready to relinquish 
control to beneficiaries, as they seek to avoid “working themselves out of their jobs”. 
Beneficiaries, on the other hand, see participation not as a means to obtain “self-reliance, 
empowerment, but as an opportunity to extract resources from  willing agencies.” (Mitchener, 
1998) We are thus often still far  from “genuine people-centered participation”, as  the  level of 
participation invested by the different stakeholders is determined by how each group gains 
maximum benefit given the power struggles going on. 
5.2.2.1 Discussion 
Mitchener has a lot of important observations from the field, which do indeed challenge  the 
existing rhetoric of participation. She  does not, however, get to a more profound critique of the 
notion, partly because she refrains from a theoretical critique of the typologies that  she initially 
lines up. Her analysis therefore becomes a bit shallow despite  the  fuel  she  delivers  for a more 
thorough critique of the notion  of participation. My critique is focused on the  following  points: 
. She does not adapt a sufficiently critical hermeneutic approach to her data; 
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. She accepts the arbitrarily and normatively-defined categories that are the basis of the 
. Her stakeholder  groups are reductionistically defined social groups that are Seen as 
. her planner/people-centred participation typology is at least as simplistic as the other 
. Her critique of participation is somewhat disengaged from a more thorough critique of the 
typologies that she lines up in the beginning; 
bearers of certain preconceived interests; 
typologies  that  she  questions; 
notion of development  as it is practised. 
This  results in an overall conclusion which is  as  sad as it is true: “Development planners and 
academics are at a point where they must adjust participatory frameworks to  be  more  responsive 
to field-level realities (Mitchener, 1998: 2116). We have to improve in our work, “tool 
perfecting”  once  again,  next ime it is going to  be “real” participation. 
The typologies  that  Mitchener lists are based on the normative and ideological assumptions of 
their writers more than on anything else. Making a typology of “genuine participation” vs. 
“pseudo-participation”, the first question one should ask  is  who defines what is genuine and what 
is  pseudo?  The typology seems to stem from a belief that African society, somewhere beneath 
colonialism, modernity and development, has a communitarian core where people have common 
interests and act together as a community. This belief does not only exist among the donors, but 
is central in many Burkinan farmers’ associations’ views of themselves. An extremely rose- 
coloured picture of Burkinan “traditional” society can be found in the declarations of the 
Ouahigouya-based  Six-S organisations, based on  the thoughts of their founder, Mr. Bernard 
Lkdka OuCdraogo. This local N G 0  has an extremely romantic vision of “traditional” Burkinan 
society as based  on trust, mutual care, respect, cooperation, the absence of competition, helping 
each other out of problems etc. (Oukdraogo, 1990). This romantic  vision of the  past is shared with 
the majority of the cultures of the world, who  all lament how “sic  transit gloria mundi”, but do 
not specify in detail how this process of moral decay goes on as anything other  than reinterpreta- 
tions of a lost  past. In this  sense, participation fits well into a development discourse  where 
development issues are depoliticized and “target groups” are made into homogenous categories 
ready for  social  engineering.  The communitarian past, like the ecological equilibrium, must be 
revived through participatory sustainable development. 
“Genuine” participation is part of the same discourse  as  the  idea  that  there is a dichotomy to  be 
made between a felt need and an externally-defined need,  that a dichotomy exists between donor- 
driven  and  demand-driven  development aid. As Mitchener rightly notes, these distinctions  are 
difficult to work with as “When asked what they need they will feed back what they have been 
taught  to  need”(Dichter, 1989 in Mitchener  1998). Not only that, they will also have acquired 
knowledge  about what is realistic to  obtain,  and might, as I tried to show in Chapter 4, even 
venture into activities that they consider are in vain in the hope that this might open up  for  other 
activities.  Pseudo-participation based on assistencialism therefore seems every bit as genuine, 
quite a bit  more  understandable  and probably also a better option for beneficiary groups,  as 
Olivier de Sardan told us in Chapter 2. Performing strange rituals like planting trees, creating 
groups, and  participating in projects resembles Melanesian Cargo cults (Laurent 1996,  Laurent 
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&Mathim, 1994, Langley 1983), but as  one author has noted, contrary to the Melanesian cargo 
cults, they work!  (Christoplos,  1994).” 
The second typology  Mitchener  mentions is equally problematic. The range from  nominal to 
transformative participation with all its levels of interests is, upon closer scrutiny, also 
reductionist in its a priori taking  for granted of certain stakeholders’ interests. In stating  that 
planners  should  have an interest in a “top-down”-approach and beneficiaries in a “bottom-up’’ 
approach, one has already revealed a heavy ideological bias. I assume that in the implicit 
topography of power  incumbent in the  top-downhottom-up dichotomy, beneficiary groups are 
to be placed at the bottom, and project staff and donors at the top. With my experience from  the 
field I would say that  things are rather the  other way around. Beneficiary groups search  for 
clientelist relations with donors, based  on acquired dependency in  order to maintain support from 
the outside (top-down). The donors, on the contrary, attempt go “bottom up”, in order to be able 
to  leave  the terrain as soon as possible in the name of sustainability, often having far too much 
faith in local institutions created or heavily reinforced with the objective of providing the 
framework  for  the project intervention. 
Another thing is that a disaggregation of “beneficiary groups” and “planners” would have been 
a good idea, as these appear much more homogenous than they have been found in the  Burkina 
Faso context. 
Finally, Cohen and Uphoff‘s definition is completely untheoretical and takes the form of a sort 
of checklist which, to  the best of  my knowledge, does not reveal much about the appreciation of 
the development activity among different stakeholder groups. In their attempts to point out  who 
participates and how, they might as well have exchanged the word participation with “hat”: they 
have a completely instrumental and undynamic interpretation of the concept as if it were any old 
technical  device you could  add to your project package. 
Mitchener  states that these typologies are insufficient and that her findings in Burkina  Faso 
challenge these analytical entries. However her own typology, planner-centered vs. people- 
centered participation does not clarify matters. Again, she is attributes special interests and 
behaviours to these two categories of actor, not  on the basis of any empirical verification, but  on 
the basis of normative, preconceived notions. 
In all of the different typologies, participation is viewed as a distinct, project-related 
phenomenon, an instrument applicable in order to improve project  performance. The development 
project is seen as a distinct,  isolated social category with an easily definable set of actors - two 
groups, the implementors and the beneficiaries. On top of this simplification is another problem 
within the discourse of participation. “Lots” of participation means good administrative 
management, “getting  the institution right”, but this is a focus which ignores the more political 
aspects of the  development activity or project, which I have tried to argue are so important. 
If we return for a moment  to  the power typologies of Nelson & Wright, (1 995) as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, it is clear that the  discourse of popular participation is based almost entirely on the 
17 Christoplos  however  does  not  provide  any  convincing  evidence  as  to why the  Melanesian 
cargo  cults should not  work. 
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“power to - metaphor. AS they  mentioned there is a danger in ending up with rather voluntaristic 
conclusions,  which has proved to  be a valid concern, 
I would argue that  to speak of participatory projects versus non-participatory projects is in a sense 
missing  the  point. As the Dori experience tells us, people always participateas far  as possible 
in development  projects, they always try to get the most out of them  in ways as  they  were 
described in Chapter two, by adopting different strategic positionings. When they do not 
participate, it is on the basis of a rational judgement on the part of the “beneficiary” actor that 
hekhe will either not get anything out of it; he/she has been excluded by other “beneficiaries” that 
have been more skilful in making alliances  with the project; or hekhe knows that hekhe will have 
hisiher  head  chopped off  if involved in project activities, the project being  oblivious as to the 
political implications of the development activity. In that sense I am in line with Ferguson, when 
asked what should  be done - they are doing  it already. But it  is the analysis of how they are doing 
it that I have  found interesting, and  this demands an approach based on critical hermeneutics  and 
methodological individualism. 
5.2.3. Dependence 
Where most analysts are aware of the problems of operating with the very normative and  opague 
notions of participation and sustainability, people are less careful with dependence. The 
importance of establishing relations of self reliance, ridding people of the  dependence vis-2-vis 
especially donors is a central concern among not only the donors, as stated in the project 
documents of the Danida projects in Burkina Faso, but also among researchers. It was,  thus, not 
only Danida, that stressed the need to support  beneficiary groups so that they could be self-reliant 
(1997). Maclure lamented that new structures  of dependence were being created between  donors 
and target groups because of development intervention; Atampugre was concerned about whether 
the local NGOs taking over projects from the big international NGOs would ever be able to “stand 
on their own feet”, or would continue to be dependent upon their foreign partners. As shown  in 
Chapter 3 all  critics of aid except Piveteau were in one way or another concerned  that  with 
continued  dependence  on external support, the genuineness of the created  institutions  that are 
supposed to undertake the tasks of development is put into question. Dependence is equated with 
“dependent  upon external economic support”, which for some ideological reason is seen as 
unfortunate. Inspired by  the  actor-oriented sociologists and anthropologists (Crehan & von Oppen 
1988,  Olivier de Sardan 1988, 1995), this study has shown that  dependence is not looked upon 
in negative  terms by the beneficiary groups. The creation of linkages with external  sources of 
resources is a vital strategy, and these relations are nurtured in ways that merit serious  attention, 
instead of lamenting that “patron-client relationships” are established,  that will not be able to 
continue  after an externally funded phase. Lamenting the continuation of dependence-relations 
therefore  risks  missing the point. The social changes arising from  the pluralisation of  Burkina 
Faso  society  and the introduction of more players such as NGOs are creating an entire  industry 
of dependency-building, social processes involving brokerage and challenges to  state  hegemony, 
which are important research issues that deserve better than being condescendingly reduced  to 
being  forms of dependence. 
The idiosyncratic view of dependence is probably based on old Western ideologies of the 
blessings of being  the independent, individual citizen of the GeselZschufl, free to do  whatever he 
(rarely she) feels, sparked by zweckrationalitut and individualism. Without resorting to 
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essentialist explanations of African societies being the  opposite, i.e. based on  communality, 
reciprocity, Gemeinschu$jt etc., it seems fair to emphasize  that  dependence  in a Burkina  Faso 
context  stresses the second meaning of  the word as it is listed in  the  Oxford Dictionary, i.e. 
dependence not as “being supported by other, but equally as a relation of confident trust.” 
The condescending view upon dependence has been easy to couple with an ideology of 
independence, of freeing the  African continent of the  burden of exploitation and  colonialism etc. 
This has led to the strong ideological reservation against dependence despite the fact that 
establishing these relations  is a central concem to the rural Burkinan social actor. S h e  of course 
prefers  dependence  to  the least viable of options, namely independence which is the same  as 
being left alone, abandoned in the middle of nowhere. It is therefore necessary that development 
workers, researchers and others be much more careful when they promote “auto-promotion”, 
“taking the future in your own hands,” “help to self-help”, “self reliance”, “autonomous 
associations”, “genuine grass-roots”, all measures to prevent dependence. The beneficiaries may 
not  be interested. 
Burkinans  have been questioning me on the issue asking: “when you make a project, you bring 
in huge amounts of logistics, build houses, employ people, etc, so why do the  donors want to 
leave often even before  things  got  going?’ It is obvious that the people involved in the project see 
this as cutting off the branch  that  they are sitting on. But more than that, the culturally embedded 
logic of wanting all institutions to be able to self-reliant, to be able to continue independently and 
sustainably, is not always met with much comprehension. 
The ideological pretensions of dependencehndependence lead to development policies that may 
be rather ill conceived, and out of touch with contemporary realities. In this contemporary world, 
that  some call globalized, it is certain that whether we accept globalization or  not, nations like 
Burkina Faso have ever more dwindling possibilities of defining and implementing an 
“independent” national  development  policy. When Danida (1997) speaks of supporting  Burkina 
Faso in achieving “self-sufficiency” with given commodities, it is a question whether this is not 
once again an  example of ill-conceived ideas  of development policies. “Self-sufficiency” was 
never the objective for the donor countries. And self-sufficiency is no guarantee that poverty and 
starvation will be eradicated. It is unlikely that “self-sufficiency” within for  instance  millet 
productionwill address problems of famine and malnutrition, as these are not caused by national 
scarcities, but by social modes of distribution and households’ inability to  cope with times of 
crisis. 
Much of the concern about creating systems of dependence in  my view therefore  deserves a 
reassessment. The creation of relationships of dependence  does not seem  to  be  among  the more 
alarming consequences of aid, and  it is clearly  not a consequence which is unpopular  among  the 
beneficiaries. 
5.3. Summing up 
As I have attempted to  show, the efforts to construct sustainable, participatory poverty oriented 
development in order to enable Burkina Faso’s rural population to stand on their  own  feet  are 
facing severe problems. Their impact has been minimal, in fact we  do not even really know how 
to assess whether there has been one. 
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It is tempting  at  this point to state that in order  for  the  development  in Burkina Faso to  be 
sustainable, the notions of sustainability, participation and dependency/self reliance should  be 
abandoned. But  it  somehow  does not sound right. 
By focusing  on  these  issues we end up addressing  the  wrong questions, providing the wrong 
solutions. Instead I would recommend, as I have attempted to do, a careful deconstruction of 
these "cross-cutting" notions of which development discourse riddled with. This should be 
attempted  from  both a post-structuralist discourse-oriented point of view,  and  from  an actor- 
oriented approach, thereby exploring how the development discourse  shapes  the way interven- 
tions are conceived and imagined, and at the same time highlighting how different interpretations 
of these concepts  lead to conflict and confusion over their meaning. 
Although there are problems of incommensurability between these two different lines of thought, 
especially regarding the notions of agency and power, these problems are not insurmountable. The 
benefits,  however, are an avoidance of normative and teleological assumptions about 
development plus the possibility of discarding a positivist interpretation of impact without ending 
up in postmodern relativism where one type  of knowledge is as good as the other. The avoidance 
of using flawed notions like sustainability, participation and dependence could serve as a first step 
in this direction. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
A strangely revelatory photo. The donor inspects a transformation of reality he is able to 
interpret: The West African N G 0  (this case is from Senegal, but we saw the  same  behaviour 
among  Pag la Yiri and CRUS) has performed the demanded ritual and has produced a plan on 
how credits will be distributed and knowledge transfened. Targets are  set,  objectives  identified 
and  responsibilities delegated. Next year, the donor will be able to assess whether targets  have 
been met and anticipated activities have been executed. The development project seems  to  be on 
the right track, the N G 0  can expect funding to be continued, the donor can note that capacity has 
been built. 
Certain  dangers however seem  to be lurking. Cracks in the walls of the project building  are 
indicate that sustainability might be in peril.  Other  dangers are also present. How does  our  donor 
assess  whether his activity has had an impact, has made a difference outside the project  office 
with its well-paid staff? The Logical Framework schemes on the wall might not lead  to  the  same 
interpretation of the reality of the project as the one the beneficiaries have arrived at. And the staff 
will probably be reluctant to put forward criticism of their own  activities, fearing that  this  might 
lead to a discontinuation of their jobs. 
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The donor will have to go to the field to  measure  the impact. But as we saw, even an apparently 
straightforward and clearly visible thing as a diguette appeared extremely difficult to assess more 
precisely. How do we assess the impact of a programme like the Gestion de Terroirs in Burkina 
Faso? Has the project contributed to an improvement  in the living  conditions of the population, 
or to amore sustainable use of natural resources, as was the  stated objective? Armed with P M ,  
ECRIS-methodologies, Entitlement approaches, actor orientation, critical hermeneutics and 
verstehen, the researcher ventures to the villages to see whether the efforts have been worthwhile 
or  not. Soon, doubts  arise as to whether thk is the right way of looking  at things. Defining 
entitlements,  strategic  groups,  revealing  conflicts and interests, scrutinizing the derived effects 
of the presence of the  development apparatus, analysing the political contexts, emphasizing 
historicity; this is all  very  well but does it enable us to answer the question of what the impact has 
been? 
I think it is the only  way to get around the problem. We have to moderate  our expectations. We 
have to accept that a crude measurement of the impact is an impossible venture, sparked by  very 
simplistic positivist assumptions about the measurability of social change, and an exaggerated 
belief in the possibility of establishing social causalities.  Furthermore,  we have to accept that 
whether someting is in a state of crisis, be it institutional, environmental or managerial, depends 
on the eyes that  look at it more than anything else. 
Impact studies in European societies have for a long time been considered more or less unrealistic 
the way  they are now being promoted in  Africa. Who would dream of assessing what the impact 
has been of, for instance,  building a new hospital in Copenhagen? Ok, you might conclude that 
waiting lists  have been reduced, but these are not  the type of questions development donors ask. 
Has health improved? Has  the quality of life improved  among  the  beneficiaries?  Has  the impact 
been positive or negative? These questions have proved not only impossible to answer, but they 
are also an indication of the unrealistic assumptions underlying development thinking which 
make us ask the wrong questions, address the wrong issues, implement projects that fail to attract 
the  enthusiasm of the beneficiary groups. In Africa, however, they prevail. The donor is in his 
right to know whether he is getting his  money’s worth. I think he  has  to  lower his expectations, 
or perhaps look  for  different answers instead. 
Are  we, on the other hand, willing to accept a view purporting  that it is more or less impossible 
to  say anything about the  impact of the efforts we make, unrealistic to predict anything, and in 
a sense  even  fruitless  to say anything about a given social situation,  as knowledge is socially 
constructed, and  forms of local knowledge are ignored? I do not  think so, but  this  does imply a 
deconstruction of notions like development and planned intervention in order to understand what 
the social processes set  in motion actually mean  to the social actors involved. 
When assessing the impact of “capacity building”, “animation”, “institution building”, “training” 
, a first and very pragmatic approach could be  to go into the process itself and look at the way 
it is being carried out, to see whether it is in any way self-reflecting, whether there is any iterative 
dialogue with the beneficiaries, whether they have any influence on the way this type of 
programme is outlined, whether there is any participant assessment going on of the training. And 
especially  what processes of selection have taken place in  order  to  define who become the 
beneficiaries. Too much emphasis has been on the quantity, not the quality of the training, and 
as Maclure  mentioned,  and I also found in Dori, much of the animation is indeed of very  low 
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standard: irrelevant, condescending, paternalistic and pedantic. By focusing on the process, we 
are in a sense “tool-perfecting” again, but  this time it is in a manner, which shifts the emphasis 
away from  the positivist attempt to measure the ex  post impact, accepting that it is in the 
animation process itself that the benefits are to be seen, not in immediate changes in the 
behaviour of the target group, caused by the animation. This is not going to solve the problem of 
knowledge transfer, but it is an acceptance of the dynamism that Olivier de Sardan mentioned, 
the logics of selection within  the  project  “package” are taken seriously, and the dissemination of 
the package becomes part of the stated objective. 
When  looking at projects in Burkina Faso the view of development as discourse has been a 
useful instrument, narrowing down the ideological  and normative notions on which development 
is built, showing  that  these rest on certain narratives and teleological ideas of social evolution, 
which do not  correspond with realities in Burkina Faso. Analytical attention is, furthermore, 
turned to  the webs of power underlying the practices of the different actors in the development 
process. The way conflicts over meaning are fought out is crystallized in its most pure form 
within the  institution that epitomizes development intervention: the development project. The 
focus is, thus, first on what sets the agenda rather than on how to improve management as the 
project inserts itself into society. Secondly, it  is to disseminate the unpackaging and selection of 
the project elements by the different social actors, and to analyse the conflicts and social positions 
it entails. 
The agenda of development as it is conceived by the Danish Development Cooperation is, as I 
have attempted to show, built on a preconceived idea of crisis in Burkina Faso, a crisis because 
society has gone from a state of equilibrium to disequilibrium. In  an urge to establish 
sustainability  (a  notion which is never more precisely defined as anything but a tautology), 
activities are outlined, which  are in fact in sharp contrast to  the strategies that the populations of 
rural Burkina  Faso themselves pursue. Never have I heard of a development project helping 
people to get to Cote d’Ivoire in order to find meaningful work (I am not however stating that this 
would be desirable), or a project helping people to  get involved in gold panning. These popular 
survival strategies  are looked upon with condescenscion by donors,  who seem to think that “la 
fixation  des  jeunes” in the villages is a vital element in the success of their efforts to regain 
equilibrium, and the fact that the young do everything to flee away to what they see as solutions 
does not make any significant impression. 
It would, however, be a serious error to state that development projects have not had a 
tremendous  influence upon the socio-economy of Seno. In the  town of Dori, 3 cars out of a 
guesstimated approximately 100 are  not financed by development aid money. I mentioned earlier 
the roughly 400 jobs within  natural resource management in Seno. These people invest primarily 
in livestock, which is likely to have a larger impact on pastures in the region  than  all their Gestion 
de Terroirs attempts.  Roads  have  been  built, and recently electricity has  come  to  Dori. A very 
popular pastime is watching  Champions League football on Wednesdays via satellite in a huge 
hangar in the middle of town, a thing that attracts considerable crowds. People pay CFA  100  per 
match. For young people, these are things that make Dori look very much more interesting than 
village  life. On the  other  hand they may also contribute to making Dori more of an option 
compared to  the tough city life of Ouagadougou and Abidjan. 
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Development,  to  the  people of Seno, (and especially the young) perhaps rather constitutes a 
sphere you can flee to when escaping from the boredom and tightly woven webs of social control 
in the villages.  Development  means electricity, high paid jobs, per diems  and flashy 4X4s, and 
provides escape  from gerontocracy, witchcraft,  pounding millet and weeding the fields. No matter 
what the character of the development aid, whether it is participatory, top-down, bilateral, non- 
governmental, poverty-oriented or whatever. 
The attraction of development upsets social  order.  Nowadays  it s not impossible to see a ferroBe 
take a job as watchman  at a development worker’s house or at a project, a task he would never 
have lowered himself to do in the past.  Unintentionally, development institutions thereby become 
instigators of significant social transformation. New elites slowly emerge. The lack of resources 
of the state, the pluralisation of the institutional landscape to which aid is directed and the 
transformations within “traditional” power structures represent a political arena where the 
accuparement of development resources constitutes a major source of power  and  resources. The 
topography of this  landscape is, however, changing constantly, and the  social  actors may wear 
several hats, according to  the occasion.  Fixed categories as to what is state  and what is society, 
what is traditional  and  what is modern, what is local and what is external, are inadequate  and 
become  the roots of simplification. 
The mayor in Dori  lamented that the German project “did nothing to  help  Dori,  but only hired 
people from Burkina Faso”. This in a sense confirms Ferguson’s thesis, that development 
becomes an instrument of new forms of governance, not as a willed action by a state with 
powerful agency, but as a kind of knotting and congealing of power, in this case state power. This 
is no linear,  evolutionary process leading to a specific type of modernity. Bayart (1996)  makes 
an interesting distinction between what  he sees as  the  state construction i.e. a deliberate creation 
of an apparatus of political control; and a state formation (in French) a more conflictual, 
involuntary and largely unconscious process, conducted in a disorderly fashion of clashes  and 
compromises by more  or less anonymous actors. It is the latter case which is interesting in this 
case. Development constitutes an important element in th1sfomtation, with its ambiguous clashes 
of logics and differences in pace, at times supporting a disitatisation, sometimes  an itatisation, 
mobilizing  different  groups of social actors who all  have their goals to pursue. 
This brings us back to the problem of impact. Development is the most important societal 
influence in what is defining current Burkinan  modernity, development is becoming the dominant 
discourse  in  the  formation of a type of governmentality as Bayart (1989), inspired by Foucault, 
calls “la politique du ventre”, an unfortunate expression that, though sophisticatedly  outlined, 
invites  for  simplistic  and essentialist interpretations. The formation of this  governmentality is a 
bumpy  political  trajectory, where the diachronic construction of the meaning of development 
among  the many social actors is by no way linear or predictable. “What holds a society together 
is  the  cohesion of its world of meanings”, says Bayart (1989, p. 329, my translation), quoting 
Castoriadis. Clearly, development is the grand motor in this societal construction of meaning, but 
this  is definitely an extremely uneven and heterogenous process, where our methodological 
individualism has taught us to be cautious in outlining deterministic and teleological patterns of 
social  transformation. The interpretation of development and its accompanying notions  needs 
deconstruction and reinstallment within  the specific context where development is on  the agenda. 
142 
In an impact study of a Danida-financed NGO-project I carried out in collaboration with a 
Tanzanian colleague in Tanzania (Kaare & Nielsen 1999), our team leader asked us during a field 
visit towards the end of our study whether the impact of the project we were analysing had been 
“overall positive or overall negative.” After  looking  at  each other, hoping the other would answer, 
we had to admit that the question was impossible to answer. Today, if he asked me again I would 
probably have responded more harshly, that the question itself is a testimony of a too simplistic 
view of what we are  aiming at when we venture into doing development. It is not my intention 
to argue that, for instance, the Danida projects (or “agricultural sector programme  components” 
or whatever they prefer to  call them) in BurkinaFaso have been failures, neither is it my intention 
to  come forward with recommendations as to how to improve them. We have  to be careful not 
to  take political issues, remove them from the realm of political discourse, only to recast them in 
a neutral  language of development, suggesting new techniques of management. What I would, 
however, recommend is that the project donor and manager accept the political implications of 
the development activity, and then hold onto the horse he wants to support, accepting the forces 
he is up against. To simply ignore them like the  German  CTA, stating that “he will have nothing 
to  do with the mayor, because what he does  has  nothing to do  with development” is as far as I can 
see a lost battle. 
This step towards a development assistance that is willing to take part in political struggles is of 
course extremely problematic as well, especially as the donor will most likely be forced  to align 
with  the government, thereby often risking losing legitimacy vis-&-vis the target groups. To 
believe  however  that  social,  economic and technological change should be  able to take  place 
without some kind of political confrontation, as development thinking suggests, is, however, an 
even  more unrealistic agenda. 
Another way of reintroducing politics within the discussion of development is to  reintroduce 
global politics of trade and inequality. The collapse of the dependency paradigm in the seventies, 
the ascension to supremacy of the neo-liberal economistic ideology of the World Bank 
concretized in the structural adjustment policies of the eighties, and finally the venue of 
discourses of democracy, decentralization and sustainability  in the nineties, have  led  to a lack of 
focus,  in fact a virtual absence of mention of the obvious facts that a country  like Burkina Faso 
has become drastically marginalized within the last 20 years. Prices of the primary export 
commodity cotton have plummeted again  and  again  in the eighties, dropping  to a fourth in 1990 
of what they were in 1980. In the nineties, producer prices have been fairly stable, due to the 
devaluation of the CFA in 1994, which has,  however,  led to sharp increases in input prices ( EIU, 
OECD 1988). Gold  prices have likewise dropped in the course of the nineties  (Danida 1999~).  
These rather disastrous economic trends are  widely  overlooked  when  the “crisis” of Burkina Faso 
is discussed.  This is all the more surprising as the Burkinan rural producers have  proved  to  be 
quick  and keen to  respond  to  market incentives (OECD, 1988). A reverse in this trend would 
however involve a shift to old political agendas like “trade, not aid”, and would mean that 
benefits would have  to be subtracted  from European and American producer  and  consumer 
interests. An unpleasantly political agenda. 
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